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I. THE WEAPON OF CHOICE 
If the other fellow sells cheaper than you, it is called "dumping"! 
Course, if you sell cheaper than him, that's "mass production."1 
Tariffs no longer matter in international trade law. Between 
1947, when the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
entered into force, 2 and 1994, the eve of the entry into force of the 
Uruguay Round agreements,3 average tariffs in industrial countries 
plunged from 40% to 6.3%.4 As a result of the Uruguay Round, 
that average will fall to just 3.9% and the percentage of industrial 
products (by value) that receive duty-free treatment will rise from 
20% to 43%.5 Nontariff barriers are what matter in late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century international trade law, leaving pro-
tectionists with few remaining weapons to achieve their goals. 
In the 1980s the United States began to utilize antidumping law 
as its weapon of choice.6 Only eighty-four U.S. antidumping 
orders, applicable to exporters from twenty-three countries, were 
I. Will Rogers, quoted in JAMES BovARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAuD 107 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter BovARD]. 
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened far sif;nature, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. 
3. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, Hein's No. KAY 3778. 
4. POWELL, GoLDSTEIN, FRAZER & MURPHY, BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON GATT 
ANTIDUMPING IssuES, tab A, at 17 (June 1994) (on file with The George Washington journal of 
International Law and Economics). 
5. /d. For analyses of the economic effects of the Uruguay Round agreements, see 
U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: URuGuAY 
RouND FINAL ACT SHOULD PRODUCE OvERALL U.S. EcoNOMIC GAINS 2-5 (1994); OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, URUGUAY RouND: Joss FOR THE UNITED STATES. GRowrH 
FOR THE WORLD 6-15 (n.d.);JEFFREYj. ScHoTT, INSTITUTE FOR INT'L EcoNOMICS, THE URu-
GUAY ROUND: AN AsSESSMENT (1994). 
6. See Bryan T.Johnson, A Guide to Antidumping Laws: America's Unfair Trade Practice, 
BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Foundation), July 21, 1992, at 1, 4-5 (stating that "successive 
GATT rounds have eliminated many forms of direct trade protectionism [and] U.S. 
antidumping laws thus have proved to be a more convenient tool to limit competition by 
denying foreigners access to the U.S. market") (on file with The George Washington journal of 
International Law and Economics); Nancy Dunne, US Companies Use Protectionist Tactics, Says 
Budget Office, FIN. TIMEs, June 16, 1994, at 5 (noting biases in U.S. antidumping law against 
foreign exporters and U.S. consumers of foreign goods); Frances Williams, Dumping Com-
plaints Rising &zpidly, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1993, at 5 (discussing the "growing use of anti-
dumping rules to keep out unwanted imports"). 
4 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. [Vol. 29 
in effect in 1980.7 These orders affected just 131 categories of mer-
chandise in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), or 3.43% of 
U.S. imports.8 By 1990 there were 197 orders applicable to export-
ers from forty-two countries.9 These orders affected 219 categories 
of merchandise in the HTS, or 9.59% of U.S. imports. 10 In addi-
tion, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) found dumping in 
over 90% of all antidumping petitions filed during this period.U 
Between 1985 and 1992 the DOC terminated only 2% of all U.S. 
antidumping cases because of a lack of dumping. 12 Similarly, the 
U.S. International Trade Commission (lTC) found that injury 
existed in just under 60% of all cases. 13 
Antidumping law also became a potent weapon for protectionists 
in other countries in the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1990 the United 
States, Australia, Canada, and the European Union were responsi-
ble for bringing 95% of all antidumping cases worldwide.14 That 
figure dropped to 80% between 1985 and 1992,15 suggesting an 
increase in other countries' use of antidumping law as a weapon. 16 
Unsurprisingly, the Economist printed in 1988 that "[a]nti-dump-
ing suits are emerging as the chemical weapons of the world's trade 
wars." 17 
7. Keith B. Anderson, Antidumping Laws in the United States: Use and Welfare Conse-
quences,]. WoRLD TRADE, Apr. 1993, at 99, 102. Unless otherwise noted, the term "exporter" 
as used herein includes both the foreign company producing merchandise and the foreign 
company exporting that merchandise. 
8. /d. at 105. 
9. /d. at 102. 
10. /d. at 105. 
11. PoWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A. at 13. See PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE: THE 
GATT AND U.S. TRADE PouCY 81 ( 1993). The 90% figure may reflect the high cost (both in 
terms of time and money) of bringing a petition. As a result of the high cost, marginal 
petitions (those with little chance of success) are not filed. 
It should be clear that not all affirmative dumping determinations yield equal results. As 
a rule of thumb, unless a petitioner successfully proves the existence of a dumping margin 
of at least 10% or more and obtains a double-digit antidumping duty order, it is unlikely to 
view the competitive playing field as leveled. See Greg Rushford, Americas "MIT/ Without 
Brains", WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1995, at A12 (for an acerbic critique of the DOC's lmpon 
Administration Department, the agency responsible for dumping margin determinations). 
12. ScHOTT, supra note 5, at 78 n.l. 
13. Low, supra note 11, at 81. As a result of settlements and other dispositions, "(w]ell 
under half of all [antidumping] cases [brought in the United States actually] result[ ed] in 
the imposition of duties." Gary N. Horlick, The United States Antidumping System, in 
ANTIDUMPING LAw AND PRACTICE: A CoMPARATIVE STUDY 99, 165 n.254 (John H. Jackson & 
Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989). 
14. Johnson, supra note 6, at 5. 
15. ScHoTT, supra note 5, at 78. 
16. See id. at 79. 
17. The Anti-Dumping Dodge, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 1988, at 77. 
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Surely, the Uruguay Round was supposed to destroy the 
antidumping law weapon. Due to its wide-ranging agreements on 
nontariff matters, the Uruguay Round is hailed as the most ambi-
tious and trade-liberalizing multilateral trade negotiation in GATT 
history. 18 Fortunately for protectionists seeking undeserved protec-
tion from competitive imports, the antidumping law weapon sur-
vived. The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Agreement),I9 
ensures that antidumping law will remain a weapon of choice, at 
least until the conclusion of the next round of multilateral trade 
negotiations.20 The Agreement deserves the "C+" grade assigned to 
it by one economist21 because it 
will add new layers to the arbitrary rules governing the use of 
antidumping measures, but will do little to assuage the concerns of 
exporters and import-competing industries alike about the abuse of trad-
ing rules. Indeed, as these changes promote the adoption of 
antidumping laws in more and more countries, the number of 
antidumping actions is likely to expand rapidly. This will 
undoubtedly lead to more trade disputes among [World Trade 
18. As the legislative history to the U.S. legislation implementing the Uruguay Round 
agreements indicates: 
In addition to updating and further developing the codes on non-tariff measures 
negotiated in the previous two rounds of multilateral trade negotiations-making 
most of them multilateral agreements instead of limited membership agreements 
as negotiated in the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds-the Uruguay Round tackled 
new areas, such as services, intellectual property rights, and investment, reflecting 
the growing complexity of the world trading system .... Furthermore, the Uru-
guay Round overhauled the mechanism for settling disputes among signatory 
countries and established the World Trade Organization (WTO), which will pro-
vide a permanent arena for member governments to address issues affecting their 
multilateral trade relations as well as to oversee the implementation of the trade 
agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round. 
SENATE COMM. ON FIN., SENATE COMM. ON AGRIC., NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, AND SENATE 
COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT, S. REP. No. 412, 
103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; see also HousE CoMM. oN WAYS 
AND MEANs, URUGUAY RouND AGREEMENTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 826, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 
(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3773 [hereinafter HousE REPORT] ("The Uruguay 
Round Agreements are the broadest, most comprehensive trade agreements in history .... 
They are vital to our national interest and to economic growth, job creation, and an 
improved standard of living for all Americans."); Results of the Uruguay Round Negotiations: 
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance, 103d Con g., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1994) (statement of 
Ambassador Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, discussing the merits of the "larg-
est, broadest trade agreement in history" that is "shaped to the strengths of our economy"). 
19. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, Dec. 15, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3778, 
annex 1A, no. 8, at 1-26 [hereinafter Agreement]. 
20. See Gary N. Horlick & Eleanor C. Shea, The World Trade Organization Antidumping 
Agreement,]. WoRLD TRADE, Feb. 1995, at 5, 6-23 (for a discussion of the negotiating history 
of the Agreement). 
21. ScHOTT, supra note 5, at 8, 12. 
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Organization] trading partners. In short, the agreement pro-
vides a bandage to a festering sore of trade policy . . . . 22 
Title II, subtitle A of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Act) ,23 
which implements the Agreement by amending the Tariff Act of 
1930 (1930 Act),24 also merits a C+. The Agreement and the Act 
fail to resolve the central crisis facing antidumping law: abuse of 
the law by protectionists who use it as a nontariff barrier to trade. 
The new law invites protectionist abuse because it is replete with 
ambiguous language and neglects to consider the relationship 
between pricing strategy and costs of production. It should be 
replaced with a straightforward "traffic-light" system. In this system 
only "red-light" dumping, which entails predatory behavior, would 
be unlawful. No liability would be ascribed to "yellow-light" or 
"green-light" dumping. 
Part II of this Article presents an economic analysis of antidump-
ing law and explains why the clear consensus of scholarly opinion 
finds no economic justification for antidumping law. More impor-
tantly, it emphasizes that this consensus is of little practical value. 
Antidumping law is here to stay, thus making the more appropriate 
inquiry whether its use for protectionist purposes may be circum-
22. /d. at 85 (emphasis added). 
23. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4842-4901 
(1994) [hereinafter Act] (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). 
For discussions of U.S. implementation of the Agreement, see generally Alan F. Holmer 
et al., Enacted and Rejected Amendments to the Antidumping Law: In Implementation or Contraven-
tion of the Antidumping Agreement~, 29 INT'L LAw. 483 (1995) (discussing the debate between 
those in favor and those opposed to antidumping law); David Palmeter, United States Imple-
mentation of the Uruguay Round Antidumping Code,]. WoRLD TRADE, June 1995, at 39 (discuss-
ing changes in U.S. antidumping law because of the Uruguay Round). 
In January 1995, the DOC published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking solicit-
ing suggestions for regulatory changes to implement the Act and improvements in 
antidumping law generally. 60 Fed. Reg. 80 ( 1995) (proposed Jan. 3, 1995). This Article 
does not address the notice or the many comments made by practitioners. For an example 
of propetitioner comments, see Letter from Michael H. Stein & John A. Ragosta of Dewey 
Ballantine to Susan G. Esserman, assistant secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce (Feb. 
3, 1995) (with attached materials) (on file with The George Washington University journal of 
International Law and Economics). For an example of prorespondent comments, see Letter 
from Eugene J. Milosh, president, Association of Exporters and Importers to Susan G. 
Esserman, assistant secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce (Feb. 3, 1995) (with attached 
materials) (on file with The George Washington University journal of International Law and 
Economics). 
24. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 19 U.S.C.). Major amendments to the antidumping provisions of the 1930 Act were 
made by the following acts: Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144; 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2984; Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107. 
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scribed. In answering this question, Part II defines protectionist 
abuse. 
Part III reviews pre-Uruguay Round U.S. antidumping law. This 
review is worthwhile for four reasons. First, the reader must under-
stand the status quo ante to recognize the significance of the 
Agreement and the Act because the protectionist abuse problem, 
left unresolved by the Agreement and the Act, is rooted in prior 
law. Second, the pre-Uruguay Round regime is applicable to cases 
arising before January 1, 1995, when the Act took effect.25 The new 
regime only applies to cases where an antidumping petition or a 
request for an annual review of an existing antidumping order is 
filed on or after January 1, 1995.26 As a result, the United States will 
have two parallel antidumping regimes for several years to come. 
Third, much of prior law remains good law for cases arising after 
January 1, 1995. Although the Agreement and the Act significantly 
modify certain aspects of prior law, they leave other mcoyor areas-
such as procedural aspects of preliminary and final determina-
tions-relatively untouched. Finally, most economic analyses of 
antidumping law proceed immediately to the level of impractical 
grand theory and neglect to consider how antidumping law actu-
ally works. An understanding of pre-Uruguay Round antidumping 
law assists in bridging the gap between theory and operation. 
Part IV argues that post-Uruguay Round antidumping law is tex-
tually ambiguous and ignores the cost structure of petitioners and 
respondents. 27 Part IV advances five key points. First, the Agree-
ment and the Act expand the universe of potential petitioners and 
cases. Second, they provide a petitioner with numerous opportuni-
ties to manipulate a dumping margin calculation to achieve the 
maximum margin. Third, their injury provisions enhance the abil-
ity of a petitioner to claim successfully that it is injured by reason of 
dumped imports. Fourth, they permit the scope of an antidumping 
order to be expanded easily to include component parts and new 
25. Act, supra note 23, § 291, 108 Stat. at 4931. 
26. Id. 
27. The petitioner, in most antidumping actions, is a U.S. producer of a domestic like 
product-merchandise identical or akin to the merchandise subject to investigation-or a 
union. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1994). 
The respondent in an antidumping action is usually the exporter of subject merchan-
dise-the allegedly dumped product under investigation. The U.S. importer of the mer-
chandise is also likely to be a respondent, particularly where the importer is legally related 
to the exporter. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(B) (1994). When an importer is unrelated to a 
respondent-exporter, its role typically is limited to monitoring a case, even though the 
importer is liable for any antidumping duties imposed. 
8 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. [Vol. 29 
shippers. Fifth, they make revocation of an antidumping order 
difficult. 
Part IV also emphasizes the distinctions between the Agreement 
and the Act. It asks whether the United States faithfully imple-
mented the Agreement and suggests that in at least three areas-
price averaging, captive production, and anticircumvention-the 
Act is inconsistent with the Agreement. These areas may give rise to 
challenges by other countries against the United States in a future 
World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute resolution proceeding. 
Part V considers how the Uruguay Round negotiators should 
have addressed the problem of protectionist abuse. It proposes a 
traffic-light system, based on the microeconomic theory of the cost 
structure of a firm, that eliminates some of the ambiguities in the 
Agreement and the Act. The traffic-light system focuses on preda-
tory behavior. Dumping is considered predatory and occurs when 
an exporter sells merchandise in the United States at a price below 
its average total and variable costs of production. Under this system 
such behavior is categorized as unlawful red-light dumping. Yellow-
light dumping occurs when an exporter sells at a price below its 
average total cost but above its average variable costs of produc-
tion, and it leads to the issuance of a caution. Green-light dumping 
is defined as pricing above average total cost of production and is 
lawful. 
Part VI provides concluding remarks. 
II. THE EcoNoMIC CRITIQUE 
In a substantial number of [antidumping] cases the root of the 
problem is a loss of comparative advantage.28 
A. Antidumping Law as Protectionism 
Broadly defined, dumping is international price discrimina-
tion.29 It occurs when an exporter sells merchandise in the import-
28. Bernard M. Hoekman & Michael P. Leidy, Antidumping and Market Disruption: The 
Incentive Effects of Antidumping Laws, in THE MuLTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: ANALYSIS AND 
OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 155, 164 (Robert M. Stem ed., 1993) (citation omitted). 
29. jACOB VINER, DuMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (Augustus M. Kelley 
1991) (1923). Ever since Viner published his classic economic study in 1923, economists 
have characterized dumping as cross-border price discrimination. See, e.g., MELVYN B. 
KRAuss, THE NEW PROTECTIONISM: THE WELFARE STATE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 68-70 
(1978) (wAccording to Article VII of GATT, dumping is defined as the sale of a product 
abroad at a lower price than charged domestically."); KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT 168 
(1970) (analyzing Viner's work and discussing dumping as international price discrimina-
tion); Alan V. Deardorff, Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law, in THE MULTILATERAL 
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ing country at a price significantly below that at which it sells like 
merchandise in its home country.30 If the home market is not via-
ble for this comparison, the exporter's prices in a third country or 
a constructed value (CV) is used to determine whether it is dump-
ing.31 A stricter definition of dumping is that it occurs when the 
exporter sells merchandise in the importing country at a price 
below its cost of production.32 In either case, dumping is actiona-
ble if: (1) it causes or threatens to cause material i~ury to an estab-
lished industry in the importing country; or (2) it materially 
TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 28, at 135, 136-42; John J. Barcelo III, Antidumping Laws as 
Barriers to Trade-The United States and the International Antidumping Code, 57 CoRNELL L. 
REv. 491, 500-16 (1972) (for an analysis of Viner's Work). 
The economic literature on dumping is voluminous. See RANIER M. BIERWAGEN, GATT 
ARTICLE VI AND THE PROTECTIONIST BIAS IN ANTI-DUMPING LAws 171 ( 1990) (for an excel-
lent bibliography as of 1990); Richard D. Boltuck, An Economic Analysis of Dumping, J. 
WoRLD TRADE L., 1987, at 45 [hereinafter An Economic Analysis of Dumping]: Richard D. 
Boltuck, Reply to Professor Lazar's Comment on "An Economic Analysis of Dumping", J. WoRLD 
TRADE L., 1988, at 129 [hereinafter Reply to Lazar]; Fred Lazar, Structural/Strategic Dumping: 
A Comment on Richard Boltuck 's "An Economic Analysis of Dumping", J. WoRLD TRADE L., 1988, 
at 91; Michael Leidy, Antidumping: Unfair Trade or Unfair Remedy, FIN. & DEv., Mar. 1995, at 
27. 
Much of the recent scholarship emphasizes econometric models of dumping. See gener-
ally Dan Bernhardt, Dumping, Adjustment Costs and Uncertainty, 8 J. EcoN. DYNAMICS & CoN-
TROL 349 (1984); James Brander & Paul Krugman, A "Reciprocal Dumping" Model of 
International Trade, 15J. INT'L EcoN. 313 (1983); Satya P. Das & Adwait K Mohanty, Dumjr 
ing in International Markets and Welfare: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 17 J. INT'L EcoN. 149 
( 1984); Stephen W. Davies & Anthony J. McGuiness, Dumping at Less than Marginal Cost, 12 
J. INT'L EcoN. 169 (1982); Wilfred]. Ethier, Dumping, 90J. PoL. EcoN. 487 (1982); Brian 
Pinto, Repeated Games and the "Reciprocal Dumping" Model of Trade, 20 J. INT'L EcoN. 357 
(1986); Daniel Trefler, Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An 
Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy, 101 J. PoL. EcoN. 138 (1993). At least one observer 
finds these studies "not very helpful~ because "[t]hey depend on a number of assumptions 
which render them useless for day to day use as well as for a more general hypothesis.~ 
BIERWAGEN, supra, at 10. My own review of the econometric analyses leads to the same 
conclusion. 
30. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs, 103D CoNe., 1ST SEss., OvERviEW AND COMPI-
LATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 62 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter OvERVIEW). 
Article VI of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) defines dump-
ing as the sale of merchandise in an export market at a price below normal value (NV). 
GATT, supra note 2, 61 Stat. at A23-25, 55 U.N.T.S. at 212; see KENNETH R. SIMMONDS & 
BRIAN H.W. HILL, LAw AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT 12 (1988). The NV is the price 
charged by the exporter for like merchandise in its home market. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(3) (d) 
(1994). If there are no sales in the exporter's home market (or the volume of such sales is 
small), the NV is estimated by calculating either the price the exporter charges in a third 
market or a constructed value (CV). 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(3)(e) (1994). The CV is the sum of 
the cost of: (1) materials and fabrication; (2) selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) 
expenses; (3) profits; and (4) containers, coverings, and items incidental to placing the 
merchandise in a condition ready for shipment to the importing country. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(3)(e)(l) (1994). 
31. See discussion infra part III.C.3. 
32. BIERWAGEN, supra note 29, at 8. 
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retards the establishment of an industry in that country.33 The 
importing country may react . to dumping by imposing an 
antidumping duty on the dumped merchandise in the amount of 
the dumping margin. The dumping margin is the difference 
between the prices for the merchandise in the exporter's home 
market and the importing country.s4 
An exporter may successfully engage in a bifurcated cross-border 
price strategy upon the existence of three necessary and sufficient 
conditions.35 First, the exporter's home market and the importing 
country's market must be segregated so that merchandise does not 
flow between them. Tariff and nontariff barriers in the exporter's 
home market must support a higher home market price and con-
sumers must face significant costs in traveling to the importer's 
market. Once this condition is met, the cross-border price differen-
tial may persist because of the impracticality of arbitrage (buying 
the product in the cheaper market and selling it in the more 
expensive market).36 
Second, the exporter must not face perfect competition in both 
markets. It must have sufficient market power to influence the 
price of merchandise in at least one of the markets. 37 Without such 
power, any price differential for merchandise in the different mar-
kets would not be within its control.38 In an extreme case, the 
exporter is a monopolist in its home market and a perfect competi-
tor in the importing country's market. 
Third, the exporter must face a relatively more elastic demand 
curve for merchandise in the importing country's market, and a 
relatively less elastic demand curve for like merchandise in its 
home market. This differential may result from trade barriers that 
shield the exporter from competition in its home market.39 Absent 
this elasticity differential, the price charged by the exporter in the 
importing country would equal or exceed the price charged in its 
home market and there would be no dumping.40 
33. 19 u.s.c. § 1673(2) (1994). 
34. GAIT, supra note 2, art. VI, 61 Stat. at A23, 55 U.N.T.S. at 212; SIMMONDS & HILL, 
supra note 30, at 13. 
35. Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 158-59. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 159. 
38. Id. 
39. ld. 
40. For example, in a world of uncertainty, unintentional dumping may occur 
because of changes in exchange rates. In this world only the first condition is required-
market power and elasticities are irrelevant. ld. 
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Economists generally agree that, except for predation, dumping 
is "basically harmless for the importing country."41 Consumers in 
the importing country benefit from the lower price of imported 
goods: 
If one takes the importing country's viewpoint only, all consum-
ers are being favored. That is, the importing country as a whole 
benefits unambiguously from dumping to the extent that it 
acquires access to imported goods at a lower price than it would 
if dumping were not taking place. This lower price must be a 
benefit to the importing country as a whole, despite distribu-
tional effects that will hurt some residents who compete with 
imports, precisely because the importing country is a net 
demander of the dumped good.42 
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that this gain outweighs the 
cost to producers in the importing country, measured by reduced 
profits, and to their employees, in terms of reduced employment. 
One economist's 1989 to 1990 welfare analysis of eight U.S. 
antidumping proceedings found that 
such duties are an extremely costly way to improve the profit-
ability of U.S. producers or employment in U.S. industries. In 
these eight cases, the consumer cost per dollar of increased 
profits ranged from 2.40 to 25.10 dollars, with an average cost of 
8.00 dollars. The cost to the U.S. economy per dollar of profit 
range[d] from 0.20 to 10.80 dollars, with an average value of 
3.60 dollars. The minimum consumer cost per job created was 
113,800 dollars, while the minimum cost to the economy to cre-
ate an additional job was 14,300 dollars.43 
The ITC recently considered what the economywide welfare 
effects would have been if all outstanding U.S. antidumping and 
countervailing duty orders in 1991 had been removed.44 These 
orders affected $9 billion out of $491 billion, or approximately 
1.8% of all U.S. merchandise imports in 1991.45 The ITC estimated 
that these orders imposed a net welfare cost on the U.S. economy 
of $1.59 billion, or 0.03% of the U.S. gross domestic product in 
1991 ($5.725 trillion).46 The loss to consumers in the form of 
41. Deardorff, supra note 29, at 135. 
42. /d. at 139. 
43. Anderson, supra note 7, at 115 (foomote omitted). In theory, the gain to consum-
ers from lower prices could be taxed and redistributed to companies and workers injured 
by competition from lower-price imports. In the context of current trade remedy laws, 
petitioners could bring safeguard actions and receive adjustment assistance. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2251 (1994). 
44. The Economic Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders and Sus-
pension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900, Inv. No. 332-344, at ix Uune 1995). 
45. /d. at ix. 
46. /d. 
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higher prices far outweighed the benefit to petitioning industries 
in the form of increased output and employment.47 
Taking both the exporting and the importing countries into con-
sideration, it is impossible to prove a priori that the welfare effects 
of cross-border price discrimination are negative. Although con-
sumers in the exporter's home market are harmed by a higher 
price, the source of the higher price is the exporter's monopoly 
power, not dumping. Such power enables the exporter to gamer 
monopoly rents by charging a price above its marginal cost of pro-
duction. These extra profits do not offset the welfare loss to con-
sumers in the exporting country. 
The same logic applies to the less extreme situation where the 
exporter charges a high (but not monopoly) price in the home 
market and a low (but not perfectly competitive) price in the 
importing country. Whether the aforementioned benefits from 
cheaper prices in the importing country offset the net loss from 
monopoly prices in the exporter's country is uncertain. As Ken-
neth Dam concludes: 
The fact that governments act against dumping only when the 
low price is charged in their own territory reveals that govern-
ments are concerned with the welfare of their own enterprises 
rather than with the protection of their citizens from extremely 
high prices charged by monopoly sellers. If the problem were 
really the discrimination itself, then presumably governments 
would be more concerned to attack high prices than low prices. 
Where an exporter sold at home at higher prices than he sold 
abroad, it would be the exporter's government, not the 
importer's government, that would take coercive action. The 
General Agreement [on Tariffs and Trade], like the govern-
ments themselves, views the impact in the low-price country as 
the harmful aspect of dumping .... 
The concern with dumping is therefore a concern with the 
protection of domestic industry from international 
competition.48 
Two hypothetical inqmnes illustrate the fallacy of assuming 
dumping is evil. First, suppose that antidumping laws are repealed 
and the conditions that make dumping possible are eliminated. 
Theoretically, prices in the home and importing countries would 
converge because of cross-border arbitrage.49 Consumers in the 
47. This static result, however, does not consider the cumulative effect of outstanding 
antidumping orders over time. 
48. DAM, supra note 29, at 168. 
49. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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home country would benefit from lower prices, consumers in the 
importing country would be harmed by higher prices, and the 
exporter's profits would decline. Whether the benefits to the con-
sumers in the home country outweigh the losses to the consumers 
in the importing country is uncertain. The net welfare effect of the 
repeal can only be forecast as positive if the exporter's monopoly 
position in the home country is completely undermined, and it 
behaves like a perfect competitor in the importing country. 
Second, suppose an antidumping duty is imposed on the 
exporter's merchandise in an effort to level the competitive playing 
field between that merchandise and like merchandise produced by 
companies in the importing country. In this situation, consumers 
in the importing country are the clear losers. They must pay a 
higher price for the imported product because of the duty. In addi-
tion, they may have to pay a higher price for like merchandise 
because other companies may competitively raise prices to match 
the price of the imported merchandise.50 
One observer points out that between 1980 and 1989, "almost all 
foreign companies investigated for alleged dumping [in the 
United States] were found guilty."51 That observer concludes: 
While many people consider dumping an arcane subject, dump-
ing penalties have forced Americans to pay more for photo 
albums, pears, mirrors, ethanol, cement, shock absorbers, roof 
shingles, codfish, televisions, paint brushes, cookware, motorcy-
cle batteries, bicycles, martial art uniforms, computers and com-
puter disks, telephone systems, forklifts, radios, flowers, aspirin, 
staplers and staples, paving equipment, and fireplace mesh 
panels. Dumping laws increasingly prevent American businesses 
from getting vital foreign supplies and machinery. Commerce 
Department officials now effectively have direct veto power over 
the pricing policies of over 3,000 foreign companies. Dumping 
law constitutes potential political price controls over almost 
$500 billion in imports a year.52 
50. William J. Davey, Antidumping Laws in the GAIT and the EC, in ANTIDUMPING LAw 
AND PRAcncE, supra note 13, at 298; see also Laura Fraedrich, The japanese Minivan 
Antidumping Case: How American Manufacturm Lost the Legal Battles But Won the War, 2 Gw. 
MAsoN U. L. REv. 107, 120-24 (1994) (for a discussion of harm to consumer interests 
resulting from an antidumping case brought and lost by General Motors, Chrysler, and 
Ford againstJapanese minivan manufacturers). 
51. BovARD, supra note 1, at 108. 
52. Id.; see also N. David Palmeter, The Capture of the Antidumping Law, 14 YALEJ. INT'L 
L. 182, 190 n.44 (1989) (citing Department of the Treasury, Antidumping Duties, in UNITED 
STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 395, 406 (1971) 
(pointing out that a DOC determination of dumping has a chilling effect on a U.S. 
importer)). 
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In effect, when the interests of consumers of dumped merchandise 
are considered, application of antidumping law makes the playing 
field less competitive. . 
What about the predation case where an exporter attempts to 
drive its competitors in the importing country out of business and 
then raise its prices? In this situation the exporter's conduct is 
unfair and antidumping law affords protection to its competitors in 
the importing country. The law, however, is clumsy. It confuses 
predatory and nonpredatory behavior because it fails to consider 
the exporter's cost structure. As long as the exporter's marginal 
revenue from sales in the importing country exceeds its marginal 
cost of production, the exporter is behaving in an economically 
rational fashion.53 Moreover, an exporter that sells merchandise in 
the importing country at a price above its average variable cost of 
production is not engaging in predatory behavior.54 The law pro-
tects the exporter's competitors from rational, nonpredatory 
behavior. Competitors are not challenged to reduce their cost 
structures to remain competitive with the exporter. The develop-
ment of a perfectly competitive market in the importing country is 
throttled and consumers are denied the benefit of lower prices: 
In using the predation rationale for AD [antidumping], pur-
portedly the interests of consumers are being advanced, not 
those of import-competing firms. Yet in the absence of success-
ful predation, the imposition of AD duties can only harm 
domestic consumers. As AD actions cause exporters to recoil 
from the foreign market, competitive pressures are diminished 
and domestic prices move upward. It is rather paradoxical that 
vigilant and enthusiastic application of AD by policy officials 
tends to promote the result that it is supposed to combat under 
the predation justification: monopoly pricing. 5 5 
Skepticism about the economic effects of antidumping law moti-
vates some scholars to argue for repeal of the law. 5 6 These scholars 
53. Davey, supra note 50, at 296 (defining and describing the role of marginal cost 
and marginal utility in a microeconomic sense). See generaUy PAuL A. SAMUELSON, EcoNOM-
ICS 431-32, 439-43 (lith ed. 1980) (discussing marginal cost and utility, cost curves, and 
shutdown and breakeven points). 
54. See infra notes 342-350 and accompanying text. 
55. Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 162. 
56. See generaUy BIERWAGEN, supra note 29, at 168-69 (concluding that the final step in 
reforming antidumping legislation is to phase it out in favor of domestic antitrust and 
competition law); BovARD, supra note I, at 160 ("The U.S. should take the lead in the 
dismantling of antidumping laws."); Davey, supra note 50, at 296-97 (antidumping laws are 
not "justified economically"); GABRIELLE MARCEAU, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-TRUST ISSUES 
IN FREE-TRADE AREAs 310-18 (1994) (discussing measures to phase out antidumping provi-
sions on a regional basis in order to integrate economies); RicHARD A. PosNER, EcoNOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAw 309-ll (4th ed. 1992) (describing antidumping policies as protectionist 
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present four lines of attack. First, they argue antidumping law is 
redundant to domestic antitrust laws.57 The Robinson-Patman 
Act58 proscribes price discrimination,59 while section two of the 
Sherman Act60 outlaws predatory pricing.61 This redundancy vio-
and thus not justified); Wesley K Caine, A Casefrn Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, 13 LAw & Pot.'Y INT't. Bus. 681, 681-83, 724-26 (1981) (arguing 
antidumping provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 are unpredictable, unfair, and should be 
repealed); Michael S. Knoll, United States Antidumping Law: The Case far Reconciliation, 22 
TEx. INT't. LJ. 265, 288 (1987) (concluding both the United States and the second GATT 
antidumping duty code provisions should be reconsidered). But see Richard Boltuck & 
Robert E. Litan, America's "Unfair" Trade Laws, in DoWN IN THE DuMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF 
THE UNFAIR TRADE LAws 1, 10-11 (Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) (summa-
rizing new economic rationales in favor of antidumping laws and rebuttals). 
57. See generatry BIERWAGEN, supra note 29, at 162-64 (discussing the substitution of 
antidumping law with competition law); PosNER, supra note 56, at 309-11 (explaining 
dumping and the free-trade question) ;Jacques HJ. Bourgeois, Antitrust and Trade Policy: A 
Peaceful Coexistence? European Community Perspective-[, INT't. Bus. LAw., Feb. 1989, at 58-67 
(discussing antidumping actions in context of competition law in the European Commu-
nity) ;Jacques HJ. Bourgeois, Antitrust and Trade Policy: A Peaceful Coexistence? European Com-
munity Perspective-//, INT't. Bus. LAw., Mar. 1989, at 115-22 (reviewing European 
Community trade policy); Terry Calvani & Randolph W. Tritell, Invocation of United States 
Import Relief Laws as an Antitrust Violation, 31 ANTITRuST But.L. 527 (1986) (explaining why 
the U.S. import relief laws are antitrust violations);Jeffrey L. Kessler, The Antidumping Act of 
1916: Antitrust Analogue ar Anathema?, 56 ANTITRUST LJ. 485 (1987) (discussing provisions 
and the legislative history of the rarely used Antidumping Act of 1916 which aimed at 
"prevention of predatory international price discrimination") (emphasis omitted); Thomas 
J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: The Need far a Synthesis 
with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT't. L. & CoM. REG. 393, 398-402 (1993) (arguing that "the 
antidumping laws have numerous shortcomings"); A Paul Victor, Antidumping and Anti-
trust: Can the Inconsistencies by Resolved?, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT't. L. & Pot.. 339 (1983) (reviewing 
the relationship between U.S. antidumping and antitrust laws); George Yarrow, Economic 
Aspects of Anti-dumping Policies, 3 OxFORD REv. EcoN. Pot.'Y 66 (1987) (assessing the current 
policies of antidumping); Note, The Antidumping Act-Tariff ar Antitrust Law?, 74 YALE LJ. 
707 ( 1965) (explaining how the Antidumping Act is a hybrid of tariff ideas and theories of 
antitrust law). But see Ronald A Cass, Price Discrimination and Predation Analysis in Antitrust 
and International Trade: A Comment, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 877 (1993) (arguing that antidump-
ing law assesses price discrimination and predation in a markedly different manner from 
international law). One scholar suggests a new way of viewing the injury requirement in 
antidumping law that is based on antitrust law principles, but stops short of calling for the 
repeal of antidumping law. Diane P. Wood, "Unfair" Trade Injury: A Competition-Based 
Approach, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1153, 1174-93 (1989); see also Richard D. Boltuck & Seth Kaplan, 
Conflicting Entitlements: Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation Be Reconciled?, 61 U. CIN. L. 
REv. 903, 912-13 (1993) (critically appraising Wood's position). 
58. Robinson-Patrnan Antidiscrimination Act, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1994) ). 
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(b), 21(a) (1994); seealsoChritopherM. Barbuto, Note, Toward 
a Convergence of Antitrust and Trade Law: An .International Trade Analogue to Robinson-Patman, 
62 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2047, 2085-94 (1994) (discussing the convergence of antitrust and 
antidumping law). 
60. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 
u.s.c. §§ 1-7 (1994)). 
61. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Some economists suggest that antitrust laws are the appro-
priate means for combating predatory pricing. See, e.g., Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 
16 Geo. Wash. ]. Int'l L. & Econ. [Vol. 29 
lates the natio~al treatment clause of Article III of the 194 7 GATT, 
which suggests that conduct permitted domestically should be 
treated similarly if engaged in intemationally.62 Antidumping law 
does not apply to the domestic context. A domestic company 
engaged in price discrimination or predatory pricing only in its 
home country may run afoul of antitrust law but not of antidump-
ing law. One could argue, however, that antidumping law is not 
redundant to domestic laws because 
161 ("In the unlikely event that an anticompetitive outcome develops from a strategy of 
predatory dumping, this could be challenged under existing antitrust or competition laws, 
assuming that problems related to extraterritorial enforcement can be overcome." (foot-
note omitted)); Barbuto, supra note 59, at 2089-94 (suggesting a convergence of antitrust 
and trade law). 
The antitrust literature on predatory pricing is extensive and a review of it is beyond the 
scope of this Article. See generally Harvey M. Applebaum, Foreign Predation & Price Discrimina-
tion against U.S. Firms-Antidumping Under Title VII, in ANTITRUST AND TRADE PoLICIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1-11 (Barry Hawk ed., 1985) (examining the issue of predatory 
intent in antidumping law); RoBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR 
WITH ITsELF (1978) (reviewing antitrust policies); George A. Hay, A Confused Lawyer's Guide 
to the Predatory Pricing Literature, in EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAw 209 (Terry 
Calvani &John Siegfried eds., 2d ed. 1988) (discussing the wave of economic litigation on 
predatory pricing); HERBERT HoVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST PoLICY: THE LAw OF CoMPE-
TITION AND ITS PRACTICE 298-328 (1994) (reviewing predatory pricing); Phillip Areeda & 
Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 
HARv. L. REv. 697, 700-32 (1975) (discussing tests for distinguishing between predatory 
and competitive pricing);Joseph F. Brodley & George A. Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing 
Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 738, 765-92 ( 1981) 
(outlining the rules on predatory pricing and their relationship to current economic theo-
ries); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 
318-33 (1981) (discussing potential remedies for predation); James D. Hurwitz & William 
E. Kovacic, judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends, 35 V AND. L. REv. 63, 94-99 
(1982) (discussing the effect of debate on judicial decisions); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K 
Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.]. 213, 242-58 (1979) 
(examining alternative policies for predatory pricing); Charles W. McCall, Predatory Pricing: 
An Economic and Legal Analysis, 32 ANTITRUST BuLL. 1, 9-19 (1987) (critically reviewing the 
legislative guidelines used in predatory pricing litigation); F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing 
and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. REv. 869, 869-83 (1976) (examining the short-
comings of the Areeda-Turner analysis of predatory pricing); Oliver E. Williamson, Preda-
tory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE LJ. 284 (1977) (discussing the 
consensus in favor of cost-based rules dealing with predatory pricing). 
For a discussion ofnonprice predatory behavior such as exclusive dealing arrangements, 
see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' 
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 230-49 (1986) (demonstrating how anti-
trust enforcers can develop a set of objective guidelines to carry out a new two-step 
analysis). 
62. MARcEAu, supra note 56, at 101-29; Davey, supra note 50, at 297; Horlick, supra 
note 13, at 10 l n.1. Of course, one could argue that there is no violation because Article VI 
of the GATT authorizes antidumping law and, therefore, is an exception to the national 
treatment clause. This rebuttal may explain why no argument about inconsistency has 
been made in a GATT proceeding. 
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[o]ver time, antidumping policy and antitrust policy have 
diverged strikingly. Antidumping law and policy have evolved 
along a path of ever-increasing protection for U.S. firms from 
imports and decreasing concern for consumers and the econ-
9my as a whole. Antitrust law relating to predatory pricing, at 
least in recent decades, has taken a path of increasing concern 
for consumers and the economy as a whole and decreasing con-
cern for firms suffering intense competition. 
Antidumping law no longer acts primarily against predatory 
pricing. It acts against international price discrimination (sales 
at a lower price in the United States than in the home country 
of the exporter) and sales below cost, regardless of whether the 
sales are predatory. Yet, the relevant provisions of the antitrust 
laws prohibit only predatory pricing; they do not prohibit selling 
below cost or price discrimination analogous to that prohibited 
by the antidumping laws except in cases where it is predatory. 
This difference is important. Predatory pricing is detrimental 
to economic welfare because it leads to monopolies, which 
cause economic inefficiency and raise concerns about social 
equity. It seldom occurs, however, because it is rarely a profita-
ble strategy and is usually not possible. By contrast, nonpreda-
tory price discrimination and sales below cost generally provide 
net benefits to the country receiving the lower price, and both 
are relatively common. Moreover, seldom do cases of price dis-
crimination or selling below cost have anything to do with pred-
atory pricing. 63 
17 
Antidumping law is not redundant to antitrust law because it is a 
practical and political necessity in a world in which cross-border 
price discrimination is possible because of protection in home 
markets. 
Second, scholars argue antidumping law is unnecessary because 
injury to an industry caused by imports can be addressed by safe-
guard or escape clause actions under section 201 of the Trade Act 
of 1974.64 Section 201 provides assistance to companies and work-
ers who suffer from fair foreign competition. Applying it in the 
context of dumping is legitimate because dumping is not necessar-
63. CoNGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, A REVIEW OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTER· 
VAIUNG-Durr LAw AND Poucv 2-3 (May 1994) (memorandum) [hereinafter CBO 
MEMORANDUM]. 
64. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201, 88 Stat. 1978, 2011-14 (codified as 
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1994)); see also Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 171-72, 
174-75, 178-79 (stating that antidumping injury requirement is less stringent than safe-
guard injury requirement); CBO MEMORANDUM, supra note 63, at 3-7 (describing section 
201 escape clause). 
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ily unfair.65 Adjustment assistance, however, is difficult to obtain 
and meager in amount.66 
Third, they argue antidumping law cannot address the source of 
the problem of the alleged unfair pricing-the closed foreign mar-
ket. 67 Although antidumping law may serve as a bargaining chip in 
dealing with a closed foreign market, the law does not aim to dis-
mantle the tariff and nontariff barriers to trade in an exporter's 
home market that ensure market segmentation. If these barriers 
were removed, one of the three conditions necessary for dumping 
would not exist and dumping would be impossible. Scholars argue 
that section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, and not antidumping 
law, is the unilateral tool for prying open a foreign market.68 The 
use of section 301, however, is constrained by the Uruguay Round 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes.69 This is illustrated by the recent U.S.:Japan dis-
pute aboutJapanese barriers to U.S. automobiles and auto parts.70 
Fourth, they argue antidumping law creates one of two perverse 
incentives for an exporter.71 First, antidumping law may distort an 
exporter's marketing decisions. An exporter might reduce its 
exports and increase its home-market sales to minimize the risk of 
being named as a respondent in an antidumping action. In turn, 
65. A section 201 claim in the United States requires: (1) an increase in the volume of 
imported merchandise that is a (2) substantial cause of (3) serious injury to ( 4) a domestic 
industry that makes like merchandise. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (1994). The price at which 
imported merchandise is sold is irrelevant. Antidumping law does not require a change in 
import volume, "substantial" cause, or "serious" injury. However, it is beyond the scope of 
this Article to consider whether the escape clause affords adequate relief or whether it 
would be desirable to harmonize the elements of an escape clause and antidumping claim. 
66. See Comment, Worker Adjustment Assistance: The Failure & the Future, 5 Nw.]. INT'L 
L. & Bus. 394, 415-17 (1983). 
67. Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 163. 
68. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (codified as 
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994)); Alan F. Holmer &Judith Hippler Bello, U.S. Trade 
Law & Policy Series No. 14: The 1988 Trade Bill: Savior or Scourge of the International Trading 
System?, 23 INT'L LAw. 523, 527 (1989). 
69. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE URU· 
GUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1008 (1994) [hereinafter MESSAGE]. 
70. See, e.g., Bob Davis, U.S. and japan Agree to One Meeting on Auto Trade as Squabble 
Continues, WALL ST.j.,June 5, 1995, atA5 (United States threatened sanctions if auto and 
auto-parts issues are not resolved); Nancy Dunne, US Steps Up Pressure on japan, FIN. TIMES, 
May 19, 1995, at 18 (citing one model on the sanctions list, the Infiniti Q45, selling at 
$59,350 in the United States and at $75,069 in Japan). 
71. See, e.g., Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 170 (listing inducements of rent-
seeking behavior for import-competing firms and the incentive to locate productive facili-
ties for exporting firms). 
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the price of its merchandise in the importing country rises, reduc-
ing competitive pressure on producers in that country, while the 
price of its merchandise in its home country falls. Alternatively, 
antidumping law may distort an exporter's decisions about foreign 
direct investment. If the importing country represents a significant 
market, the exporter may relocate its production facilities there. 
These skeptics teach that antidumping law is inherently protec-
tionist.72 As Bovard states, "[e]conomic xenophobia is the founda-
tion of U.S. antidumping law."73 Unfortunately, this insight is on a 
par with advice that "rain is wet" when what is sorely needed is 
direction to the nearest umbrella vendor. The call for repeal of 
antidumping law is quixotic. For approximately the last century, 
long before the GATT entered into force, the international trading 
community has condemned dumping.74 The GATT contracting 
parties have had four opportunities to ban antidumping law: (1) in 
1947 when the GATT was drafted; (2) between 1964 and 1967 
when the Kennedy Round Antidumping Code was produced; (3) 
between 1974 and 1979 when the Tokyo Round Antidumping 
Code was produced; and (4) between 1986 and 1994 when the 
Uruguay Round Antidumping Code was produced.75 Each time, 
however, the negotiators affirmed the law. 
72. The first U.S. legislation designed to afford relieffrom dumping, enacted in 1916, 
was designed principally to protect the U.S. chemical industry from German competition, 
particularly in the dyestuff sector. JosEPH E. PA1TISON, ANTIDUMPING AND CouNTERVAILING 
DtnY LAws § 15.02 (May 1995). For a review of this Act, see RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAw: CAsEs AND MATERtALS ch. 7 (Michie 1996). For an entertaining account of the 
history of U.S. antidumping law, see BovARD, supra note 1, at 109-14. 
73. BovARD, supra note 1, at 107. 
74. SeeJoHN H. JACKSON, THE WoRLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAw AND POLICY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 221 (1989). 
75. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT 1969 (discussing the 
drafting of the 1947 GATT). 
For discussions of the 1967 Kennedy Round Antidumping Code, see BHALA, supra note 
72, ch. 6; THoMAS B. CuRTIS &JoHN RoBERT VASTINE, JR., THE KENNEDY RouND AND THE 
FUTURE OF AMERICAN TRADE 202-215 (l971);JOHN W. EVANS, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMER-
ICAN TRADE PoLICY: THE TWILIGHT OF THE GATT? 260-62, 270 (1971). This Code took 
effect on July 1, 1968. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 32. The United States was one of 
the original signers of the Code. However, for political reasons relating to congressional-
executive relations, Congress limited the effect of the Code by statute. See Renegotiation 
Amendments Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-634, § 201, 82 Stat. 1345, 1347. Some scholars 
incorrectly suggest that the United States never joined the Code. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra 
note 74, at 226 ("The Code, as an international treaty, had been signed by authority of the 
President, but there was no participation of the U.S. Congress .... The Congress enacted 
legislation that prohibited the executive and the ... [lTC] from following the rules of the 
GATT [Antidumping] Code in certain circumstances."). 
For a review of the 1979 Tokyo Round Antidumping Code and U.S. implementing legis-
lation-the Trade Agreements Act of 1979-see William H. Barringer & Christopher A 
20 Geo. Wash.]. Int'l L. & Econ. [Vol. 29 
One observer commented that the Tokyo Round actually 
resulted in greater opportunities for bringing antidumping claims: 
Since antidumping laws are a protectionist device, the GATT 
should attempt to eliminate them or restrict their use. Unfortu-
nately, the fact that article VI of the General Agreement explic-
itly allows their use, has meant that GATT control of dumping 
has been largely limited to regulation of procedures only. What 
is needed is a change in emphasis in the GAIT [Tokyo Rnund] 
Antidumping Code, so that it restricts more tightly than now the permis-
sible scope of antidumping laws. A similar change in attitude is 
needed in GATT member states. The antidumping laws have 
been treated by many legislators as inherent rights of their con-
stituents, rights that should be regularly "improved" by making 
relief more readily available. 76 
The harsh reality is that antidumping law remains a strategic 
weapon in the protectionist arsenal.77 A cynical view of this reality 
is that the law benefits a powerful lobby in Washington, D.C.-the 
international trade bar. Eliminating antidumping law would dra-
matically reduce the business of international trade lawyers. 
Whether antidumping law is economically justified is irrelevant. 
The practical and more ambitious inquiry is whether the law can 
be circumscribed to minimize the risk of protectionist abuse. Like 
Dunn, Antidumping and Counteroailing Duties Investigations Under the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979, 14]. INT'L L. & EcoN. 1, 2-3 (1979); Peter D. Ehrenhaft, lWiat the Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act {Can][WUL]{Should] Mean for U.S. 
Trade Policy, 11 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1361, 1361-65 (1979);Johnj. Barcelo III, Subsidies, 
Countervailing Duties and Antidumping After the Tokyo Round, 13 CoRNELL INT'L LJ. 257, 259 
(1980); Terrence Roche Murphy, Antidumping and Counteroailing Duties under the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979: A Preliminary Analysis, 14 INT'L LAw. 203, 221 (1980); Alan H. 
Silverman, An Examination of the Antidumping Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979: 
United States Implementation of the Antidumping Code Formulated in the Tokyo Round, 7 SYRACUSE 
J. INT'L L. & CoM., 239, 240 (1979); Diana Jean Carloni, Note, An Analysis of "Material 
Injury" Under the 1979 Trade Agreement Act, 4 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CaMP. LJ. 87, 88-89 (1981); 
Thomas Early, Note, judicial Review of Antidumping Cases and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979: 
Towards a Unified System of Review, 14]. INT'L L. & EcoN. 101, 101 n.5 (1979); Shelley A 
Lorenzen, Technical Analysis of the Antidumping Agreement and the Trade Agreements Act, 11 
LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1405, 1416-19 (1979); Nancy L. Nowak, Note, The Trade Agreements 
Act of 1979: Counteroailing and Antidumping Procedures, 14 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 63, 84-85 
( 1979); Timothy J. Paten ode, Comment, The New Anti-Dumping Procedures of the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979: Does it Create a New Non-Tariff Trade Barrier?, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 200, 
221 (1980); Robert L. Reifenberg, Comment, Antidumping Investigations: Procedural Reform 
and Substantive Change Through the Trade Agreements Act, 1 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 261, 263, 281-82 
(1981). The United States and 25 other GATT contracting parties signed this Code, which 
replaced the Kennedy Round Antidumping Code. The Tokyo Round Code and Trade 
Agreements Act entered into force on Jan. 1, 1980. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 32. 
Both the Agreement and the Act supersede them. 
76. Davey, supra note 50, at 296 (emphasis added). 
77. See, e.g., Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 156 (suggesting that antidumping law 
is the most common method of "contingent protection"). 
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their predecessors, the Uruguay Round negotiators dodged this 
question and wound up expanding opportunities for a petitioner 
to deploy antidumping law as a nontariff barrier to trade. 
B. Focusing on Protectionist Abuse 
The profile of a protectionist abuser is a petitioner that has lost 
its comparative advantage in manufacturing merchandise to a 
respondent that makes the same or similar merchandise. The peti-
tioner is unwilling or unable to reduce its cost structure to meet 
global competitive pressures, fails to incorporate technological 
innovations in its manufacturing process and product design, or is 
insensitive to changes in consumer tastes. Its strategy for restoring 
its advantage is to raise the cost of imported merchandise by impos-
ing an antidumping duty on the imports. 
To some extent, the very filing of the petition serves this goal. It 
harasses the competitive respondent, generates uncertainty about 
the respondent's future prices and liabilities, and raises the respon-
dent's legal fees. 7s Litigation in federal courts may drag on for over 
a decade, thus enabling a petitioner to delay final liquidation of 
entries of merchandise.79 As Judge Posner writes: 
Of course, the concerns that actually animate anti-dumping, 
countervailing-duty, and other measures directed against alleg-
edly "unfair" trade practices of foreign producers go far beyond 
a concern with predatory pricing. The dominant concern is to pro-
tect U.S. industry from foreign producers that have genuinely lower costs, 
whether because they pay lower wages, incur fewer pollution-control and 
other regulatary costs, are better managed, have better workers, or have 
more modern plants and equipment. Policies so motivated are called 
"protectionist" . . . . 80 
78. See, e.g., Low, supra note 11, at 86 (stating that antidumping law "can in effect be 
easily used to create uncertainty and Inhibit trade" and that "[m]ere initiation of a case can 
have trade harassment effects."); ScHOTT, supra note 5, at 78 ("[T]he very initiation of an 
antidumping case casts a cloud over trade, both because the liability for penalty duties that 
accused exporters face is uncertain and potentially large, and because there is concern that 
national authorities will interpret the rules so as to favor the domestic constituents seeking 
import relief."); PoWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 13 (discussing the chilling effect of 
antidumping litigation and stating that the cost of defending against a petition typically 
exceeds $1 million per year); Tim W. Ferguson, Trade Policy's "Chokepoint", WALL ST.J., Apr. 
11, 1995, at A21 (explaining that "[s]ome manufacturers ... cannot bear the overhead 
expense and risk of a dumping case [and] withhold shipments to be safe .... By disrupting 
dependable supply channels, dumping law is the most injurious .form of trade barrier 
0 0 0 0 ") 0 ' 
79. See, e.g., Daniel Michaels, Legal Charges KeepEkctric Golf Cart Going-To Court, WALL 
ST. J., May 24, 1995, at A1 (discussing antidumping litigation involving golf carts from 
Poland that has run for 21 years). 
80. PoSNER, supra note 56, at 310·11 (emphasis added). 
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After initiating an antidumping case, the protectionist abuser 
eagerly manipulates the calculation of a dumping margin to maxi-
mize the potential duty. It exploits permissive injury and causation 
standards to support its dubious claim. In effect, the petitioner 
seeks governmental assistance to negate the economic law of com-
parative advantage with respect to specific merchandise.81 When-
ever the government obliges, it gives greater priority to the 
interests of the inefficient petitioner than to those of the importing 
country (not to mention the global economy) as a whole: 
Local firms suffer "injury" (in the sense that they make less, or 
lose more, money than they otherwise would) whenever the 
import price is the same or lower than the price they charge. 
That injury is no greater when dumping is present than when the import 
price merely reflects the comparative advantage of the exporter. But it is 
only when consumers in another country are charged a higher 
price that this injury triggers government action under 
antidumping laws. And this government action normally occurs, 
unless the "injury" criterion is unusually stringently construed, 
whatever the level of efficiency of local firms. Indeed, the less efficient the 
local firms, or the greater their local monopoly, the more easily the requi-
site injury can be shown (even though the local consumer's need for the 
low-priced goods is comparatively greater. J32 
In contrast to the protectionist petitioner, one bringing a merito-
rious antidumping action can show predatory dumping. It can 
demonstrate that the exporter sells merchandise in the importing 
market at a price below the exporter's average variable cost of pro-
duction.83 Further, it can prove that the exporter seeks to drive it 
out of business and, perhaps, to ultimately gain a monopoly posi-
tion in the importing country. Such a petition has merit because 
absent predqtory dumping· the petitioner would be a financially 
robust and competitive company. The antidumping order places 
both the petitioner and consumers of its product at risk.84 
To differentiate the protectionist abuser from the meritorious 
petitioner, antidumping law must avoid two pitfalls. First, it must 
81. This law, articulated by Adam Smith in 1776 and David Ricardo in 1819, remains 
the standard economic rationale for why nations trade. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES 
oF POLITICAL EcoNOMY AND TAXATION 141-42 (Piero Sraffa ed., 1951); ADAM SMITH, AN 
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 474, 474-95 (Edwin 
Cannan ed., 1976). For modem treatments of the principle, see generally BHALA, supra 
note 72, ch. l. To the extent international trade law reflects this principle, nations gain 
from trade. See id.; Ronald A. Brand, GAIT and the Evolution of United States Trade Law, 18 
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 101, 105, 116 (1992) (discussing the extent to which the principle is 
manifest in U.S. trade law). 
82. DAM, supra note 29, at 168-69 (emphasis added). 
83. See infra notes 59!H>01 and accompanying text. 
84. See discussion infra part IV.E. 
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be clear and unequivocal. A protectionist abuser is sure to exploit 
ambiguities. The broad comment of one observer about pre-Uru-
guay Round law remains true: 
[E]ven if there is some underlying validity to the notion of the 
international and national antidumping rules when properly 
managed, as actually managed currently it is fair to express con-
siderable doubt about the policy soundness of the implementa-
tion of some of these rules. There seems to be a considerable "tilt" 
against imports, and any close observer of the processes of gov-
ernments, whether of the United States, European Community, 
Canada, or Australia (the four principal users of antidumping 
law), can observe the considerable pressures brought by compet-
ing domestic producer groups so as to influence the govern-
mental implementation of the antidumping laws in order to 
limit import competition. 
United States law, in particular, is especially vulnerable to 
these type[s] of criticisms.s5 
Second, antidumping law must be grounded in microeconomic 
theory. It must examine the cost structure of a firm to isolate and 
sanction predation cases. The Agreement and the Act also fail to 
satisfy this criterion. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit accurately observed over a decade ago in Smith-CtYrona 
Group v. United States: 
Antidumping duties are imposed on the basis of differences in 
value, not differences in cost. The importation of foreign mer-
chandise can occur at a price greater than cost, yet still generate 
liability for an antidumping duty. The language of the statute 
would impose a duty on a foreign producer who "eats" either 
costs or profits in the American market relative to .the home 
market. Thus, cost criteria alone will not r~dress ¢-e fpll margin 
of dumping to which Congress sought to attach an antidumping 
duty. Value must be considered under the statute. : 
Congress sought to afford the domestic manufacturer strong 
protection against dumping, seeming to indicate that the Secre-
tary [of Commerce] should err in Javor of protectionism.86 
The traffic-light system proposed in Part V attempts to differentiate 
the protectionist abuser from the meritorious petitioner by avoid-
ing both pitfalls. 
85. JACKSON, supra note 74, at 242 (emphasis added). 
86. 713 F.2d 1568, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 
1022 (1984). The court's subsequent discussion of cost concerned only circumstances of 
sale adjustments to foreign market value, not a complete accounting for comparative 
advantage. Id. at 1577-82. This adjustment is discussed later. See infra notes 194-196 and 
accompanying text. 
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III. PRE-URUGUAY RouND .ANn:nuMPING LAw 
This is not a protectionist administration .... This is an admin-
istration that believes in opening markets. 87 
The principal U.S. antidumping statute is the 1930 Act,88 which 
mandates the assessment and collection of antidumping duties if 
findings are affirmative in two separate and final administrative 
determinations.89 These determinations are complex as well as 
contentious.90 The following flow chart lays out the course of an 
antidumping case:9I 
87. Paul Ingrassia & Asra Q. Nomani, Some Fear a Backlash As Detroit Prepares Charges 
Against japan, WALL ST.j., Feb. 8, 1993, at AI (quoting Commerce Secretary Ron Brown). 
88. Title VII of the 1930 Act contains the antidumping sections. See Trade Agreements 
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144, 150 (adding title VII, entitled Counter-
vailing and Antidumping Duties, to the Tariff Act of 1930) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 19 U.S.C.). After the Uruguay Round a number of terms used in the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act were changed to conform with the Agreement. For 
example: 
the term "export price" replaces the term "purchase price," the term constructed 
export price" replaces the term "exporter's sales price," and the term "normal 
value" replaces the term "foreign market value." In addition, because the Agree-
ment[ ] use[s] the term "like product" to refer to both foreign and domestic 
merchandise, the [Act] distinguishes between "foreign like product," which 
replaces the term "such or similar merchandise" (referring to merchandise pro-
duced in the foreign country whose exports to the United States are subject to 
investigation), and "domestic like product," which replaces the term "like prod-
uct" (which, under U.S. law, refers to U.S. production). And, for ease of refer-
ence, in ... the antidumping ... provisions, what was formerly referred to as the 
"class or kind" or merchandise subject to investigation ot covered by an order is 
now referred to as "subject merchandise." 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33. These changes may be easily referenced in the table 
of Pre- and Post-Uruguay Round Terminology and Abbreviations. See infra app. A. 
This Article us.es the pre-Uruguay Round terminology in its discussion of pre-Uruguay 
Round law, and the post-Uruguay Round terminology in its discussion of post-Uruguay 
Round law. 
For in-depth discussions of the 1930 Act, see BRuCE E. CLUBB, UNITED STATES FoREIGN 
TRADE LAw§§ 21.1-.33 (1991); Horlick, supra note 13; PATTISON, supra note 72, § 1.04; 
DAVID SERKO, IMPORT PRACTICE CuSTOMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 465-95 (2d ed. 
1991); THOMAS V. VAKERICS ET AL., ANTIDUMPING, COUNTERVAJUNG DUTY, AND OTHER 
TRADE ACTIONS 23-192 (1987); EDWIN A VERMULST, ANTIDUMPING LAw AND PRACTICE IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 31-193, 338-415, 504-626 ( 1987). 
89. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. at 162 (adding 
§ 731 of title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1673 
(1994)). 
90. See, e.g., Smith-Corona Group, 713 F.2d at 1571 (accurately pointing out that the 
dumping margin determination is "complicated by the difficulty in quantification of these 
factors [Foreign Market Value and United States Price] and the foreign policy repercus-
sions of a dumping determination," thus making it "a difficult and supremely delicate 
endeavor"). 
91. See discussion infra parts III.A-E (discussing the flow chart in greater detail). 
1995] Rethinking Antidumping Law 
TABLE 1. 
THE PROCESS OF AN ANrmUMPING CAsE 
1. Petition is filed with the DOC and the ITC. 
2. The lTC preliminary determination: "reasonable indication" of 
injury 
25 
a) If the ITC's preliminary dump-
ing injury determination is affirm-
ative, the DOC renders a 
preliminary determination as to 
whether there is a "reasonable 
b) H the ITC's preliminary dump-
ing injury is negative, the petition 
is dismissed. 
basis" for concluding there are 
less than fair value (LTFV) sales. 
3. The DOC preliminary dumping determination: "reasonable basis" 
that there are L TFV sales 
a) If the DOC's preliminary LTFV b) If the DOC's preliminary 
dumping determination is affirm- dumping injury determination is 
ative: (1) it suspends liquidation negative, the DOC proceeds to a 
of entries; and (2) requires that final dumping determination. 
estimated antidumping duties are 
deposited. The DOC proceeds to 
a final dumping determination. 
4. The DOC final dumping injury determination. 
a) If the DOC's final dumping b) If the DOC's final dumping 
injury determination is affirma- injury determination is negative, 
tive, the lTC renders a final injury thepetition is dismissed. Any sus-
determination. pension of entries is lifted and any 
estimated duty deposits are 
refunded. 
5. The ITC final injury determination 
a) If the ITC's final injury deter~ b) 'If the ITC's final injury deter-
mination is affirmative, the DOG mination is negative, the petition 
issues an antidumping order. is dismissed. Any suspension of 
liquidation of entries is lifted and 
any estimated duty deposits are 
refunded. 
First, the DOC must determine whether the respondent sells the 
class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation at less than 
fair value (LTFV) in the United States.92 It does so by calculating 
the dumping margin or the extent of cross-border price discrimi-
nation. Second, the lTC must determine that the merchandise 
92. For a discussion of this determination, see Alan F. Holmer &Judith Hippler Bello, 
U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series #9: The Scope of "Class or Kind of Merchandise" in Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duty Cases, 20 INT'L LAw. 1015, 1015-24 (1986). 
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materially injures or threatens to injure a U.S. industry or materi-
ally retards the establishment of a U.S. industry.93 
If both determinations are affirmative, the DOC issues an 
antidumping order calling for the collection of a duty equal to the 
dumping margin.94 The duty is collected by the U.S. Customs Ser-
vice on a company-specific basis for an indefinite period.95 It 
applies to current and future imports of the class or kind of mer-
chandise subject to investigation.96 
The amount of the duty depends on the estimated duty deposit, 
calculated as part of the DOC's initial investigation. The respon-
dent makes the deposit with the U.S. Customs Service at the time 
merchandise is imported.97 If neither the petitioner nor the 
respondent requests an annual administrative review, the estimated 
duty amount remains effective and the deposit is converted to an 
assessed duty. Each year, in the anniversary month of the 
antidumping order, either party may request the DOC to review 
whether the estimated amount is accurate or should be adjusted to 
yield a new amount applicable to the prior twelve months of 
imports. 98 If the DOC determines that a higher amount is appro-
priate, the respondent is liable for the difference between the esti-
mated and final amount plus any interest. If a lower amount is 
appropriate, the respondent receives a refund for the difference 
plus interest. In either case, the new final amount remains the 
deposit rate until completion of the next administrative review.99 
A. Filing a Petition 
Although the DOC may initiate an antidumping action, in 
almost every case an interested party files a petition. An "interested 
party" is one that acts on behalf of the allegedly affected U.S. indus-
try and may be defined as follows: (1) "a manufacturer, producer, 
or wholesaler in the United States of a domestic like product"; (2) 
a "certified ... or recognized union or group of workers which is 
representative of an [affected] industry"; (3) "a trade or business 
association [with] a majority of ... members" producing a domes-
tic like product; ( 4) a coalition of firms, unions, or trade associa-
93. OvERVIEw, supra note 30, at 64. 
94. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(1) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.21 (1995). 
95. See PoWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 5-6. 
96~ See Monique Ross & Pete Zarocostas, An Overview of Antidumping, GLOBAL TRADE 
TALK, Mar./ Apr. 1994, at 8, 8-9 (for a brief discussion of the role of the Customs Service). 
97. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)(1)(A)-(B) (1994). 
98. 19 u.s.c. § 1675 (1994). 
99. PoWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 5-6. 
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tions in which a majority of the individual members have standing; 
(5) a coalition or trade association representative of processors, or 
processors and producers, or processors and growers in cases 
involving processed agricultural products.100 A petitioner files with 
the DOC and the lTC simultaneously.1o1 
The DOC does not ask whether any other producers support the 
petition. Instead, it assumes that standing to file a petition exists 
unless a majority of the industry contests the petitioner's stand-
ing.102 Therefore, as Gary N. Horlick states, "when Commerce 
finds standing, it actually has no idea what proportion of the 
domestic industry supports the petition."103 The DOC does not 
place an emphasis on standing requirements because an antidump-
ing order cannot be issued until the DOC makes a final affirmative 
determination of injury to a U.S. industry. The DOC "has gone to 
great lengths to try to define the industry in such a way as to be 
able to find support from more than a mathematical majority." 104 
100. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(C)-(G) (1994); see also OVERVIEW, supra note 30, at 66; 
Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 667 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (upholding the DOC's interpretation that so long as a petition is filed by an "inter-
ested party," it is considered filed "on behalf of" the domestic industry). 
101. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(2) (1994). A petitioner, in its filing, must set forth the fol-
lowing information: (1) its identity; (2) the identity of all known domestic producers of the 
domestic like product; (3) the volume and value of the domestic like product that is pro-
duced by the petitioner and each domestic producer; ( 4) a description of the allegedly 
dumped product; (5) the name of each country in which the allegedly dumped product 
originates or from which it is exported; (6) the identity of each known exporter, foreign 
producer, and importer of the allegedly dumped product; (7) the nature of its injury alleg-
edly caused by the allegedly dumped product; (8) the export price or constructed export 
price of the allegedly dumped product; and (9) the NV of the allegedly dumped product. 
19 C.F.R. § 353.12(b) (1995). 
102. Horlick, supra note 13, at 154. 
103. !d. 
104. ld. at 155. U.S. companies may file claims when they are injured by dumping 
outside the United States. Such petitions may arise in the case of third-country dumping. 
For example, if U.S. and Japanese companies each sell merchandise in Thailand, the U.S. 
exporter may claim injury from dumping by the Japanese company. In this situation, the 
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is authorized to ask the third country-here, Thai-
land-to take action against dumping in its market that injures U.S. exporters. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677k(c)(1) (1994). In contrast, neither the DOC nor the International Trade Commis-
sion (lTC) is authorized to take action in response to requests from other countries. 
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 106. 
Downstream or diversionary input dumping is another example of dumping outside the 
United States that adversely affects U.S. exporters. Downstream dumping occurs when an 
exporter ships finished merchandise to the United States that is comprised of raw and 
intermediate goods that have been dumped in the exporter's country by some third coun-
try. For example, a Japanese company may sell merchandise in the United States com-
prised of Thai components dumped in Japan by a Thai exporter. As a result, the price of 
the imports sold in the United States is below that of comparable U.S.-made goods. In such 
a case a U.S. company may file a petition with the USTR for relief from alleged injury. 19 
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Although the DOC's aim is to identify and dismiss those petitions 
supported by producers accounting for only a small volume of the 
subject merchandise, the DOC makes little effort to ascertain the 
relevant facts and rarely dismisses a petition for lack of support.105 
B. Preliminary and Final Determinations 
Mter an antidumping petition is filed, the DOC and the ITC 
render preliminary and final administrative determinations.106 The 
process is designed to allow the U.S. Customs Service to begin col-
lecting security for antidumping duties as soon as the ITC and the 
DOC have preliminarily determined that imports are causing or 
threatening to cause injury to a U.S. industry and are being sold at 
less than fair value.1o1 
The DOC sets the duty rate by calculating the rate of dumping in 
three stages: ( 1) a preliminary determination (the basis for collect-
ing the security); (2) a final determination (the basis for collecting 
cash deposits of the estimated duties); and (3) an annual review of 
the dumping order (the basis for collecting the actual duties and 
liquidating the entries of the class or kind of merchandise subject 
to investigation) .108 Absent a request for an annual review, the lia-
bility of the importer of the merchandise is fixed at the cash 
deposit rate. 
The ITC makes an initial preliminary determination as to 
whether there is a "reasonable indication" of material injury within 
forty-five days after a petition is filed. 109 If this determination is 
negative, the investigation is concluded. If the ITC's preliminary 
injury determination is affirmative, the DOC makes a second pre-
liminary determination as to whether there is a "reasonable basis to 
believe or suspect" that the class or kind of merchandise subject to 
U.S.C. § 1677k(b) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 71. If the USTR finds a reasonable 
basis for the allegation of downstream dumping, it requests the government of the third 
country-here, Thailand-to investigate and, if necessary, take action against the dump-
ing on behalf of the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1677k(c)(1) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 
30, at 71. If the foreign government refuses to take such action, the USTR consults with the 
petitioner to determine whether relief under U.S. law is appropriate. 19 U.S.C. § 1677k(e) 
(1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 71. 
105. Horlick, supra note 13, at 155. 
106. For discussions of procedural aspects of these determinations, see OVERVIEW, supra 
note 30, at 66-69; VAKERICS, supra note 88, at 23-56. 
107. See OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 69. 
108. !d. at 66-69. 
109. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 66-67. This and other 
time limits for preliminary and final determinations are subject to extension under certain 
circumstances. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(5)(B) (1994). 
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investigation is or is likely to be sold at less than fair value. 11o The 
DOC must make this determination within 160 days after a petition 
is filed, but the DOC may not do so before the lTC has made a 
preliminary affirmative determination of injury.111 
An affirmative preliminary dumping margin determination by 
the DOC has three effects. First, the DOC directs the U.S. Customs 
Service to suspend liquidation of all entries of merchandise subject 
to the affirmative preliminary determination.112 Liquidation is "the 
final computation of the duties and fees due on an entry."113 The 
suspension requires the U.S. Customs Service to "defer[] calcula-
tion of the amount and rate of duty applicable to each individual 
entry until a later time."114Second, the respondent posts with the 
U.S. Customs Service a cash deposit, bond, or other appropriate 
security equal to the estimated dumping margin calculated by the 
DOC in its preliminary determination for each entry of the class or 
kind of merchandise subject to investigation.115 This security 
deposit is required to ensure payment of antidumping duties in the 
event that final affirmative dumping and injury determinations are 
rendered and an antidumping order is issued. 
Third, the lTC begins a final injury determination. If the DOC's 
preliminary determination is negative, the lTC will not begin a 
final injury determination unless the DOC renders a final affirma-
tive dumping determination.116 The lTC renders its final determi-
nation of injury by the later of 120 days after the DOC's 
preliminary affirmative determination, or forty-five days after the 
DOC's final affirmative determination.II7 
The DOC renders a final determination regardless of whether its 
preliminary dumping margin determination is affirmative or nega-
tive. It makes its final determination within seventy-five days of its 
preliminary determination. 118 If its final determination is negative, 
the DOC terminates the investigation,119 revokes the suspension of 
llO. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1)(A) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 67. 
Ill. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1)(A) (1994) (stating 140 days after initiation of investiga-
tion); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 67 (stating 160 days after filing of petition). 
ll2. 19 u.s.c. § 1673b(d)(2) (1994). 
ll3. RicHARD M. BELANGER, IMPORT AND CuSTOMS CoMPLIANCE GumE, glossary, at 7 
(1995); see also 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (1995) (defining liquidation as "the final computation or 
ascertainment of the duties or drawback accruing on an entry"). 
114. BELANGER, supra note ll3, 'I 1512.21. 
ll5. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) (1)(B) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 67. 
ll6. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 67. 
ll7. 19 u.s.c. § 1673d(b)(2) (1994). 
liS. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(1) (1994); BELANGER, supra note ll3, '11512.22. 
ll9. BELANGER, supra note ll3, 'I 1512.22. 
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liquidation, and refunds any estimated antidumping duty depos-
its.120 If the DOC's final determination is affirmative, the lTC 
makes a final injury determination.I2I 
If the ITC's final determination is negative, it terminates the case 
and refunds any estimated duty deposits. 122 If it is affirmative, the 
DOC issues an antidumping order within seven days of the ITC's 
determination.123 The order requires the U.S. Customs Service to 
collect an antidumping duty equal to the dumping margin. 124 The 
company that imports the dumped product ultimately is responsi-
ble for payment of this duty as well as estimated duty deposits.125 
The antidumping order applies on a countrywide basis. It 
includes all exporters, whether or not investigated, unless the DOC 
determines that a specific exporter is selling its product at a 
nondumped price.126 The DOC generally attempts to include 
exporters accounting for 60% of U.S. imports of the class or kind 
of merchandise subject to investigation in its LTFV investigation. 
Nonetheless, the 40% of exporters not investigated are subject to 
the order. 127 
C. The Dumping Margin Calculation 
1. The Basic Formula 
To calculate the dumping margin, the DOC makes a "fair" value 
comparison between: (1) the United States Price (USP), the price 
of the class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation in the 
United States; and (2) the foreign market value (FMV), the price 
of "such or similar merchandise" in the exporter's home market. 128 
The formula for the dumping margin calculation is: 
120. See id. 
121. 19 u.s.c. § 1673d(b) (2) (1994). 
122. See BEI.ANGER, supra note 113, 'I 1512.23; 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (1994). 
123. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 69. 
124. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 69. 
125. 19 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994) (citing "importer of record" is responsible). 
126. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.14(a), 353.21(c) (1995). 
127. See David A Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in 
the United States, 12 Aluz.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 70. The order also covers merchandise from 
a new shipper. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(d)(2) (1994). A new shipper is an exporter that did not 
ship merchandise at the time the order was issued but began exportation thereafter. /d. 
128. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994). Section 233(a) (4) of the Act substituted "foreign like 
product" for "such or similar merchandise." See Act, supra note 23, 108 Stat. at 4899. 
Under pre-Uruguay Round law the term "such or similar merchandise" was defined as 
merchandise identical or comparable to the merchandise subject to investigation. See 19 
u.s.c. § 1677(16) (1994). 
Several cases have addressed the relationship between the DOC's determination of the 
class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation (for purposes of the dumping margin 
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Dumping Margin= FMV- USP. 
The DOC faces three threshold questions in the dumping mar-
gin calculation. First, can nondumped sales offset dumped sales? 
An exporter may make some, but not all of its home-market sales at 
a price above the USP. The DOC does not offset sales made at 
LTFV in the United States-those where the FMV exceeds the 
USP-against those not made at LTFV-those where the FMV is 
less than the USP.I29 
Second, is there an amount of dumping that is nonactionable? 
Nonactionable dumping is defined in terms of a de minimis dump-
ing margin or volume of imports. 130 Although there is no bright-
line rule to determine whether the volume of the class or kind of 
merchandise subject to investigation is de minimis,I31 a weighted 
average dumping margin of 0.5% or less is typically considered de 
m1mmis. If such a margin exists, the DOC terminates its 
investigation.132 
Third, should average or individual transaction prices be used to 
compare the FMV with the USP? It is critical to compare "apples 
with apples." If an average-to-average methodology is used, the 
DOC compares the average FMV to the average USP. The averages 
investigation) and the ITC's identification of a like domestic product (for purposes of the 
injury investigation). See Hosiden Corp. v. United States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 1088, 1094-99 
(1992) (holding that the ITC must make a separate injury determination for each class or 
kind of merchandise designated by the DOC, but that the ITC's like product determina-
tion could include products with minor differences in physical characteristics or uses from 
the imported article); Torrington Co. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1278, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (upholding the ITC's determination that there were six separate like products and 
domestic industries involving antifriction bearings); see also Luciano Pisoni Fabbrica Acces-
sori Instrument Musicali v. United States, 10 Ct. Int'l Trade 424, 429 (1986) (holding that 
the DOC improperly compared Italian woodwind instrument pads without allowing for 
differences in physical characteristics and pad sizes). 
129. See Davey, supra note 50, at 298-99; Horlick, supra note 13, at 146. 
130. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(4) (1994);jACKSON, supra note 74, at 232. 
131. The issue of whether a dumping margin is de minimis is distinct from the issue of 
whether the volume of imports is negligible. While the first issue is determined by the 
DOC, the second issue is a matter for the ITC. In making a material injury determination, 
the ITC declines to cumulate imports that are negligible and that have no discernible 
impact on the domestic injury. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1994). "Negligible" is defined in terms 
of qualitative factors, and the ITC examines the U.S. market share held by each country's 
imports. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(24) (1994). 
132. 19 C.F.R. § 353.6 (1995); see also Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 10 
Ct. Int'l Trade 301, 306 (1986) (Carlisle II) (holding that a 0.45% margin might be de 
minimis if the DOC can adequately explain the basis for such a finding). The de minimis 
exception was not set forth in the statute. Rather, it was created by the DOC over the 
objections of petitioners. See Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 1 Ct. Int'l Trade 
352, 353-54 (1981) (Carlisle 1). The exception was promulgated as a regulation after Carlisle 
II 
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are based on data from the same time period and the respondent 
may be able to use nondumped sales to offset dumped sales. Con-
versely, if the DOC uses the individual-to-individual methodology, 
it compares the FMV of a specific sale in the exporter's home mar-
ket to the USP associated with a specific and contemporaneous sale 
in the United States. Although the DOC is authorized to use either 
methodology, 133 its practice is to calculate an average of prices in 
the exporter's home market-generally based on a six-month 
period-and then to compare that average to an individual U.S. 
sales price. 134 This practice protects firms and consumers against 
"targeted" dumping, where an exporter charges a dumped price to 
particular customers or regions while selling at higher prices to 
other customers or regions at the same time. 135 
2. Identifying the USP 
The USP is based on either the Purchaser's Price (PP) or the 
Exporter's Sales Price (ESP) of the class or kind of merchandise 
subject to investigation.136 Both measures attempt to establish an 
arms-length price; namely, an unbiased, undistorted figure. 137 The 
PP is the price at which the class or kind of merchandise subject to 
investigation is purchased or agreed to be purchased from the 
manufacturer for export to the United States prior to the date of 
importation into the United States. 138 The DOC uses the PP if the 
exporter sells the merchandise before importation by an unrelated 
U.S. purchaser. 139 The ESP is the price at which the exporter sells 
133. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(a)-(c) (1994). 
134. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33; Boltuck & Litan, supra note 56, at 14. In 
contrast to the calculation period for a Less Than Fair Value (LTFV) investigation, the 
DOC uses a monthly average when reviewing an antidumping order. 
135. Boltuck & Litan, supra note 56, at 14 (discussing individual-to-average compari-
sons and "spot" or "rifleshot" dumping); HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 98; MESSAGE, 
supra note 69, at 842; see also Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1156, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (observing that "[a]veraging U.S. prices defeats [the purpose of the antidumping 
statute] by allowing foreign manufacturers to offset sales made at Jess-than-fair value with 
higher priced sales. Commerce refers to this practice as 'masked dumping' "). 
136. OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 65. Some scholars do not always differentiate carefully 
between the Purchaser's Price (PP) and the Export Sales Price (ESP). See, e.g., JACKSON, 
supra note 74, at 232 (stating that either ESP or PP shall be used, "whichever is 
appropriate"). 
137. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.04(1]. 
138. 19 C.F.R § 353.41(b) (1995). 
139. See PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.04[2]. The PP is also used where an intermediary, 
whether unrelated or related to the exporter, exists between the exporter and the U.S. 
buyer. Suppose the buyer has an overseas purchasing agent that purchases merchandise 
from an unrelated foreign manufacturer. The price paid by the agent to that manufacturer 
is the PP. Conversely, suppose a foreign manufacturer has a U.S. marketing subsidiary that 
1995] Rethinking Antidumping Law 33 
or agrees to sell the class or kind of merchandise subject to investi-
gation.140 It is most frequently used "when the merchandise has 
not as yet been sold at the time of importation and, therefore, 
since the exporter or a party related to the exporter still has title 
over the goods, is imported for the benefit of the exporter."141 
3. Identifying the FMV 
The DOC begins the FMV determination with one threshold 
inquiry: What merchandise sold by the exporter in its home market 
is the same as the class or kind of merchandise subject to investiga-
tion in the United States? Ideally, the DOC will be able to identify 
identical merchandise the exporter sells in the home market in a 
quantity sufficient to allow for meaningful comparison. The DOC 
modifies its FMV determination, however, if the exporter does not 
sell identical merchandise in the home market or if the exporter 
sells a significant amount of merchandise at a price below the cost 
of production.142 In these situations, the DOC may look to a CV or 
to intermediate country sales in determining the FMV. 143 
Although the DOC prefers to use identical merchandise, 144 such 
merchandise may not exist because of differences in style, design, 
or features that accommodate variations in consumer preferences 
in the home and U.S. markets. The DOC may be _forced to use the 
exporter's sales of merchandise similar to or of the same general 
class as the merchandise subject to investigation. 145 If the exporter 
does not sell identical or comparable merchandise in its home 
sells merchandise to an unrelated U.S. buyer. The price charged by that subsidiary to the 
buyer is the PP. Note, however, that under certain circumstances, if the merchandise is 
placed in inventory at the expense of the subsidiary before it is sold to the buyer, the price 
is the ESP. In both cases the DOC relies on the PP because the exporter knows the mer-
chandise is destined for the United States. 
140. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (1994); 19 C.F.R § 353.41(c) (1995); see OvERVIEW, supra 
note 30, at 65. Section 223 of the Act generally amended 19 U.S.C. § 1677a, substituting 
the term "export sales price" with "constructed export price." Act, supra note 23, 108 Stat. 
at 4876-78. 
141. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.04[3]. In practice, despite the statutory language 
regarding the ESP, the DOC sometimes focuses more on which party has title to the mer-
chandise and whether the merchandise is held in inventory in the United States, than on 
the time the sale actually occurs. 
142. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(C) (1994). 
143. Id. § 1677b(a)(4). 
144. See id. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (using the term "foreign like product"). 
145. These alternative preferences are set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16) (1994). The 
DOC seeks to treat merchandise with distinct features as if it were identical, unless there 
are significant differences in cost associated with the features. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16) (1994). 
The market value of the particular features may also be relevant. PATIISON, supra note 72, 
§ 5.06[5]. 
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country, the DOC investigates whether the exporter sells identical 
or comparable merchandise in a third country.146 In some cases, 
the DOC may have to look to sales in a third country as a basis for 
the FMV even though sales exist in the home market of identical or 
comparable merchandise. This situation arises when: (1) the 
exporter sells merchandise only or largely for export, eliminating 
home-market sales or rendering them so few as to provide an inad-
equate basis for comparison; and (2) more than 90% of sales are 
disregarded by the DOC as below the exporter's cost of 
production. 147 
To determine whether an exporter's home market provides an 
adequate basis for comparison, the DOC applies a 5% "home-mar-
ket viability test." If the volume of home-market sales is less than 
5% of the volume the exporter sells to third countries, it is deemed 
insufficient. 148 The market viability formula is: 
MV = (<bi/(b) X 100 
where MV is market viability, <bi is the quantity of sales by an 
exporter of such or similar merchandise in its home market, and 
(b is the quantity of sales by an exporter of such or similar mer-
chandise to countries other than the United States. 149 If the home 
market is not viable, the DOC bases the FMV on the price at which 
the exporter sells such or similar merchandise to a third 
country. 150 
146. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.05[3). 
147. !d. § 5.05[2]. Alternatively, unique circumstances may exist in the home market 
that render sales therein incomparable. !d.§ 5.05[3]. 
148. 19 C.F.R. § 353.48 (1995). The test has a long history. SeeH.R. REP. No. 1261, 85th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1957); S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 92-95 (1979), reprinted in 
1979 U.S.C.CAN. 381, 478-81. 
The DOC, in some instances, may choose to examine U.S., not third-country, sales. See 
PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.05[2]. 
149. 19 C.F.R. § 353.46 (1995). 
150. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(C) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.49(a) (1995); see also NMB 
Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 590, 593-95 (1991) (holding that the 
DOC erred in including ball bearing parts in the calculation of the viability of the Singa-
pore home market for ball bearings). 
A variation of the third-country sales scenario occurs when a foreign company with inad-
equate home-country sales has production facilities in several countries. The DOC may use 
data from the markets in which a multinational company's facilities are located as a basis 
for calculating the foreign market value (FMV). See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(d) (1994); 19 C.F.R. 
§ 353.53 (1995). 
If sales in two or more third countries may provide a basis for calculating the FMV, an 
interesting question arises as to selection of an appropriate third country. Criteria for mak-
ing this selection are set forth at 19 C.F.R. § 353.49 (b) (1995). See also Southwest Fla. Win-
ter Vegetable Growers Ass'n v. United States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 99, 103 (1984) (rejecting a 
claim that use of third-country sales was inappropriate because of price volatility and sales 
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The DOC disregards sales made at prices below the cost of pro-
duction in the home- or third-country market and calculates the 
FMV on the basis of the remaining above-cost sales. 15 1 The exclu-
sion of below-cost sales causes the FMV to rise because below-cost 
sales are the exporter's lowest-price sales. In turn, the probability 
of an affirmative dumping margin determination increases. 
Before disregarding certain sales, the DOC must have "reason-
able grounds to believe or suspect" that the exporter sells such or 
similar merchandise in the home- or third-country market at prices 
below the cost of production. 152 If reasonable grounds exist, the 
DOC determines whether such sales exist "in fact." The DOC must 
then exclude these sales if they are made: ( 1) "in substantial quan-
tities;" (2) "over an extended period of time;" and (3) not "at 
prices which permit recovery of all costs within a reasonable period 
of time in the normal course of trade."153 
As to the first criterion, the DOC considers sales to be made in 
substantial quantities when they cross a 10% threshold. If 10% or 
less of the sales of a particular product are below cost, they are 
included in the calculation of the FMV. 154 If between 10% and 
90% of the sales are below cost, the DOC only uses those sales that 
are above cost. 155 If more than 90% of the sales are below cost, the 
DOC disregards all sales. 156 
With respect to the second criterion, an extended period of time 
normally means a period greater than six months.157A recent case, 
however, suggests a three-month period will be typical in the 
future. 158 
below cost of production in the third country). In certain circumstances the DOC may 
combine sales to several third countries. 
151. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.51(a) (1995). The cost of produc-
tion of such or similar merchandise sold in the home market is the sum of the costs of 
manufacturing the merchandise (and includes factors such as materials and labor costs, 
factory overhead, financing expenses), plus an amount for general expenses, such as 
expenses incurred to sell the product. It does not include an amount for profit. 19 C.F.R. 
§ 353.51(c) (1995). For a discussion of the Cost of Production Questionnaire used by the 
DOC, see PATIISON, supra note 72, § 5.05[7]. 
152. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1994); 19 C.F.R § 353.51(a) (1995). 
153. 19 C.F.R. § 353.51(a)(1)-(2) (1995). 
154. Horlick, supra note 13, at 137. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b)(2)(B) (1994). 
158. Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products from the United 
Kingdom, 60 Fed. Reg. 10061, 10063 (Dep't Comm. 1995) (preliminary results of 
antidumping review). 
36 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. [Vol. 29 
The third criterion is defined in a case-specific context. 159 As a 
practical matter, it is usually ignored by the DOC and therefore is 
not a source of controversy. 
If neither home- nor third-country sales are an adequate basis 
for the FMV, either because of insufficient sales or because more 
than 90% of the sales are disregarded as below the cost of produc-
tion, the DOC identifies the FMV by calculating the CV of such or 
similar merchandise.160 A statutory formula for the CV emphasizes 
the average total costs of manufacture plus a minimum amount for 
profit and overhead. 161 The CV functions as a substitute for the 
sales price and thus incorporates the same items as an actual sales 
price. It equals the sum of: (1) the costs of materials, fabrication, 
and other processing; (2) an amount for general expenses based 
on actual financial performance, but at least 10% of material and 
fabrication costs; (3) an amount for profits based on actual finan-
cial performance but at least 8% of materials, fabrication costs, and 
general expenses; and ( 4) the cost of all containers, coverings, and 
packing.I62 
Sometimes the class or kind of merchandise subject to investiga-
tion is exported to the United States from an intermediate country, 
rather than directly from the country of origin. In such cases, the 
DOC bases the FMV of such or similar merchandise on sales in the 
intermediate country if: ( 1) the producer of the merchandise does 
159. See PATIISON, supra note 72, § 5.05[6] (stating that the DOC treats many below-
cost sale issues "on a case-by-case basis" and has "no available set of guidelines ... which are 
of general applicability in below cost sale situations."). 
160. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (2), (b), (e) (1994). The DOC expressly prefers to examine 
third-country sales as a basis for determining the FMV before resorting to the CV. 19 C.F.R. 
§ 353.48(b) (1995); see also Floral Trade Council v. United States, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 497, 
500-01 (1991) (upholding the DOC's rejection of home-market and third-country sales in 
favor of CV because: (1) U.S. and third-country prices were not positively correlated; (2) 
third-country sales occurred only in peak months; and (3) the perishability of the prod-
uct-fresh-cut flowers-led to price differentials unrelated to dumping). However, as a 
practical matter, when there are no acceptable home-market sales to serve as a basis for 
determining the FMV, the DOC often uses the CV without bothering to seek data on third-
country prices. 
161. 19 C.F.R. § 353.50(a) (1995). The concept of the cost of manufacturing-which is 
associated with the CV and adjustments for differences in merchandise, see infra notes 186-
187 and accompanying text-is distinct from the concept of the cost of production, which 
is associated with below-cost sales. The cost of manufacturing includes only variable costs of 
production. 
162. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.50(a) (1995). General expenses 
include interest, and the DOC's approach to interest has created controversy. See generally 
Mark David Davis &Jeffrey Allen May, Recent Stitches in the Department of Commerce's Cost of 
Production Analysis: The MMF Sweaters Antidumping Case and Commerce's Treatment of Interest 
Expense, 25 Gw. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. ll5, 123-30 (1991) (discussing the DOC's 
approach to interest). 
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not know its merchandise is destined for export; and (2) the class 
or kind of merchandise subject to investigation is transshipped 
through, not substantially transformed in, the intermediate coun-
try.163 When either of these conditions is not satisfied, or the inter-
mediate-country market is not viable (i.e., sales are too small in 
volume to serve as a basis for the FMV), the DOC bases the FMV on 
sales in the country of origin. 
Regardless of whether home-country sales, third-country sales, 
the CV, or sales in an intermediate country are used to identify the 
FMV, the sale prices typically will be denominated in a foreign cur-
rency. The DOC converts these prices into U.S. dollars at an offi-
cial quarterly foreign exchange rate published by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.164 Because exchange rates are notori-
ously volatile, changing dramatically in a short period,165 the DOC 
disregards temporary fluctuations. Temporary fluctuations are 
those where the exchange rate on a day during the investigation 
period varies by 5% or more from the applicable quarterly rate 
during that period.I66 
4. Adjusting the USP 
The DOC and lawyers for the petitioner and respondent spend 
an enormous amount of time and energy adjusting the FMV and 
163. 19 U.S.C. § l677b(a) (3) (1994). 
164. See 31 U.S.C. § 5151 (1988) (ordering the secretary of the Treasury to estimate 
and publish the values of foreign coins quarterly). Under certain circumstances the DOC 
may use a hedged, or forward, rate. 
165. See generally Raj Bhala, Risk Trade-Offs in the Foreign Exchange Spot, Forward and Deriv-
ative Markets, THE FINANCIER: ANALYSES OF CAPITAL AND MoNEY MARKET TRANSACTIONS, Aug. 
1994, at 34, 34-50 (discussing the management of currency risks). For a recent discussion 
of key issues, see Thyssen Stahl AG v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 23, 25-29 (Ct. Im'l Trade 
1995) (discussing an adjustment to the U.S. price requested by Thyssen under 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677a(c)(2)(A)). 
166. See 19 C.F.R § 353.60(b) (1995); PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.01(3]. For discus-
sions of pre-Uruguay Round rules on currency conversion, see William Dickey, Antidump-
ing: Currency Fluctuations as a Cause of Dumping Margins, 7 INT'L TRADE LJ. 67 (1982) 
(discussing the potential for widespread antidumping activity during 1982); William 
Mange, Recent Development, 20 TEx. INT'L LJ. 425 (1985) (discussing one court's method of 
calculating the foreign currency exchange rate); N. David Palmeter, Exchange Rates and 
Antidumping Determinations,]. WoRLD TRADE, 1988, at 73, 73-80 (discussing the selection of 
an appropriate exchange rate under Article VI of the GATT). Of course, the DOC cannot 
ignore long-term appreciation or depreciation, such as the appreciation of the Japanese 
yen relative to the U.S. dollar from approximately 1992 to the present. See THE BANK 
CREDIT ANALYST RESEARCH GROUP, THE OUTLOOK 1995, at 57 (1995) (on file with The George 
Washington journal of International Law and Economics). Exporters are expected to respond 
to such trends within a reasonable period known as the "lag time." See 19 C.F.R. 
§ 353.60(b) (1995); PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.01(3]. 
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the USP to ensure that the methodologies used to arrive at those 
prices are comparable: 
Were products produced overseas and in U.S. markets virtually 
identical in physical and sales characteristics, the complex 
adjustments established by the Tariff Act would be unnecessary. 
In reality, however, such identical characteristics are never pres-
ent. Even if domestic and export products are identical physi-
cally, they are inevitably packed and transported differently, and 
often sold through different commercial procedures. The 
adjustment framework is designed to effectively reduce domestic 
and U.S. sales to common denominators so that they may be 
fairly compared.l67 
Adjustments are supposed to ensure that the FMV and the USP are 
ex-factory prices, or prices prevailing when the merchandise leaves 
the factory in which it is made. 
Determining the appropriate adjustments is very complicated 
and largely within the discretion of the DOC. The stakes are high 
because whether the DOC finds a dumping margin invariably 
depends on adjustments made to the sales prices. 168 Arguments 
about adjustments are common, time-consuming, and costly. One 
practitioner writes that "fighting over adjustments to [the FMV and 
the USP] historically has been the main forum for lawyers' 
efforts." 169 Another writes that "[m]any attorney hours are spent 
on numerous potential adjustments to each of the prices to be 
compared."170 A petitioner's incentive is to maximize the dumping 
margin by maximizing the FMV and minimizing the USP. It seeks 
to minimize deductions from the FMV and maximize deductions 
from the USP. Conversely, a respondent wants to minimize or elim-
inate the dumping margin by minimizing the FMV (without lower-
ing prices below cost) and maximizing the USP. It aims to 
167. PA"ITISON, supra note 72, § 5.01[1]. Similarly, one observer points out that the 
dumping margin 
determination process can be extremely complex, partly because of the large 
number of potential "adjustments" that can be made either to the export price 
figures or to the comparable home-market price in order to arrive at what is 
deemed a fair comparison. 
jACKSON, supra note 74, at 231-32; see generaUy Charlene Barshefsky & Richard 0. Cunning-
ham, The Prosecution of Antidumping Actions Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 6 N.C.]. 
INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 307, 343-50 (1981) (for discussions of adjustments under pre-Uru-
guay Round law); U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERCE, STUDY OF ANTIDUMPING ADJUSTMENTS METHOD-
OLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY CHANGE (1985) (regarding the need and 
the means for simplifying and modifying adjustment practices). 
168. See PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.06[1] ("[T]he results of most antidumping investi-
gations hinge upon the application of such adjustments."). 
169. Horlick, supra note 13, at 144. 
170. jACKSON, supra note 74, at 233. 
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maximize deductions from the FMV and minimize deductions 
from the USP. 
The DOC makes adjustments for differences in the quantity and 
quality of merchandise sold in the exporter's home market and the 
United States, as well as for differences in the circumstances of sale 
in these two markets. 171 It may make several adjustments to the 
USP, whether the PP or the ESP. These adjustments are divided 
into two categories: additions to and subtractions from a starting 
figure for the USP. 
The DOC makes three additions to the USP, assuming these 
additions are not already included in the USP and are directly 
related to the class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation: 
(1) the cost of containers and coverings used to pack the merchan-
dise for shipment to the United States;172 (2) the amount of any 
import duties imposed by the exporting country that are rebated 
or uncollected because the merchandise is exported to the United 
States;173 and (3) the amount of any taxes imposed by the export-
ing country that are rebated or uncollected because the merchan-
dise is exported to the United States. 174 The logic behind making 
these additions to the USP is that the FMV includes these items. 
171. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (1994). Some obseiVers fail to differentiate care-
fully among the adjusonents made to the FMV versus the United States Price (USP). See, 
e.g., jACKSON, supra note 74, at 232-33 (explaining that for the ESP a single price is matched 
to determine whether dumping or LTFV exists, but because the FMV is an average of all 
expon sales, about half of the expon sales are below the average (the FMV), and thus 
dumping or LTFV is established). 
172. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c) (1) (A) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41 (d) (1) (i) (1995). This addi-
tion, which concerns preshipment expenses, is distinct from the deduction for costs associ-
ated with the shipment of the merchandise to the United States. See infra note 175 and 
accompanying text. In effect, the DOC attempts to arrive at net prices for merchandise 
packed ready for shipment to the United States. Accordingly, it deducts packing costs from 
both the USP and the FMV but includes the cost of U.S. packing. See infra note 182 and 
accompanying text. 
173. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(B) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d)(l)(ii) (1995). An exam-
ple of this addition would be drawback of customs duties. 
174. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(l)(B) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d)(l)(iii) (1995). An 
example of this addition would be an indirect tax such as a sales or value added tax. See, 
e.g., Daewoo Elec. Co. v. International Union ofEiec. Workers, 6 F.3d 1511, 1513-19 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993) (upholding the DOC's accounting methodology whereby all Korean commodity 
taxes assessed on home-market sales but forgiven upon expon were added to the USP, and 
finding that the DOC was not required to make an econometric analysis of the tax inci-
dence on Korean consumers); Zenith Elec. Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573, 1580-82 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that the DOC improperly applied a circumstances-of-sale adjust-
ment to the FMV to account for a multiplier effect of home-country taxes associated with 
an adjustment to the USP). As the Daewoo and Zenith cases suggest, how to adjust for 
rebated or uncollected taxes has been litigated extensively. 
Technically, the 1930 Act, as codified in the U.S. Code, calls for a fourth addition-the 
amount of any countervailing duty imposed by the United States on merchandise to offset 
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The exporter incorporates packing costs, import duties, and taxes 
into the price of such or similar merchandise and passes these 
items onto home-country consumers. Without these additions, the 
FMV and the USP are incomparable because the USP is artificially 
low and any dumping margin is correspondingly high. 
The DOC also makes two deductions from the USP, assuming 
they are not already excluded: (1) costs associated with shipping 
the class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation from the 
original place of shipment in the exporting country to the United 
States; 175 and (2) the amount of any export taxes imposed by the 
exporting country on the merchandise. 176 The rationale for mak-
ing these deductions is that the FMV excludes these items. The 
exporter does not incorporate these items in the price of such or 
similar merchandise and does not pass them on to home-country 
consumers. Without these deductions, the FMV and the USP are 
incomparable because the USP is artificially high and any dumping 
margin is correspondingly low. 
If the ESP is the basis for the USP, the DOC makes three further 
deductions, assuming the ESP also includes these deductions: (1) 
any direct or indirect selling expenses incurred by the exporter-
such as a commission paid, guarantee, warranty, or credit 
expense-to sell subject merchandise in the United States; 177 (2) 
any direct or indirect expenses incurred by the exporter to sell 
merchandise in the United States that is the same or similar to sub-
ject merchandise; 178 and (3) the amount of any value added to the 
merchandise as a result of manufacture or assembly after its import 
into the United States, but before its sale to an unrelated buyer. 179 
The second deduction is related to the ESP offset to the FMV. 180 
These deductions are necessary because of the costs associated with 
using the ESP. 
an export (but not domestic) subsidy provided by the exporter's government. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677a(c)(1)(C) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d)(l)(iv) (1995). 
175. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d)(2)(i) (1995). These 
include, for example, international and U.S. freight charges, insurance premiums, han-
dling, port and customs brokerage fees, U.S. import duties, and warehousing expenses. 
PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.04(4). 
176. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(B) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d)(2)(ii) (1995). This 
deduction is rarely applied because so few countries tax their exports. 
177. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(l)(A)-(C) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(e)(1)-(2) (1995). 
178. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(l)(D) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(e)(2) (1995). An example 
might be advertising expenses. 
179. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(2) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(e)(3) (1995). 
180. See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text. 
1995] Rethinking Antidumping Law 41 
When the ESP is used, the exporter sells and ships merchandise 
to a related party in the United States before a final sale to an unre-
lated buyer is arranged. Typically, the exporter pays the related 
party a commission and incurs selling expenses in connection with 
the final sale. Before this sale, the related party may process the 
merchandise further by adding material or labor. Neither the com-
mission nor the expenses are included in the FMV of such or simi-
lar merchandise the exporter sells directly to consumers in its 
home market. 
The DOC also excludes from the FMV material, labor, and other 
expenses associated with processing in the United States because 
merchandise sold in the home market is not further processed. If 
commissions, sales expenses, and value added are not deducted, 
the ESP is artificially inflated and the dumping margin is corre-
spondingly small. In practice, a case involving further processing 
may be extraordinarily complicated, particularly where there are 
multiple related parties and the value added in the United States is 
high. 
5. Adjusting the FMV 
Like adjustments to the USP, adjustments to the FMV are 
divided into additions to and subtractions from a starting figure for 
the FMV.181 Some of these adjustments are the same as those made 
to the USP. If, for example, the cost of containers and coverings 
used to pack such or similar merchandise sold in the exporter's 
home market is not already included, it is added to the FMV. 182 
Four types of adjustments to the FMV that are particularly notewor-
thy include those made to account for differences in: (1) the quan-
tity of merchandise sold in the home market and the United States; 
(2) the physical characteristics of merchandise sold in the home 
market and United States; (3) the levels of trade of such sales; and 
(4) the circumstances of such sales. Iss 
181. The DOC has a de minimis rule regarding FMV adjustments. Any individual 
adjustment with an ad valorem effect of less than 0.33%, or any group of adjustments with 
an ad valorem effect of less than 1%, is de minimis and may be disregarded. 19 C.F.R. 
§ 353.59(a) (1995). In practice, this rule is rarely invoked because the DOC has to make 
the adjustment in order to determine whether it has a de minimis effect. There is no 
reason to disregard the adjustment once it is made. 
182. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.46(a) (1), 353.49(a) (1) (1995). But see Ad Hoc Comm. of AZ-NM-
TX-FL Producers of Gray Portland Cement v. United States, 13 F.3d 398, 402 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (holding that home-market transportation costs in the country of origin are not to 
be deducted from the FMV). 
183. 19 C.F.R §§ 353.54-.58 (1995); see 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(6)-(7) (1994) 
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With respect to quantity adjustments, the DOC ensures that sales 
used to establish the FMV are comparable in volume to those used 
to establish the USP. 184 Where an exporter grants a quantity dis-
count in its home market but not in the United States, there is an 
issue as to whether the DOC should compare the USP to the dis-
counted price alone. It may do so on two conditions. First, the 
exporter must give the discount to 20% or more of the home mar-
ket. Second, the exporter must show that its discount is warranted 
on the basis of cost savings. This requires a showing that the 
exporter has achieved an economy of scale in production. 1s5 
With respect to adjustments for physical characteristics, com-
monly known as difference in merchandise (DIFMER) adjust-
ments, the DOC ensures that the merchandise sold in the home 
and U.S. markets are comparable. Merchandise that is similar but 
not identical requires a DIFMER adjustment unless both the home-
market and the U .S.-market merchandise incur the same cost of 
production. To determine whether merchandise is identical or 
merely similar, the DOC focuses on the physical comparability of 
merchandise, not their uses. 186 A respondent asserting that its 
home-market merchandise is of a lower quality than the merchan-
dise it sells in the United States will not receive a DIFMER adjust-
ment unless it demonstrates that the quality differential results in a 
cost difference between the home-market and U .S.-market mer-
chandise. The DOC has broad discretion in this regard and, as sug-
gested above, it almost always analyzes cost of production data. 187 If 
there is a direct relationship between the cost of production and 
the difference in merchandise sold in the home and U.S. markets, 
a DIFMER adjustment is appropriate. No adjustment is made, how-
ever, where identical merchandise is manufactured in different 
facilities with different production costs. 
Differences between the actual functions performed by the sell-
ers in the foreign and U.S. markets, or differences in the level of 
184. 19 C.F.R § 353.55(a) (1995). 
185. Jd. § 353.55(b), (d). 
186. ld. § 353.57(a) (stating that the DOC must make "reasonable allowance for differ-
ences in the physical characteristics of merchandise") (emphasis added). 
187. But see Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984). There, the DOC made a difference in merchandise 
(DIFMER) adjustment based on value, instead of cost of production. The court upheld the 
DOC's decision to adjust for accessories and printed manuals associated with merchandise 
sold in the home market but not the U.S. market, even though the merchandise itself was 
not changed by these features. The dispositive fact was that the DIFMER adjustment was 
based on a difference in value, and product accessories and manuals can enhance value. 
/d. at 1582. 
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trade, may necessitate a level of trade (LOT) adjustment that 
increases or reduces the FMV. 188 The 1930 Act does not expressly 
allow for this adjustment, though DOC regulations provide for 
comparisons "at the same commercial level of trade" or "appropri-
ate adjustments for differences· affecting price comparability."189 
The purpose of the adjustment is to ensure that retail sales in the 
home market are not compared with wholesale sales in the United 
States (or vice versa). The FMV and the USP must result from func-
tions performed by those sellers in the foreign market and the 
United States that operate at the same level of trade (usually the 
ex-factory level) .190 The burden is on the respondent to prove the 
validity of any LOT adjustment that lowers the dumping margin. 
Sometimes an exporter does not sell to end-user customers in its 
home market but to wholesale distributors in the United States. In 
such cases, the DOC makes a LOT adjustment to compare whole-
sale-to-wholesale or retail-to-retail sales.191 The DOC looks past for-
malisms like the name of a purchaser or the characterization of the 
purchaser by a petitioner or respondent. Instead, the DOC focuses 
on substantive issues such as the purchaser's marketing and distri-
bution functions and the quantity of merchandise that it buys. If 
the volume of sales in either or both the home- or U.S.-markets at 
the same level of trade is inadequate, the DOC compares sales at 
the nearest commercial level of sales. In general, the DOC prefers 
to avoid making a LOT adjustment because it is unnecessary and 
susceptible to abuse: 
The effect of difference in trade levels can often be adjusted 
through other types of adjustments, based on the particular 
facts of a case. Indeed, the level of trade adjustment in many 
respects could be characterized as a redundant provision of 
Department regulations; in some ways it invites parties to place 
labels on transactions (wholesale, retail, etc.) that the Department will 
not accept on their face in any event, being inclined to analyze trans-
actions in its own framework. It is not surprising that level of 
trade adjustments are frequently rejected.I92 
188. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.58 (1995). 
189. Id. 
190. In practice, the meaning of the phrase "ex-factory level" and its relation to the 
purpose of the statute are unclear. 
191. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.58 (1995). 
192. PA1TISON, supra note 72, § 5.06[3] (emphasis added) (foomote omitted). 
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Practitioners sometimes find it futile to request a LOT adjustment 
because the DOC rarely grants the request. In lieu of a LOT adjust-
ment, the DOC simply seeks to match prices at the same level.l93 
In contrast to LOT adjustments, circumstances of sale (COS) 
adjustments are common. Differences in home-market and U.S. 
prices may arise because of differences in sales commissions, war-
ranties, technical services, interest on accounts receivable, guaran-
tees, credit terms, advertising, warehousing, general discounts and 
rebates, free samples of merchandise, and sampling and testing 
expenses. 194 If such differences relate directly to the sales under 
consideration and arise simultaneously with or after such sales, the 
DOC makes appropriate adjustments to the FMV. These criteria 
amount to a "but for" test. An expense is deducted from the FMV 
as a circumstance of sale if it would not have been incurred but for 
the particular sales at issue.195 Research and development expenses 
and salaries of technical service personnel are usually not deducted 
from the FMV because these costs are incurred regardless of 
whether the sales were made.196 
The DOC traditionally takes a strict view of what constitutes a 
"direct" sales expense because it fears that a respondent can easily 
manipulate the level of such expenses incurred in its home market 
in order to minimize any dumping margin. Accordingly, a salesper-
son's salary is considered an indirect sales expense. 197 It is not 
deducted from the FMV in a case where a PP is used as the basis for 
the USP. Indirect sales expenses related to circumstances of sale, 
however, may be deducted from the FMV in a case where the ESP 
is used. 198 
The DOC limits the amount of indirect sales expenses that a 
respondent can deduct from the FMV. The most controversial COS 
adjustment is the ESP cap-offset scheme.199 As stated above, if the 
basis for the USP is the ESP, the DOC deducts from the ESP both 
direct and indirect expenses incurred in connection with U.S. 
193. Courts have upheld the DOC's requirement that a respondent bears the burden 
of supporting its claim for a level of trade adjustment. See, e.g., Fundicao Tupy SA v. 
United States, 12 Ct. lnt'l Trade 6, 7 ( 1988) (agreeing that "it is reasonable to place a 
burden on the party seeking the benefit of those assertedly lower selling costs"), aff'd, 859 
F.2d 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming lower court's discretion in denying an adjustment 
based on respondent's insufficiency of proof). 
194. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.06[4}. 
195. Id. 
196. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(a) (1995). 
197. Horlick, supra note 13, at 145. 
198. Id. 
199. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.06; 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(b)(2) (1995). 
1995] Rethinking Antidumping Law 45 
sales.200 At the same time that the DOC deducts indirect sales 
expenses from the ESP, it deducts indirect expenses associated 
with home-market sales from the FMV. The deduction from the 
FMV for indirect sales expenses is the "ESP offset." The amount 
deducted from the ESP establishes the "ESP cap." The ESP offset 
cannot exceed the ESP cap. The deduction for indirect sales 
expenses from the FMV may be, at most, equal to the amount of 
indirect sales expenses deducted from the ESP. The rationale for 
this policy, as one practitioner puts it, is that "the cap represents an 
irrebuttable presumption that all indirect selling expenses claimed 
for home market sales are false to the extent they are in excess of 
indirect selling expenses deducted from the U.S. price."201 
In spite of this limitation, the ESP offset is extremely valuable. In 
1987 Senator Ernest Hollings sponsored legislation that would 
have eliminated the offset.202 The bill, which was not enacted, 
would have inflated dumping margins by continuing the deduction 
for indirect sales expenses from the ESP but barring an offset to 
the FMV.203 Had it been passed, deleterious economic effects 
might have ensued: U.S. living standards might have fallen by $38.7 
billion-about $640 per four-person family-in part because for-
eign companies would have had to raise their prices by 20% or 
more to avoid accusations of dumping. In addition, higher import 
prices might have caused the loss of 880,000 jobs among U.S. 
wholesalers and retailers, as well as reduced the competitiveness of 
U.S. exporters that rely on imported components.204 
D. The Injury Determination 
The ITC's injury determination previously entailed a two-pro-
nged inquiry: injury and causation.2°5 First, the lTC decided 
whether there was material injury to a U.S. industry, threat of mate-
rial injury to a U.S. industry, or material retardation of the estab-
lishment of a U.S. industry.206 Second, if there was actual injury, 
200. See supra notes 177-180 and accompanying text. 
201. Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 498 n.57. 
202. Donald B. Cameron & Susan M. Crawford, An Overview of the Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Amendments: A New Protectionism?, 20 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 471, 497 
(1989). 
203. ld. 
204. Robert Z. Lawrence, The Dangers of the ESP Amendment, 1, 6-8 (on file with The 
George Washington journal of International Law and Economics). 
205. OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 66. Interestingly, in countervailing duty cases the lTC 
undertakes the same inquiries using the same standards. 
206. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b) (1) (1994). As with DOC dumping margin investigations, the 
lTC makes its injury determinations, in pan, on the basis of a questionnaire sent to rele-
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threat of injury, or retardation, the ITC had to determine whether 
dumped merchandise was the cause.207 Recent ITC practice sug-
gests that it increasingly uses a unitary approach to injury determi-
nations, essentially combining the two inquiries. Nonetheless, for 
present purposes it is useful to retain the conceptual distinction 
between injury and causation analysis. 
A critical threshold requirement underlies both the injury and 
causation inquiries. The injury must be to an industry as a whole; 
not merely to one or a few firms in the industry that do not com-
prise all or a sizeable portion of that industry.208 As John H. Jack-
son states, "[i] f the industry is generally thriving, even though 
several firms are going out of business, arguably, there is not mate-
rial injury."209 The outcome of an ITC inquiry hinges critically on 
its identification of the U.S. industry allegedly injured by dumping. 
As amended and codified in the U.S. Code, the 1930 Act defines 
"industry" as the "producers as a whole of a domestic like product, 
or those producers whose collective output of a domestic like prod-
uct constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic produc-
tion of the product."210 Identifying the industry, therefore, 
depends on defining "like product." 
vant parties; namely, importers and U.S. producers of the merchandise in question. See 
PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.03. The lTC relies on the same factors to make preliminary 
and final injury determinations. See, e.g., Certain Carbon Steel Products from Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom, 45 Fed. Reg. 31,814, 31,815 (Dep't Comm. 1980) {stating that "the same 
factors with respect to material injury are to be considered in making both preliminary and 
final determinations"). For discussions of pre-Uruguay Round injury rules, see Paul W. 
Jameson, Recent International Trade Commission Practice Regarding the Material Injury Standard: 
A Critique, 18 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 517, 517-77 (1986); N. David Palmeter, Material Retar-
dation in the Establishment of an Industry Standard in Antidumping Cases,]. WoRLD TRADE L., 
June 1987, at 113, 113-15; N. David Pal meter, Injury Determinations in Antidumping and Coun-
teroailing Duty Cases-A Commentary on U.S. Practice,]. WoRLD TRADE L.,Jan. 1987, at 23-26 
[hereinafter Injury Determinations]; Bruce A. Ortwine, Note, Injury Determinations Under 
United States Antidumping Laws Before and After the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 33 RuTGERS L. 
REv. 1076, 1076-1107 (1981 ); John Slayton, Note, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Material 
Injury Standard, 14]. hn'L L. & EcoN. 87, 87-100 {1979); Peter D. Staple, Note, Implement-
ing "Tokyo Round" Commitments: The New Injury Standard in Antidumping and Counteroailing 
Duty Law, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1183-87 (1980). 
207. For discussions of causation in the context of injury determinations, see William 
D. DeGrandis, Proving Causation in Antidumping Cases, 20 INT'L LAw. 563, 563-90 (1986); 
Edward R. Easton & William E. Perry, The Causation of Material Injury: Changes in the 
Antidumping and Counteroailing Duty Investigations of the International Trade Commission, 2 
U.C.L.A PAC. BASIN LJ. 35, 35-37 (1983). 
208. jACKSON, supra note 74, at 236. 
209. !d. 
210. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (1994). The lTC has discretion to exclude from the defi-
nition of "industry" a U.S. producer that is related to the exporter or importer of dumped 
merchandise, or which itself is the importer of dumped merchandise. !d. § 1677(4)(B) 
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The 1930 Act states that a "like product" is a product that is like, 
or the most similar in characteristics to, the class or kind of mer-
chandise subject to investigation.211 This definition leaves the lTC 
with considerable discretion. Usually, it will not conclude that 
products are different because of minor variations.212 Several of 
the factors used by the lTC to determine if an item is a "like prod-
uct" include: (1) the characteristics and uses of the product; (2) 
whether the product is interchangeable with another product; (3) 
channels of distribution for the product; ( 4) customer and pro-
ducer perceptions of the product; (5) whether the product is made 
at the same manufacturing facility as another product; and some-
times (6) the price of the product.213 If the lTC cannot obtain this 
product data, it considers economic data that might permit the 
separate identification of production-profits, production 
processes, productivity, employment, cash flow and capacity utiliza-
tion.214 The lTC is not required to define a "like product" in the 
same way the DOC defines a "class or kind of merchandise" and 
neither grouping must resemble a classification in the Harmonized 
Tariff System.215 
1. I~ury Standards 
"Material injury" is defined by statute as harm that "is not incon-
sequential, immaterial, or unimportant."216 As with the like prod-
uct determination, the lTC possesses considerable discretion in 
determining whether an injury is material.217 The lTC analyzes 
three variables: (1) the volume of imports of the class or kind of 
(1994). See, e.g., Torrington Co. v. United States, 16 Ct. lnt'l Trade 220 (1992) (holding 
that the lTC did not abuse its discretion in failing to exclude parties that import or are 
related to exporters of ball bearings from a preliminary injury determination because 
"appropriate circumstances did not exist for exclusion"). 
211. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10). Section 233(a) (3) (A) (iii) of the Act substituted "domestic 
like product" for "like product." Act, supra note 23, 108 Stat. at 4898. 
212. See SENATE COMM. ON FIN., TRADE AGREEMENTS Acr OF 1979, S. REP. No. 249, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.AN. 381,476-77 [hereinafter TRADE 
AGREEMENTS Acr SENATE REPORT]. 
213. High Information Content Flat Panel Displays and Display Glass Therefore from 
Japan, 56 Fed. Reg. 32,376, 32,381 (Dep't Comm. 1991) (final determination). 
214. TRADE AGREEMENTS Acr SENATE REPORT, supra note 212, at 83-84. 
215. Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories from Japan, 57 Fed. Reg. 11,599, 
11,601 (Dep't Comm. 1992) (final scope rule); see Robert Mordhorst, Comment, Interna-
tional Trade Administration vs. International Trade Commission: The Scape of Antidumping/Coun-
tervailing Duty Investigations Issue, 9 Gw. MAsoN U. L. REv. 147, 153-54 (1986) (for a 
discussion of the relationship between the DOC and lTC definitions). 
216. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (A) (1994). 
217. For an analysis of voting patterns of Commissioners on the lTC, see Jameson, 
supra note 206, at 521 n.26, 530 n.53. 
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merchandise subject to investigation; (2) the effect of such mer-
chandise on U.S. prices of like merchandise; and (3) the effect of 
such merchandise on U.S. producers of like products.218 
With respect to the first variable, the less significant the volume 
of imports, the less likely it is the lTC will find that material injury 
exists. The difficulty lies in identifying a "significant" volume. The 
lTC may consider volume either in absolute terms or relative to 
U.S. production or consumption.219 Market share data alone are 
not important: 
It is clear from the cases that the simple existence of a large 
importers' [sic] market share is somewhat meaningless as an 
injury index. Rather, the Commission will be concerned with 
the dynamics of that share; it would be difficult to show current 
injury on the sole grounds of a foreign market share of, for 
example, 30 percent, if that percentage had not been subject to 
significant change for the past 15 years. A much smaller share, 
for example, 5 percent, however, could be highly significant as 
an injury gauge if that share had risen from .5 percent in one 
year. Such a significant rise in market penetration has been a 
much more vital concern to the Commission than market share 
size alone.220 
Similarly, lost sales and revenue attributable to an increased vol-
ume of imports cannot be the sole basis for an affirmative injury 
determination. 221 
Analyzing the second variable entails a seemingly straightforward 
inquiry-have the imports forced or kept down U.S. prices?222 
There are different ways, however, to measure the price sensitivity 
of U.S.-made products to imports. Lost sales or revenue, for exam-
ple, may indicate price depression or suppression. The most prom-
inent type of evidence may be the elasticity of substitution between 
the class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation and such 
or similar merchandise. This type of evidence "reflects the degree 
218. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i) (1994); see, e.g., SCM Corp. v. United States, 4 Ct. lnt'l 
Trade 7, 12-16 ( 1982) (discussing market penetration by dumped imports, price suppres-
sion, and lost sales). 
Plainly, these variables are also important to the causation determination. This duality of 
function may help explain the ITC's recent unitary approach referred to above. See supra 
note 208 and accompanying text. 
219. 19 u.s.c. § 1677(7)(C)(i) (1994). 
220. PATriSON, supra note 72, § 4.04[2] (foomote omitted); see also SCM Corp. v. 
United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 7, 12-16 (1982) (discussing market penetration by dumped 
imports, price suppression, and lost sales). 
221. USX Corp. v. United States, 11 Ct. lnt'l Trade 82, 86 (1987). 
222. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (C) (ii) (II) (1994). 
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to which competition is based on price."223 Other elasticities, such 
as the elasticity of substitution between subject and nonsubject 
imports of aggregate U.S. demand and of domestic producers' sup-
ply, also influence lTC determinations.224 
Underselling may be evidence of price depression or suppres-
sion; however, it is not a per se basis for an affirmative material 
injury determination.225 The lTC must examine the degree and 
duration of the underselling and consider whether price is a signif-
icant factor in a purchaser's decision. Underselling need not be 
predatory for the lTC to consider it evidence of price depression 
or suppression.226 The safest generalization with respect to under-
selling is that "[i]f demand for the product is not price sensitive, 
but, rather, is the function of other product characteristics, it is 
likely that price undercutting will not be a central consideration in 
any injury finding. "227 
Gauging the third variable calls for an assessment of "all relevant 
economic factors which have a bearing on the state of the [U.S.] 
industry."228 Such factors include: 
(I) actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, 
profits, productivity, return on investments, and utilization of 
capacity, (II) factors affecting domestic prices, (III) actual and 
potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employ-
ment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and investment, 
[and] (IV) actual and potential negative effects on the develop-
ment and production efforts of the domestic industry, including 
efforts to develop a derivative or more advanced version of the 
allegedly dumped merchandise.229 
223. Daniel W. Klett & Todd T. Schneider, Price Sensitivity and fTC Injury Determinations, 
J. WoRLD TRADE, Apr. 1994, at 96 (foomote omitted). This elasticity measures the upercent-
age change in quantity demanded of domestic product given a percentage change in the 
price of subject imports." /d. at 96 n.9. 
224. /d. at 96-99, 109-10. 
225. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (C)(ii) (1994). 
226. /d. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 changed the statutory 
term uprice undercutting" to "price underselling," which some observers suggest is more 
ambiguous and confusing. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.04[4] n.30.1. 
227. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.04[ 4]. 
228. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (C) (iii) (1994); see, e.g., American Spring Wire Corp. v. United 
States, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade 20, 24-26 (1984) (discussing market demand, production, capacity 
utilization, net sales, inventory levels, capital funding and expenditures, and profitability), 
aff'd suh nom. Armco Inc. v. United States, 760 F.2d 249 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
229. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 66. 
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The lTC must evaluate these factors in the context of the busi-
ness cycle of the affected U.S. industry.230 No one factor is disposi-
tive, and it is not necessary that each factor be negative to make an 
injury finding. 231 The lTC cannot substitute its own set of factors 
for determining injury,232 nor can it "rely on isolated tidbits of data 
which suggest a result contrary to the clear weight of the evi-
dence."233 Interestingly, however, the amount of the dumping mar-
gin is not expressly mentioned in the statute as a factor in the 
material injury determination.234 
The lTC may base an injury determination on a threat of mate-
rial injury, rather than present material injury. 235 The likelihood 
of material injury must be "real and imminent" and not simply a 
matter of "supposition, speculation or conjecture."236 Although 
predicting future events is more difficult and controversial than 
analyzing current data,237 the lTC must consider certain factors 
when making a material threat of injury determination: ( 1) an 
increase in the exporting country's production capacity likely to 
result in a significant increase in imports into the United States; 
(2) a rapid increase in U.S. market penetration that will be injuri-
ous; (3) the probability that imports will depress or suppress U.S. 
prices; ( 4) a substantial increase in inventories; (5) the presence of 
230. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (C) (iii) (1994). Presumably, the ITC takes measures to ensure 
that lingering effects of past injury do not form the basis for a present injury 
determination. 
231. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (E) (ii) (1994); see also Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v. United States, 2 
Ct. Int'l Trade 18, 22 (1981) (indicating that no single factor is decisive with respect to a 
material injury determination), rev'd on other grounds, 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 
Iwatsu Elec. Co. v. United States, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 44, 49 (1991) (stating that the ITC can 
weigh each factor in light of the circumstances of the case and need not find that all 
factors point to material injury to render an affirmative injury determination). 
232. Trent Tube Div. v. Avesta Sandvik Tube, 975 F.2d 807, 814 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting a five-factor test devised and applied by a commissioner). 
233. USX Corp. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 82, 84 (1987). 
234. PArriSON, supra note 72, § 4.04[7]; see also Hyundai Pipe Co. Ltd. v. United States, 
11 Ct. Int'l Trade 117, 123 (1987) (rejecting an argument that the ITC must engage in a 
dumping margin analysis in injury determinations). For discussion of dumping margin 
analysis under pre-Uruguay Round law, see jACKSON, supra note 74, 241-42; N. David 
Palmeter, Note, Dumping Margins and Material Injury: The USITC is Free to Choose, J. WoRLD 
TRADE L., Apr. 1987, at 173, 173-175. 
235. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.06. 
236. !d.; see also American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1001-04 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (holding that the statutory requirement that the ITC base a preliminary determina-
tion on a "reasonable indication" of threat of material injury does not mean the same as a 
"mere possibility" of threat of injury). 
237. H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Gong., 2d Sess. 174 ( 1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4910, 5291; Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, CA v. United States, 17 
Ct. Int'l Trade 146, 164 (1993). 
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underutilized capacity in the exporting country; (6) the actual and 
potential negative effects on development and production efforts 
in the United States, including attempts to develop derivative or 
more advanced products; and (7) the existence of dumping of the 
subject merchandise in a third country.23B 
The lTC rarely uses material retardation of the establishment of 
a domestic industry as the basis for a material injury determina-
tion;239 the evidentiary requirements are severe.240 There must be a 
substantial commitment to commence production, demonstrated 
by information about business plans, market surveys, product 
designs, and financial commitments.241 In addition, "a representa-
tive of an 'inchoate' or 'nonexistent' industry is not likely to be 
financially and commercially postured to complain of imports."242 
Nonetheless, the lTC has found material retardation in a few cases. 
In one instance the lTC held that where a petitioner had made a 
substantial investment in a product that competed with the class or 
kind of merchandise subject to investigation, such merchandise 
would impede the petitioner's market entry.243 In another instance 
the lTC considered the commercial viability of a petitioner's start-
up operations.244 
2. Causation 
The 1930 Act requires only that injury to a U.S. industry be 
caused "by reason of" dumped merchandise.245 A petitioner need 
not show that the class or kind of merchandise subject to investiga-
tion is the direct, immediate or proximate, or even substantial 
cause of the injury. In contrast, "substantial" causation is a neces-
sary element of an escape clause claim under section 201 of the 
Trade Act of 1974.246 In addition, a petitioner need not show that 
238. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i), (iii) (1994). 
239. See PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.07. 
240. See id. 
241. Id.; see, e.g., Motorcycle Batteries from Taiwan, 47 Fed. Reg. 13,609 (Dep't Comm. 
1982) (finding no material injury); Memorandum from the General Counsel to the Trade 
Commission Regarding Legal Issues in Certain Dried Salted Codfish from Canada, Inv. No. 
731-TA-199 (preliminary) (Aug. 22, 1984) (recommending that a material injury analysis, 
rather than material retardation, is appropriate). 
242. PATIISON, supra note 72, § 4.07. 
243. Salmon Gill Fish Netting of Manmade Fibers from Japan, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,979, 
14,981 (Dep't Comm. 1982) (finding material retardation in the fish-netting industry). 
244. BMT Commodity Corp. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 524, 526-27 (1987) 
(criticizing the ITC's approach for failing to focus on the effect on the petitioner's ability 
to produce the merchandise subject to investigation). 
245. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2) (1994) (codification of Tariff Act of 1930 as amended). 
246. Id. § 2251(a) (codification of Trade Act of 1974 as amended). 
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dumping is the sole or even primary cause of injury.247 It may show 
injury through other factors, including: (1) the volume and price 
of merchandise that is not dumped; (2) a contraction in demand 
or changes in consumption patterns; (3) competition between for-
eign and domestic producers; ( 4) technological developments; and 
(5) "[t]he export performance and productivity of the domestic 
industry."248 These factors are irrelevant, however, because "[i]t 
has been unequivocally established that extraneous factors are not 
to be weighed or balanced against the injury caused by dump-
ing."249 Therefore, 
in reaching an injury determination, the [International Trade] 
Commission does not ask whether the subject imports are the 
principal or fundamental cause of injury to the concerned 
industry. In the words of the House of Representatives in review-
ing the injury standard, any such construction of the injury stan-
dard would have the "undesirable result of making relief more 
difficult to obtain for those industries facing difficulties from a 
variety of sources, precisely those industries that are most vul-
nerable to ... dumped imports." In this light, the Commission 
has explained, the "causative link required in unfair trade cir-
cumstances . . . is weaker than when fair trade conditions 
exist."250 
The ITC may consider evidence introduced by a respondent that 
injury is caused by extraneous factors; however, the petitioner does 
not bear the burden of proving that injury is not caused by such 
factors. 251 
With respect to actual injury and threat determinations, the ITC 
may cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports of like 
merchandise from multiple countries, as opposed to imports of 
merchandise from a single country, under certain conditions. 
Those imports must: (1) be subject to investigation; (2) compete 
with each other and a U.S. product; and (3) be marketed in the 
247. See POWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 5. 
248. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.05; see 19 U.S. C. § 1677(7) (B) (ii) (1994). 
249. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.05 (foomote omitted); see also USX Corp. v. United 
States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 205, 214 (1988) (rejecting the ITC's use of a five-factor causation 
test and a causation analysis based on an elasticity estimate); Horlick, supra note 13, at 163 
(stating that "weighing of causes ... is specifically forbidden under U.S. law" (footnote 
omitted)); PoWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 5 (stating that the lTC "lacks authority to 
weigh other countervailing interests against evidence of injury, such as consumer interests 
or those of other U.S. industries such as those that rely on 'dumped' components for their 
own production (which could suffer from dumping duties), or the 'national' interest (e.g., 
national security, bilateral relations, market access [and] trade strategy)"). 
250. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.05 (foomotes omitted). 
251. !d. 
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United States in a reasonably contemporaneous period.2s2 The 
traditional rationale for a cumulative analysis is that a U.S. industry 
can be injured by imports whether those imports come from one 
or many sources.253 The second requirement for cumulative assess-
ment is met if the imports: (1) are sold in the same U.S. markets as 
a U.S. product; (2) are distributed through the same channels as a 
U.S. product; (3) are fungible with a U.S. product; ( 4) fall within 
the same price range as a U.S. product; or (5) are present in the 
U.S. market at the same time as a U.S. product.254 The first require-
ment is met if the imports are identified by one or more petitions 
filed simultaneously.255 Curiously, the third requirement is not set 
forth in the 1930 Act, either because it is redundant or because it 
requires that the imports compete with one another and U.S. prod-
ucts.256 The lTC may also cumulate imports subject to an 
antidumping investigation with those subject to a countervailing 
duty investigation;257 however, the lTC may not cumulate those 
imports subject to a voluntary restraint agreement that addresses a 
dumping dispute.2ss 
252. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G)(i) (1994); H.R CONF. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 173 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 4910, 5290; OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 66. 
While the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 only applied to material injury determinations, 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 612(a)(2) (A), 98 StaL at 3033, the Court oflnternational 
Trade subsequently held that the ITC may cumulate imports in appropriate cases. Asocia-
cion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'I Trade 634, 642 
- (1988). 
For a discussion of pre-Uruguay Round cumulation practice, seeM. Roy Goldberg, lWien 
Unimportant Is Interesting: The Negligible Import Exception to Cumulation in Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Investigations, 25 Gw. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 721, 721-36 (1992); 
William B.T. Mock, Jr., Cumulation of Import Statistics in Injury Investigations &fare the Interna-
tional Trade Commission, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 433, 439-77 (1986); Jonathan T. Suder, 
Note, Cumulation of Imports in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations, 17 GEo. 
WASH.]. INT'L L. & EcoN. 463, 470-85 (1983). 
As a result of an amendment to the 1930 Act made by the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988, the ITC need not cumulatively assess the volume and effects of 
imports from two or more countries if imports from one country are negligible and have 
no discernible adverse impact on a U.S. industry. The ITC may deem imports as negligible 
and having no discernible impact if they are the product of a country with which the U.S. 
entered into a free trade agreement before january 1, 1987. See Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1330(b), 98 Stat. 2948, 3033 (amending 
section 771(7) of the 1930 Act). Israel satisfies this requirement as a result of the 1985 
United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement. No other country satisfies this requiremenL 
253. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 847. 
254. PAITISON, supra note 72, § 4.12. 
255. /d. 
256. See id. § 4.12 n.6. 
257. Bingham & Taylor Div. v. United States, 815 F.2d 1482, 1486 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
258. Chaparral Steel Co. v. United States, 901 F.2d 1097, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
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E. Anticircumvention 
A respondent may attempt to circumvent an antidumping order 
by: (1) assembling merchandise subject to the order in the United 
States or a third country; (2) altering the merchandise in a minor 
way; or (3) developing different merchandise, so-called "later-
developed" merchandise.259 In these situations the problem of cir-
cumvention can raise difficult questions of policy and 
enforcement: 
How different should a product be to be reasonably excluded 
from the scope of an order? Should the import relief laws rea-
sonably be extended to provide protection for consecutive gen-
erations of products? Are the rights of third countries infringed 
when imports from them are subjected to an order which had 
originally been targeted against another country?26° 
In response to these issues, the DOC has been empowered to 
expand the scope of an antidumping order to include: (1) compo-
nents imported into the United States and assembled in the United 
States to make finished merchandise; (2) imported merchandise 
assembled from components in a third country; (3) altered mer-
chandise; or ( 4) later-developed merchandise.261 
Before expanding the scope of an antidumping order to include 
imported components subsequently assembled in the United 
States, the DOC must determine that: 
(1) merchandise is sold in the United States that is the same as 
merchandise that is subject to an antidumping ... order; (2) 
merchandise is completed or assembled in the United States 
from parts or components produced in the foreign country to 
which the antidumping order applies; and (3) the difference 
between the value of the merchandise sold in the United States 
and the value of the imported parts and components is small. 262 
The third condition is particularly telling because if a small 
amount of value is added in the United States, the exporter is prob-
ably dumping finished merchandise in an unfinished form. 
The DOC has similar power v.rith respect to imported merchan-
dise assembled from components in a third country. Before 
expanding the scope of an order, the DOC must determine that: 
259. OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 70; see Cameron & Crawford, supra note 202, at 4 73-80 
(discussing changes to the circumvention rules made by the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988). 
260. PATriSON, supra note 72, § 10.09. 
261. 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(a)-(d) (1994); 19 C.F.R § 353.29(e)-(h) (1995); OvERVIEW, 
supra note 30, at 70. 
262. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 81; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(a)-(b) (1994). 
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(1) merchandise imported into the United States is the same 
class or kind as merchandise subject to an order; (2) before 
importation, that merchandise was completed or assembled in 
another foreign country from merchandise subject to an order 
or was produced in the foreign country to which the order 
applies; (3) the difference between the value of the imported 
merchandise and the value of the merchandise completed or 
assembled in a third country is small; and ( 4) ... action is 
appropriate to prevent evasion of an order.263 
55 
Again, the value added condition is crucial. It may indicate that the 
exporter is dumping merchandise assembled in a third country. 
The DOC is virtually unfettered in expanding the scope of an 
antidumping order to include altered or slightly modified mer-
chandise. Examples include merchandise of the same class or kind 
as that subject to an order, merchandise assembled or completed 
from components from the country subject to the order, and mer-
chandise to which a small value is added in a third country. The 
DOC need not make an additional determination with respect to 
altered merchandise because it is presumed to include such mer-
chandise in its underlying order.264 
The DOC may also expand an order to include later-developed 
merchandise if it finds-on the basis of consumer expectations, 
physical characteristics, use, advertising, and channels of trade-
that later-developed merchandise is the same as that subject to the 
underlying order.265 
IV. AssESSING PosT-URUGUAY RouND A.NrmuMPING LAw 
A word here, a phrase there, inserted in the implementing legis-
lation for the Uruguay Round, means that foreign steel export-
ers and other industries selling in the US market could still find 
themselves subject to "unfair trade" complaints and years of 
expensive litigation before winning market access for their 
products. 266 
The Agreement and the Act fail to resolve the problem of pro-
tectionist abuse of antidumping law by a petitioner that has lost its 
comparative advantage relative to an exporter. This failure is evi-
263. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 81; see 19 U.S.C. § I677j(b) (1994). 
264. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(c) (1994). For a discussion of the treatment under pre-Uru-
guay Round law of circumvention through minor alterations, see George Kleinfeld & 
Diane Gaylor, Circumvention of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders through Minor 
Alterations in Merchandise: Where to Draw the Line?, J. WoRLD TRADE, Feb. 1994, at 77, 79-88 
(1994). 
265. 19 u.s.c. § 1677j(d) (1994). 
266. Nancy Dunne, US Takes Hard Line on "Dumping": Hapes Ro.ised By Uruguay Round 
May Be Dashed, FIN. TIMES, Aug. I, 1994, at 4. 
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dent in five contexts. First, the Agreement and the Act expand 
opportunities for filing a petition. Second, a petitioner can manip-
ulate a dumping margin calculation to maximize that margin. 
Third, a petitioner can exploit standards for demonstrating injury 
and claim that imports are the cause of its woes. Fourth, by invok-
ing anticircumvention or new shipper rules, a petitioner that has 
obtained an antidumping order can extend the protection 
afforded by the order. Fifth, despite mandatory "sunset" reviews of 
outstanding antidumping orders, revocation of an order is 
unlikely. In each context the root of the failure is ambiguity in the 
text of the Agreement or the Act, inconsistency with fundamental 
microeconomic concepts, or both. 
A. Filing a Petition 
l. Conceptual and Practical Flaws 
A protectionist abuser benefits from an overly broad standing 
requirement in antidumping law. At the same time, the meritori-
ous petitioner is harmed by a standing requirement that is too 
strict. 
Article 5.1 of the Agreement explains that a petition must be 
filed "by or on behalf of" an industry.267 Article 5.4 defines this 
phrase in terms of a 50% and 25% of production threshold tests.268 
These tests are calculated to ensure the support of a critical mass of 
domestic producers in the importing country. The Agreement 
requires that both tests be satisfied.269 The 50% test focuses on the 
size of domestic producers supporting the petition relative to those 
opposing it. Producers who support the petition must account for 
more than 50% of the total output of the product.270 This requires 
that "of [all] those producers expressing a view [on the petition], 
267. Agreement, supra note 19, at 7. 
268. Id. at 8. Section 212(a)(2) of the Act implements the 50% and 25% tests. Act, 
supra note 23, § 212(a)(2), 108 Stat. at 4846. It also appears to add a third threshold test 
not found in the Agreement. Compare Act, supra note 23, § 212(a) (2), 108 Stat. at 4846 
(disregarding position of domestic producers related to foreign producers and producers 
who are importers) with Agreement, supra note 19, at 8 (imposing no qualification of pro-
ducers polled). 
Suppose a petition does not establish prima facie that it is supported by domestic produ-
cers or workers accounting for more than 50% of the total production of the domestic like 
product. The DOC must poll the industry to see whether the 50% and 25% threshold tests 
are met. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c) ( 4) (D) (1994); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 36; 
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 48, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3820. 
269. Agreement, supra note 19, at 8. 
270. /d. 
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more producers support than oppose the petition."271 The 25% 
test focuses on the absolute size, measured in terms of output, of 
domestic producers supporting the petition. 272 Producers expres-
sing support for the petition must account for at least 25% of the 
total domestic production of the like domestic product.273 
These tests, in one respect, are a welcome development given 
the vacuum existing under prior law.274 The tests create bright 
lines that should provide certainty and predictability. The tests, 
however, are conceptually and operationally flawed. They rely on 
an antediluvian distinction between foreign and domestic produc-
tion, and it is unclear whether they will reduce protectionist abuse. 
A petitioner remains able to "point the Commerce Department 
like a guided missile against its foreign competition and let the 
U.S. government do the rest."275 
Articles 4 and 5 of the Agreement, entitled "Definition of 
Domestic Industry" and "Initiation and Subsequent Investigation," 
do not require a domestic industry, on behalf of which a petition is 
filed, to be owned or controlled by a party in the importing coun-
try.276 These articles are conceptually flawed, however, because 
they rely on an underlying assumption that manufacturing opera-
tions are neatly divided along territorial lines between a petitioner 
in the importing country and a respondent in a foreign country. In 
reality, the situation is more complex because such operations are 
often global.277 For example, a finished good may be the end prod-
uct of raw materials from South Africa, processed into an interme-
diate good in Zimbabwe, shipped to the United States, and 
processed into a final product through the addition of Malaysian 
components. Suppose the U.S. producer is owned by a Japanese 
holding company and wants to file a dumping petition against: (1) 
a Japanese exporter of the same finished merchandise; and (2) a 
Malaysian exporter of the components used in the finished mer-
chandise. The petitioner has standing to bring the first case but 
not the second because it is a U.S. producer of the finished mer-
chandise and not the component. Whether this result is just is 
271. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 35. 
272. Agreement, supra note 19, at 8. 
273. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 35. 
274. Under prior laws petitioner was assumed to have standing to file an antidumping 
petition on behalf of an industry unless its standing was challanged by another member of 
the relevant industry. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text. 
275. BovARD, supra note 1, at 139. 
276. Agreement, supra note 19, at 6-7. 
277. See Horlick, supra note 13, at 156. 
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arguable, but it is artificial because the finished merchandise is a 
global product. Any distinction between "domestic" and "foreign" 
manufacturing is drawn on the basis of geopolitical boundaries, 
not substantive economic reality. 
The 50% and 25% tests may enhance opportunities for protec-
tionist abuse. They make filing an antidumping petition easier 
than under prior law for two reasons.27S First, Article 5.4 of the 
Agreement broadens the universe of potential petitioners.279 Sec-
ond, Article 4.1 (i) conditionally disenfranchises producers related 
to the respondent.2so 
Article 5.4 expands the universe of potential petitioners beyond 
firms in a domestic industry to include other parties purporting to 
act on behalf of the industry. Footnote 14 to Article 5.4 states that 
"[m]embers are aware that in the territory of certain Members, 
employees of domestic producers of the like product or representatives 
of those employees, may make or support an application for an 
investigation."281 Read literally, this language means that, in addi-
tion to labor unions or other worker associations, individual 
employees and ad hoc groups of workers may file petitions.282 
In the United States the effect of footnote 14 is to place manage-
ment and workers on equal footing with respect to supporting or 
opposing a petition.283 As a result, "if workers and management of 
the same firm express opposing views with respect to a petition, the 
firm and the production it represents would not be counted as 
expressing either support for or opposition to the petition."284 The 
repercussions of footnote 14 may be more dramatic in WTO mem-
bers other than the United States. Under the pre-Uruguay Round 
law of some members, unions did not have standing to file peti-
tions and individual employees were certainly prohibited from 
doing so. There is likely to be an increase in dumping actions filed 
278. One practitioner suggests that the bright-line tests could make it more difficult for 
U.S. producers to gain relief from dumping. Michael H. Stein, The Uruguay Round and the 
Trade Laws: Antidumping, Countervailing Duties, Common Provisions, in THE CoMMERCE 
DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND lNVESrMENT 877, 892 (PU 1994). 
279. Agreement, supra note 19, at 8. 
280. Id. at 6. 
281. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
282. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 48, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3820. 
283. The Act clearly intends "labor [to] have [an] equal voice with management in 
supporting or opposing" a petition. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 35; HousE REPORT, 
supra note 18, at 48, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3820; MEssAGE, supra note 69, at 862. 
284. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 35; see HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 48, 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3820. 
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by foreign unions and workers in such members and successful 
U.S. exporters could be vulnerable to attack. 
With respect to the conditional disenfranchisement of producers 
related to a respondent, Article 4.1 (i) of the Agreement, and the 
implementing legislation in section 212(a) (2) of the Act, establish 
a perverse burden of proof for a determination of industry support 
for a petition.285 Consider the following hypothetical. 
Nippon Steel Corporation (NSC) has a U.S. subsidiary, Nippon 
U.S.A., to which it exports steel. Nippon U.S.A. manufactures both 
steel and steel-based products like tubing, ball bearings, and chain-
linked fences. Nippon U.S.A. opposes the petition of Bethlehem 
Steel, a U.S. producer, filed against NSC. In addition, the Savan-
nah Steel Company (SSC), a U.S. company unrelated to NSC or 
Nippon U.S.A., purchases steel and steel-based products from both 
of these companies for use in its steel processing operations. 
Should the DOC consider the opposition of Nippon U.S.A. and 
sse when determining whether there is sufficient industry support 
for the petition? 
The DOC must exclude from its application of the 50% and 25% 
tests an opposing domestic producer related to the exporter 
because of Article 4.1(i).286 The DOC can also exclude an unre-
lated importer of subject merchandise. A related producer or an 
unrelated importer may only be included upon a showing that its 
interests would be adversely affected by an antidumping order. No 
such rule existed in the 1930 Act. 
Plainly, the rule conditionally disenfranchises an affiliate of an 
exporter, as well as an unaffiliated importer, creating an inherent 
bias in favor of a petitioner. Nippon U.S.A., an affiliate of the 
exporter NSC, must prove to the DOC that: (1) it uses steel from 
NSC in the production of steel-based products; (2) it would be 
harmed by an increase in the price of steel caused by an antidump-
ing duty; and (3) there is no reliable domestic source of substitut-
285. See Act, supra note 23, § 212(a)(2), 108 Stat. at 4846; SENATE REPORT, supra note 
18, at 35-36. 
286. Agreement, supra note 19, at 6 n.ll. The Senate report states that 
a producer and an exporter or importer are related if the producer directly or 
indirectly controls either the exporter or the importer; the exporter or the 
importer directly or indirectly controls the producer; a third party directly or 
indirectly controls the producer and exporter or importer; or the producer and 
the exporter or importer directly or indirectly control a third party and there is 
reason to believe that the relationship causes the producer to act differently than 
an unrelated producer would act. ... [D]irect or indirect control is established if 
a party is legally or operationally in a position to exercise restraint or direction 
over the other party. 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 53. 
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able steel or such source is prohibitively expensive. SSC, an 
unaffiliated importer, must make the same showing. The rationale 
for such disenfranchisement is unpersuasive: Section 212(a) of the 
Act is 
necessary to ensure that foreign producers, who would not nor-
mally be expected to support a petition, are not allowed to pre-
vent investigations from going forward simply by directing or 
encouraging (implicitly or explicitly) their affiliates in the 
United States to oppose a petition .... Since it would normally 
be expected that an order would benefit domestic producers at 
the expense of foreign producers, when there is a relationship 
between the two producers and the domestic producer opposes 
an investigation, the Commerce Department needs to be satis-
fied that the opposition is based on the effect of an order on 
domestic rather than foreign production interests.287 
This rationale has two flaws. First, it is unclear how a related 
domestic producer that imports subject merchandise can meet the 
burden of proof. Section 212(a) (2) states only that related domes-
tic producers must "demonstrate that their interests as domestic 
producers would be adversely affected by the imposition of an 
antidumping duty order."288 The legislative history is similarly 
unhelpful: 
The Committee does not intend that the Commerce Depart-
ment establish a "bright-line" test for determining whether it is 
appropriate to exclude importers who are also domestic produ-
cers. Rather, the Committee expects Commerce to look at the 
relevant facts in each case, examining, for example, the volume 
and value of the producer's imports, the percentage of that pro-
ducer's production accounted for by imports, and other rele-
vant factors. 289 
Must Nippon U.S.A. demonstrate that it would have to close 
down production because of the increased cost of imported materi-
als resulting from an antidumping duty, or is a small drop in the 
profits of Nippon U.S.A. a sufficient adverse effect? Because of this 
ambiguity, Bethlehem Steel has ample room to argue that a duty 
would have no adverse effect on Nippon U.S.A. 
Second, Article 4.1 (i) of the Agreement, and section 212(a) (2) 
of the Act, operate in a discriminatory manner by placing the bur-
den of showing harm from an antidumping order on a related 
287. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 35-36. 
288. Act, supra note 23, § 212(a)(2), 108 Stat. at 4846 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1673a(c) ( 4) (B) (i) (1994) ). 
289. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 36 (emphasis added). 
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domestic producer or an unrelated importer.290 No burden, how-
ever, is placed on an unrelated domestic producer or, for that mat-
ter, a related importer. Suppose the Patriot Steel· Corporation 
(PSC), a U.S. company unrelated to NSC, manufactures steel and 
steel products. To register its opposition to Bethlehem Steel's peti-
tion with the DOC, PSC need not prove it would be injured by an 
order. By placing the burden on Nippon U.S.A. but not PSC, the 
Agreement and the Act assume that corporate affiliation alone 
determines the position a company takes in an antidumping action 
and essentially treat a foreign-owned company as guilty until 
proven innocent. The unlikelihood that a U.S. subsidiary would 
challenge its foreign parent may not justify this discrimination. 
If the Agreement and the Act truly sought to minimize protec-
tionist abuse, they would reverse the burden of proof. The pre-
sumption should be that both PSC and Nippon U.S.A. are 
enfranchised. The petitioner ought to be required to prove to the 
DOC that Nippon U.S.A. should be excluded on the ground that 
the affiliate assesses its interests from the viewpoint of its Japanese 
parent and not its U.S. operations.291 Reversing the burden might 
also force the DOC to consider the possible positive effects of steel 
imports at allegedly dumped prices, rather than to focus on Bethle-
hem Steel's claims. 
2. Third-Country Petitions 
Article 14 of the Agreement,292 implemented by section 232 of 
the Act, 293 expands the scope of protection afforded by antidump-
ing law by authorizing third-country dumping petitions. The pro-
tected class now includes a third-country exporter competing in 
the United States with a foreign exporter.294 
Suppose Panasonic of Japan, the third-country exporter, and 
GoldStar of Korea, the foreign exporter, each sell televisions in the 
United States. Panasonic believes GoldStar is dumping televisions 
in the United States but no U.S. company files a petition. 
Panasonic can request the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to 
290. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 6; Act, supra note 23, § 212(a)(2), 108 Stat. at 
4846. 
291. Circumstantial evidence presented by the petitioner should be accepted because 
the petitioner may not have access to proprietary information about its competitor during 
the early phase of a case. 
292. Agreement, supra note 19, at 19-20. 
293. Act, supra note 23, § 232, 108 Stat. at 4897 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677n ( 1994)). 
294. Id. 
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file a petition on its behalf.295 In contrast to prior law, the Agree-
ment and the Act obligate the USTR, the DOC, and the lTC to 
respond to this third-country dumping petition.296 Consequently, 
any WTO member can seek protection in the United States, even if 
no U.S. industry is complaining. Approval of the petition, however, 
is not automatic. First, the petition must allege that an exporter 
from another WTO member is dumping merchandise in the 
United States and that such dumping injures an industry produc-
ing like merchandise in the country of the petitioning member. 
Second, the USTR must consult with the DOC and the lTC, obtain 
the approval of the WTO Council for Trade in Goods, and ensure 
that the petitioning member affords U.S. exporters an equal 
opportunity to initiate dumping actions.29 7 
The principal effect of this new provision will likely be an 
increase in the number of antidumping cases brought in the 
United States and other WTO members. The microeconomic 
rationale for accepting a third-country dumping petition is weak, 
however, because U.S. consumers benefit from competition among 
foreign exporters, such as Japanese and Korean television 
exporters. 
The issuance of an antidumping order against GoldStar's televi-
sions will generally result in a price increase equivalent to the 
amount of the duty set by the order or a portion thereof. U.S. con-
sumers are harmed because consumer surplus is reduced or per-
haps eliminated.298 Although Panasonic gains from protection in 
this case, there is no offsetting benefit for a U.S. company. The 
conventional argument in support of antidumping law-the pro-
tection of U.S. companies and workers from unfair foreign compe-
tition-is inapplicable. In light of global production, it may even 
be obsolete. Of course, the conventional argument may be 
deployed if a U.S. company is the third-country exporter, though 
in such a case the company would already be eligible to seek pro-
tection based on the loss of its comparative advantage relative to a 
foreign exporter. In any event, antidumping law is a tool for pro-
tecting domestic manufacturers, not boosting U.S. exports. 
295. /d. 
296. See Act, supra note 23, § 232, 108 Stat. at 4897. 
297. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87. 
298. Section 232 expressly requires the USTR to provide an opportunity for public 
comment in determining whether to initiate a third-country investigation. Act, supra note 
23, § 232, 108 Stat. at 4897 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677n(d) (1994)). 
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Moreover, ambiguity surrounds the treatment of a third-country 
dumping petition. Neither Article 14 nor section 232 indicate 
whether the same substantive and procedural standards that apply 
to a traditional petition also apply to a third-country petition.299 
The USTR has discretion to specify the standards the DOC and the 
lTC must use in conducting a third-country investigation. 300 
Assuming other WTO members also have such discretion, recipro-
cal manipulation of standards could occur. Suppose a WTO mem-
ber lodges a third-country petition with the USTR and, at the same 
time, a U.S. exporter seeks relief in that same member's market. 
The U.S. exporter will urge the USTR to look favorably on the 
third-country petition so that the WTO member will accommodate 
the petition in which the exporter has an interest. Paradoxically, 
the U.S. exporter would be arguing in favor of protection in the 
United States and against protection overseas. The result might be 
a "race to the bottom," as the USTR and other WTO members 
relax their standards in response to pressure from companies in 
their respective countries hoping to enhance the likelihood of a 
satisfactory resolution of their own petitions. 
B. The Dumping Margin Calculation 
1. The Basic Formula and Problems of De Minimis Thresholds, 
Averaging, and Comparability 
Broadly speaking, Article 2 of the Agreement provides specific 
rules on dumping margin calculations that substantially resemble 
the rules in pre-Uruguay Round U.S. antidumping law.301 A review 
of those changes reveals that some are unlikely to have a substan-
tive effect on prior law, others are likely to have a substantive effect, 
and still others whose impact is uncertain. It is unclear whether 
Article 2's revision of terminology, relating to the DOC's discretion 
in calculating dumping margins, will have a practical effect. 
Changes in basic antidumping nomenclature create less uncer-
tainty because they merely clarify ambiguity under prior law. New 
standards relating to the de minimis margin inquiry, the practice 
299. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 19-20; Act, supra note 23, 108 Stat. at 4897 ( codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1677n (1994)). 
300. Act, supra note 23, § 232, 108 Stat. at 4897-98 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677n(c) 
(1994)). 
301. Compare Agreement, supra note 19, at 1-4 {stating new rules on determination of 
dumping) with supra note 128 and accompanying text {stating pre-Uruguay Round U.S. law 
on imposition of antidumping duties). 
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of averaging, and questions of comparability are problematic and 
are likely to have a felt impact. 
Article 2 adopts the standard definition of dumping, based on 
Article VI of the GAIT. A product is dumped if its "export price" 
(EP) is less than "normal value" (NV).S02 The NV is the foreign 
home market price of a "foreign like product" sold in the ordinary 
course of trade (i.e., not to a related party or below cost) for con-
sumption in the exporter's country. If home-market sales are 
incomparable because such sales are few, nonexistent, or at below-
cost prices, the DOC uses either the NV in a third country or a 
constructed value (CV) in lieu of the NV.303 The EP is the sale 
price of the allegedly dumped product to an unaffiliated purchaser 
in the importing country before the date of importation.304 Where 
the EP is unavailable or unreliable, a "constructed export price" 
(CEP) is used. The EP may be unusable because the purchaser in 
the importing country is affiliated with the exporter. The CEP is 
based on the first sale to a purchaser unrelated to the exporter.305 
Article 2 requires a "fair comparison" between the NV and the EP 
(or CEP). 306 The general formula for the calculation remains con-
ceptually the same as under prior law: 
302. Agreement, supra note 19, at 1. 
303. Agreement, supra note 19, at 1; see SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 67-68. 
304. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 63. 
305. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3. 
306. Id.; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 67; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 78, 82, 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3850, 3854. 
The DOC continues to attempt to calculate an individual dumping margin for all export-
ers subject to an antidumping investigation. Act, supra note 23, § 229, 108 Stat. at 4889 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1 (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 78. 
As under prior law the DOC bases its determination on data provided by foreign export-
ers and U.S. producers in response to questionnaires issued by the DOC. If an exporter or 
producer does not respond to a questionnaire or impedes an investigation, the DOC can 
make a determination based on "facts available." See Act, supra note 23, § 231 (c), 108 Stat. 
at 4896 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a) (1994)); MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 869; HousE 
REPORT, supra note 18, at 105, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3877. Under prior law the 
DOC made determinations based on the "best information available" in such situations. 
Whether the DOC's discretion is reduced because of this change in terminology remains 
to be seen. 
If a large number of exporters are named as respondents, the DOC may not have the 
resources to calculate margins for each exporter. The DOC, in such cases, may limit its 
calculation to respondents accounting for the largest volume of exports. Alternatively, it 
may calculate the dumping margin based on a "statistically valid" sample of exporters. 
Agreement, supra note 19, at 11; Act, supra note 23, § 229(a), 108 Stat. at 4890 (codified at 
19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2)(A) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 79; HousE REPORT, 
supra note 18, at 100, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3872. In both cases, an "all others" rate 
is calculated for those exporters not included in the calculation. Generally, this rate is 
based on a weighted average of individual dumping margins calculated for those exporters 
that are individually investigated. Agreement, supra note 19, at 15; Act, supra note 23, 
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Dumping Margin = NV - EP (or CEP), 
where NV is determined by home or third-country sales or a CV. 
Sections 223 and 224 of the Act implement Article 2 by altering 
the 1930 Act nomenclature to ensure consistency with new termi-
nology.307 The term "NV'' replaces the term "FMV''; "EP" replaces 
"PP"; "CEP" replaces "ESP"; and the term "USP" is abolished.3°8 
Furthermore, the Agreement uses the term "like product" to refer 
to both foreign and domestic merchandise and distinguishes 
between the two by modifying the term with either "domestic" or 
"foreign."309 Under prior law "like product" referred to a domestic 
(U.S.-produced) product, whereas "such or similar merchandise" 
referred to a foreign like product (a foreign export subject to the 
antidumping investigation).310 The Act clarifies the distinction and 
eliminates this awkward terminology. Finally, the term "subject 
merchandise" replaces the term "class or kind of merchandise sub-
ject to investigation."311 These changes in terminology are not 
intended to have any substantive legal ramifications.312 
§ 229(a), 108 Stat. at 4856-57 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c) (5) (1994)); MESSAGE, supra 
note 69, at 872-73; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 42, 78-79; HousE REPORT, supra note 
18, at 54, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3826. 
Under prior law the DOC used "generally recognized sampling techniques" to calculate 
the dumping margin. See NTN Bearing Corp. v. United States, 997 F.2d 1453, 1457-58 
(Fed. Cir. 1993). The new law contains a revised reference to a "statistically valid sample" 
but does not imply any substantive change. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 872. Rather, the new 
term simply conforms with the language in Article 6.10. Note, however, that the DOC is 
not obligated to obtain the most representative sample. It is merely obligated to employ a 
sampling methodology that yields representative results based on known facts. Id. at 873. 
Note also that the DOC is directed to investigate each known producer in a nonsampling 
situation. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(1) (1994). It is unclear whether this requirement effec-
tively supersedes the prior DOC regulation concerning 60% coverage, whereby the DOC 
normally examined at least 60% of the dollar value or volume of merchandise sold 150 
days before and 30 days after the first day of the month in which a petition was filed. 19 
C.F.R. § 353.42 (b) ( 1995). If so, then the consequent increase in administrative burden is 
certain to raise the number of instances in which the DOC uses sampling. 
307. Act, supra note 23, §§ 223-224, 108 Stat. at 4876-86 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 1677a, 1677b ( 1994)); MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 820; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 
33, 63. 
308. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 78-79, 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3850-51; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 820. 
309. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 820; see also 19 
U.S.C. § 1677(10), (16) (1994) (defining "domestic like product" and "foreign like 
product"). 
310. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 820; see supra note 
128 and accompanying text. 
311. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33. 
312. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 820. For a summary of changes to nomenclature, see 
Pre- and Post-Uruguay Round Terminology and Abbreviations, infra at Appendix A. 
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In contrast to the innocuous effects of the changes in terminol-
ogy, Article 5 of the Agreement establishes a problematic two-part 
de minimis margin inquiry. The first question is whether the vol-
ume of imports ·of the subject merchandise is so low that the 
authorities should ignore the allegation. The second question is 
whether the durpping margin is so slight that the authorities 
should ignore it for purposes of dumping margin and injury deter-
minations. Section 2 sets the threshold standards for answering 
these questions at 3% for the de minimis volume test and at 2% for 
the de minimis margin test.313 These standards represent a substan-
tial change from prior law. There was no analog in prior law to the 
3% volume test and the standard for the de minimis margin thresh-
old was 0.5%, not 2%.314 
Under the de minimis volume test, the DOC does not initiate an 
investigation if the volume of imports of subject merchandise from 
the exporter's country is less than 3% of total imports of like mer-
chandise from all countries.315 The 3% test is subject to an excep-
tion for cases in which more than one country exports subject 
merchandise.316 If the total volume of exports from such countries 
collectively exceeds 7%, an action may be brought even though no 
one exporting country's share exceeds 3%. The second test means 
that a dumping margin of 2% or less, ad valorem, is de minimis and, 
therefore, no investigation ensues.317 Obviously, no petitioner 
would allege the existence of a de minimis margin or volume; thus, 
the two-part inquiry may reduce the number of investigations that 
313. Agreement, supra note 19, at 8. 
314. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 38; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 49, reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3821; see supra text accompanying notes 131-132. Section 213 of the 
Act amends the 1930 Act to make it consistent with the Agreement. See Act, supra note 23, 
§ 213, 108 Stat. at 4850 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b) (1994)). 
315. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 57; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 71, 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3843. In other words, the volume of subject merchandise is 
compared with the total imports from all sources of like merchandise. Section 222(d) of 
the Act states that subject merchandise is negligible if it accounts for less than 3% of the 
total volume of all like merchandise imported into the United States in the most recent 
year preceding the filing of the antidumping petition. See Act, supra note 23, § 222(d), 108 
Stat. at 4871-72 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(24)(A)(i) (1994)). 
316. Act, supra note 23, § 222(d), 108 Stat. at 4871-72 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677 (24) (A) (i) ( 1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 57; HousE REPORT, supra note 
18, at 71, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3843. 
317. Interestingly, the 2% de minimis margin test applies only to antidumping investi-
gations. The DOC retains its ability to use the 0.5% test in reviews. See HousE REPORT, supra 
note 18, at 49, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3821; Memorandum from Powell, Goldstein, 
Frazer & Murphy on Analysis and Summary of Antidumping Provisions in GAIT Legisla-
tion (Oct. 1994) [hereinafter Analysis and Summary] (on file with The George Washington 
journal of International Law and Economics). 
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end in antidumping orders, but it will not reduce the number of 
investigations initiated. 
Further, the established thresholds seem to be too low. The chal-
lenge is to dismiss marginal petitions by appropriately calibrating 
the thresholds to eliminate protectionist abusers, not meritorious 
petitioners. If larger dumping margins and import volumes are 
required, fewer petitions will satisfy the de minimis threshold. 
Given that almost all petitioners allege dumping margins far in 
excess of 5%,318 perhaps a volume test of 10% and a margin test of 
10% might work. Although further empirical research is needed to 
fine-tune the appropriate threshold levels, the 10% figures provide 
a basis for further study. 
Another unsatisfactory aspect of Article 2 of the Agreement is its 
ambiguity with respect to averaging.319 The basic rule is that the 
DOC must use either average or individual transaction prices.320 
Authorities are not permitted to combine methods of comparison 
in a particular case unless there is evidence of a "pattern" of export 
prices that "differs significantly" among different purchasers, 
regions, or time periods. The key terms "pattern" and "differs sig-
nificantly" are undefined. Furthermore, section 229 of tlie Act, 
which implements the averaging rule, preserves the ability of the 
DOC to compare an average NV to an individual EP or CEP if the 
average-to-average and individual-to-individual methodologies fail 
to identify targeted dumping.321 The persistent use of individual-to-
average price comparisons perpetuates the bias in favor of finding 
a dumping margin by comparing an average FMV to an individual 
USP-a situation created by prior law.322 In addition, individual-to-
318. See Administration Voluntary Restraint Program Vzewed As Successful Only in Isolated 
Cases, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 714 (May 28, 1986). 
319. See supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text. 
320. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3; see also HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 98-99, 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3870-71 (stating that "the Committee expects that [the 
DOC] will use [the individual-to-individual} methodology far less frequently than average-
to-average methodology"). The Statement of Administrative Action indicates that the DOC 
does not like to make average-to-average comparisons. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 842. 
321. Act, supra note 23, § 229, 108 Stat. at 4889-91 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1 
(1994) ). 
322. The most blatant distortion in the Commerce Department's administration 
of the U.S. antidumping law is its refusal to average both U.S. and foreign prices 
in computing dumping margins .... The Department typically ignores any U.S. 
import prices above the foreign average and thus counts in its computation of the 
dumping margin only those below the foreign average price. 
The result is dumping margins even when foreign and U.S. pricing is identicaL 
For example, a foreign producer who sells three items in its home market at $9, 
$10 and $11 will be found to have dumped if the same sales are made at the same 
prices in the U.S. market. The average foreign market value in this example would 
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average price comparisons do not permit an exporter exercising 
reasonable care and judgment to determine at the time it sets its 
U.S. prices whether or not it is selling at LTFV. Suppose an 
exporter makes its first U.S. sale in January. At that time, the 
exporter cannot know what its weighted-average, home-market 
prices for the next six months or year will be; thus, it cannot deter-
mine a priori what prices may lead to an accusation of dumping. 
Interestingly, U.S. implementation of the basic rule that compar-
isons be made on the basis of either average or individual prices 
may be inconsistent with at least two provisions of the Agreement. 
Section 229(a) of the Act indicates that the basic rule is applicable 
only in the investigatory phase of a case, not in a subsequent 
annual administrative review, which is when antidumping duties 
are assessed instead of merely estimated.323 
In drafting the implementing legislation on price comparison 
methodology, the [Clinton] administration ignored the fair 
comparison requirement of article 2.4 of the Agreement and 
adopted for administrative reviews the current U.S. practice of 
comparing individual U.S. sales to a monthly weighted-average 
of sales in the foreign market. The administration also ignored 
article 18.3 of the Agreement, which applies the agreed rules 
equally to both investigations and reviews of existing measures. 
It is quite likely that the United States will be challenged in the 
WfO on the comparison methodology applied in reviews. This 
potentiality for challenge follows not only from the express 
wording of articles 2.4 and 18.3, but also from the practical con-
sequences. That is, if the United States applies different price 
comparison methodologies in investigations and reviews, it will 
cause great uncertainty and unpredictability. Further, it will 
impede the ability of foreign producers and exporters subject to 
dumping orders to set prices in the United States at a level suffi-
cient to be found selling at nondumped prices.324 
be $10 ($30/3), and would result in a $1 dumping margin when compared indi-
vidually with the $9 U.S. sale. 
PoWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 6-7. But see Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 20 F.3d 
1159 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that the DOC did not abuse "its discretion by refusing to 
consider averaging U.S. prices"). 
323. Act, supra note 23, § 229(a), 108 Stat. at 4890 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-
1 (d) (2) ( 1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 79-80; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 
99, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871; Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 492. However, the 
DOC must limit the averaging of NV to the month closest to the individual export sale with 
which the average is compared. Thus, the DOC can no longer compare an individual sale 
price to an average price calculated over a six- or twelve-month period. See HousE REPORT, 
supra note 18, at 99, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3871; Analysis and Summary, supra note 
317,at7. 
324. Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 493 (foomotes omitted). 
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There may be valid policy reasons for not using the averaging 
methodology during the phase when antidumping duties are 
assessed. For instance, averaging during that phase may result in a 
windfall to buyers of dumped goods because some part of the 
dumping duties that should be paid are charged to importers pay-
ing fair value.325 However, because averaging is not used during an 
administrative review, terminating an order may be as difficult as it 
is easy to find that targeted dumping exists.326 In sum, not only is 
the price-averaging rule ambiguous, the limit on the use of averag-
ing to the investigatory phase appears to be at variance with U.S. 
international obligations. 
Finally, the Agreement and the Act purport to guide the DOC in 
deciding what sales are comparable for purposes of calculating 
average NV.327 Nonetheless, ambiguities persist.328 Suppose a peti-
tioner accuses an exporter of dumping televisions. While it may be 
obvious that the NV of televisions with thirteen-inch screens should 
not be averaged with those having twenty-one-inch screens, it is less 
clear whether the NV of televisions with thirty-inch screens and 
televisions with thirty-five-inch screens fall into distinct product cat-
egories.329 Nor is it clear that the exporter's sales in its home-coun-
try urban areas are comparable with those in rural areas. To limit 
the effect of averaging, the petitioner will most likely argue for the 
narrowest possible averaging categories. Undoubtedly, the peti-
tioner will urge the DOC to accept an interpretation of compara-
bility that maximizes the dumping margin. Similarly, with respect 
to the individual-to-individual methodology, the DOC lacks ade-
quate standards for determining whether merchandise sold over-
seas is comparable to merchandise sold in the United States.330 
Here, again, the Sesame Street game is played: Is a right-hand drive 
Nissan Sentra sold in Tokyo comparable to a left-hand drive Sentra 
sold in New York? If so, would differences in the model name, 
stereo features, or trunk space vitiate comparability? In sum, the 
problematic de minimis tests, coupled with the ambiguity with 
325. ld. at 494. 
326. But see Stein, sufrra note 278, at 882 (suggesting that the implementing legislation 
creates standards for averaging that do not place an undue burden on petitioners). 
327. Holmer et al., sufrra note 23, at 494. 
328. See Agreement, sufrra note 19, at 3; Act, sufrra note 23, § 229, 108 Stat. at 4889-91 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1 (1994)). 
329. When merchandise compared is not identical, a DIFMER adjustment is appropri-
ate when there is a difference in the cost of manufacture, but not when there is a differ-
ence in market value that is not based on a difference in cost. See sufrra notes 186-187 and 
accompanying text. 
330. See supra note 321 and accompanying text. 
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respect to averaging and comparability, invite a protectionist 
abuser to manipulate the dumping margin calculation. 
2. Concerns About Home-Market Viability 
The Agreement alters the home-market viability test in an effort 
to prevent the calculation of NV on the basis of home-market sales 
that are too small in volume to present an accurate picture. The 
new test, in at least one respect, makes calculation of the dumping 
margin less susceptible to manipulation by petitioners. It provides, 
however, no guidance on which alternative to home-country sales is 
appropriate. The test is further flawed because it fails to detect the 
occurrence of cross-border subsidization. 
The home-market viability test determines whether the volume 
of foreign home-market sales is too small to serve as a basis for 
calculating the dumping margin. If the exporter's home-market 
sales are less than 5% of its sales to the importing country, "nor-
mally" the home-market sales will be too small in quantity to 
render the home market viable. 331 In such a case, export prices to a 
third country may be used in lieu of the home-market price. The 
formula, therefore, for market viability is: 
MV = (~/Q) X 100 
where MV is market viability, ~ is the quantity of sales by an 
exporter in its home market, and Q is the quantity of sales by an 
exporter in the importing country. If this ratio exceeds 5%, the 
home market is viable.332 
This formula represents a departure from prior law. Formerly, 
the DOC's home-market viability test involved a comparison of the 
volume of home-market sales to the volume of sales to countries 
other than the United States, rather than to U.S. sales.333 The new 
test changes the denominator from the volume of sales to coun-
tries other than the United States, to the volume of sales to the 
United States.334 The purpose behind this change is to prevent the 
use of NV on the basis of "thin" (low volume) home-market 
331. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 1 n.2. 
332. See Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4878-79 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(b) 
(1994) ). 
333. See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text. 
334. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(B)(ii)(II) (1994). See aLso SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, 
at 68 (providing that viability will be measured by comparing home-market sales with sales 
to the United States); HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 83, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3855 (stating that home-market viability will depend upon the quantity of sales by the 
home-market exporter compared with the quantity of sales by the exporter to the U.S. 
market). 
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sales.335 If the DOC uses sales figures from countries other than the 
United States in which the volume of sales is low, the size of the 
denominator will be reduced. In turn, the probability of satisfying 
the benchmark, and thus using a NV based on thin home-market 
sales, increases. By preventing the use of sales figures from other 
countries in the denominator, calculation of the dumping margin 
is less susceptible to manipulation by other countries. 
Nevertheless, the new home-market viability test raises at least 
two concerns. First, the new test offers no guidance on whether 
third-country sales or CV should be used as an alternative to home-
country sales when the home market is not viable. In contrast, 
under prior DOC regulations, there was an express preference for 
third-country sales.336 Second, the new test suggests, without fur-
ther elaboration, that a "particular market situation" may preclude 
the use of foreign home-market sales.337 Would a single sale in the 
foreign home market that constitutes 5% of sales to the United 
States be a "particular market situation" rendering the foreign mar-
ket sale nonviable? If the exporter's government establishes prices 
that cannot be considered competitively set, would foreign market 
sales then be incomparable?3 38 Would significant price changes 
associated with holidays that occur at different times of the year in 
the foreign and U.S. markets mean that prices in the foreign mar-
ket are not suitable for comparison? These ambiguities are 
unresolved. 
Finally, the new test, while operationally straightforward, ignores 
a salient microeconomic feature of dumping: it fails to detect 
whether cross-border subsidization occurs. Dumping consists of 
cross-border price discrimination as well as cross-border subsidiza-
tion. A foreign exporter earns super-normal profits in its protected 
home market where prices are high, thus offsetting below-normal 
profits or losses incurred in the United States where it sells at 
dumped prices.339 Absent this subsidization, it seems difficult to 
argue that the exporter is deliberately attempting to drive its U.S. 
competitors out of business. Home-market sales cannot subsidize 
U.S. sales unless one of two conditions exist. Either home-market 
335. HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 83, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3855. 
336. 19 C.F.R § 353.48(b} (1995). 
337. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 1. 
338. The Statement of Administrative Action suggests an affirmative answer. See 
MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 822. 
339. Admittedly, an exporter has an incentive to maximize profits in its home market 
by charging an optimum price in that market that is unrelated to the price it charges in the 
importing country. See DAM, supra note 29, at 169. 
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sales must be so significant in volume that the profits generated 
plainly offset losses incurred in the United States340 or, where only 
a small volume of home-market sales exists, each sale must gener-
ate an extraordinarily high profit margin so that losses incurred in 
the United States are offset. The 5% bright-line test, while opera-
tionally straight forward, does not consider whether either condi-
tion is satisfied. Consequently, home-market sales can be used as a 
basis for NV, even where a respondent is not cross-subsidizing U.S. 
sales. The traffic-light system proposed in Part V avoids the issue of 
home-market viability by eliminating the concept of NV. 
3. Wrongfully Excluding Below-Cost Sales 
The treatment of below-cost sales in calculating NV is of enor-
mous practical importance. Since 1980 roughly 60% of all 
antidumping cases in the United States involved allegations of 
below-cost sales.341 Including these sales in the calculation of NV 
significantly lowers the probability of a final affirmative dumping 
determination. The NV is calculated on the basis of an average of 
prices in the home market. It is a mathematical fact that the exclu-
sion of below-cost sales raises the average and therefore increases 
the likelihood of finding a dumping margin. 
The fundamental microeconomic problem with Article 2.2 of 
the Agreement, and section 222(h) of the Act which implements 
this article, stems from the ambiguous phrase "ordinary course of 
trade."342 The Agreement and the Act treat below-cost sales as 
outside of the "ordinary course of trade"343 and fail to differentiate 
among total, variable, and fixed costs of production.344 This helps 
340. As one practitioner notes: 
Obviously, if dumping is based on the assumption of cross subsidization of export 
sales by home market sales, a company which sells 95% of its production in the 
U.S. and 5% in the home market is not likely to be able to cross-subsidize from 
the home market into the U.S. to a significant degree. 
Horlick, supra note 13, at 131. 
341. Id. at 136; see also Gilbert B. Kaplan eta!., Cost Analysis Under the Antidumping Law, 
21 CEO. WASH.]. INT'L L. & EcoN. 358, 358(1988) (stating that "approximately two-thirds 
of the antidumping investigations processed in calendar year 1987 involved cost of produc-
tion or constructed value analyses"). 
342. 19 u.s.c. § 1677(15) (1994). 
343. "(D]umping is measured by comparing the export price of a product with the 
comparable price of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, in the market of the 
exporting country." SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 61; see HousE REPORT, supra note 18, 
at 76, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3848. Interestingly, in a recent case arising under prior 
law, the DOC decided that below-cost sales are in the ordinary course of trade. See Antifric-
tion Bearings and Parts Thereof from France, 60 Fed. Reg. 10,900, 10,922-23 (1995). Of 
course, final DOC and ITC determinations have no precedential effect. 
344. See infra notes 584-594 and accompanying text. 
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to perpetuate the bias created under prior law by ignoring the pos-
sibility that pricing behavior, which appears unfair or predatory, 
may be economically justified. For instance, it may be economically 
rational for a respondent to sell a foreign like product below its 
average total cost of production, yet above its average variable cost 
of production,345 because the respondent may be facing either 
depressed market conditions for foreign like merchandise or a 
temporary excess inventory of such merchandise in its home coun-
try.346 By pricing the merchandise below its minimum average total 
cost of production, but above its average variable cost of produc-
tion, the respondent may only be trying to maintain market share. 
At such a level, the respondent incurs short-run losses; although it 
can cover all of its fixed costs, it can only cover a portion of its 
variable costs.347 The respondent expects to recoup these losses 
when market conditions improve and prices rise to a level above its 
average total cost of production or when it sells its excess 
inventory.348 
Still other economic rationales may explain the respondent's 
behavior. The respondent may be attempting to increase its market 
share without driving competitors out of business or to "move 
down its learning curve" by developing further knowledge and 
experience in making the product in question.349 In sum, it is 
345. See infra notes 584-594 and accompanying text. Interestingly, one practitioner 
points out that "[b]y the mid-1970s, there was a fair degree of consensus in the U.S. that 
sales below fully allocated cost, but above some form of average variable cost, would not be 
penalized as such under the U.S. antitrust laws." Horlick, supra note 13, at 134 (foomote 
omitted). Horlick argues that the United States violates the national treatment clause of 
Article III of GAIT 1947 because the cost-based pricing standard in antidumping law for 
imported goods differs from the standard in antitrust laws for domestic goods. Id.; see also 
Boltuck & Litan, supra note 56, at 15 (noting that foreigners are punished "for pricing 
practices ... that are perfectly legal for U.S. firms to engage in when selling in the domes-
tic market") (foomote omitted). 
346. Under prior law Congress appears to have recognized this possibility. SeeS. REP. 
No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 173-74 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 7186, 7310. 
347. See infra notes 584-594 and accompanying text. 
348. See Deardorff, supra note 29, at 30-31. Note, however, that Deardorff presumes 
that the exporter prices its product below average cost but not marginal cost. Id.; see also 
BovARD, supra note 1, at 130-131 (explaining that "[t]he real question in cost of produc-
tion cases should be not what total costs are, but what the variable costs are"); PoWELL ET 
AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 6 (stating that the failure of antidumping law to distinguish 
between truly anticompetitive conduct and legitimate pricing differences based on normal 
business considerations "forces foreign sellers to keep their prices high to avoid dumping 
allegations, even when market considerations might warrant reductions and their U.S. 
competitors may in fact be lowering their own prices"). 
349. See generally Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 158-59 (explaining further eco-
nomic rationales for dumping). For a debate on other causes of predation, see Janusz A 
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a well-known conclusion of basic microeconomics [that] [e]ven 
in perfectly competitive markets, profit-maximizing firms with 
no significant market power may sometimes find it rational to 
price below average cost. And the new trade theory contains 
many examples of how such a pricing strategy can lead to effi-
cient outcomes under imperfectly competitive conditions .... 
In short, there is often nothing in such pricing behavior to sug-
gest market power, unfair practices, or predatory malice.350 
By ignoring this conclusion, the Agreement and the Act conse-
quently maintain the same protectionist bias that existed under 
prior law.351 When a respondent's below-cost sales are excluded 
from the calculation of NV, the respondent is, in effect, obligated 
to price its merchandise at a higher level than the petitioner would 
price its merchandise under similar circumstances.352 This obliga-
tion is especially onerous for any respondent which incurs large 
research, development, and start-up costs, yet has low variable 
costs.353 
Aside from faulty microeconomic logic, problems of practical 
application further ensure a continuation of protectionist bias. 
Under prior law the DOC could launch a below-cost sales investiga-
tion if it had "reasonable grounds" to believe or suspect that sales 
were being made at below-cost prices.354 One practitioner, discuss-
ing shortcomings of the prior law, commented: " [ t] he threshold of 
"reasonable grounds to believe or suspect' for cost investigations 
frustrates many parties with its ambiguity. The standard is far from 
self-defining, and can lend great uncertainty to the early stages of 
investigation when cost and price issues must be identified."355 
Ordover et al., Predatory Systems Rivalry: A Reply, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1150 (1983);Joseph G. 
Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 1121 (1983). 
350. LAuRA D'ANDREA TYSoN, INSTITUTE FOR INT'L EcoNOMICS, WHo's BASHING WHoM? 
TRADE CoNFLicr IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INousrRIES 268 (1992). 
351. See supra notes 151-159 and accompanying text. 
352. For a version of this point under prior law, see jACKSON, supra note 74, at 235. 
353. High-technology companies are an example: 
Especially for high-tech products, variable costs are usually far lower than fully 
allocated costs. Assume a company's fully allocated cost for producing chips is 
$1.40, and its variable cost is 70 cents. Is the company better off selling 5 million 
chips at $1.50, or 100 million chips at $1 each? Selling 5 million chips at $1.50 
provides a total revenue of $7.5 million; selling 100 million chips at $1 each pro-
vides $100 million. The greater the volume of sales that occur above variable cost 
of production, the more irrelevant the fully allocated cost standard becomes. 
[The DOC] 's method pressures foreign companies to sell a small number of 
items above fully allocated costs rather than a great number of items above varia-
ble costs. 
BovARD, supra note I, at 131. 
354. 19 u.s.c. § l677b(b) (1994) 
355. PATriSON, supra note 72 § 5.05[6]; see also AI Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United 
States, 6 Ct. Int'l Trade 245, 250 (1983), aff'd, 745 F.2d 632 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (drawing on 
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Article 2.4 of the Agreement and section 224 of the Act, which 
implements this article, ensure that it remains relatively easy for a 
petitioner to trigger a below-cost sales investigation, also called a 
cost-of-production investigation.356 As under pre-Uruguay Round 
law, the DOC is required to merely have "reasonable grounds" to 
believe or suspect that sales under consideration for the determina-
tion of NV have been made at below-cost prices.357 This minimum 
standard is met if the petitioner provides information on costs and 
prices (either observed or constructed) indicating that sales in the 
foreign home market are at below-cost prices. However, contrary to 
the law as applied by the DOC prior to the Act, the information 
provided by the petitioner need not relate to a particular exporter 
alleged to be engaged in dumping; the allegation may be country-
wide, as opposed to company-specific.sss 
Under prior law the DOC was required to have independent rea-
sonable grounds for launching a below-cost price investigation. 
The new regime merely requires the DOC to have information 
"reasonably available to petitioners." Considering these changes, it 
appears that the Agreement and the Act have lowered the standard 
for initiating an investigation.359 Worse yet, the Agreement and 
the Act do not tighten the criteria for excluding below-cost sales, 
thus replicating the opportunities for protectionist abuse inherent 
in the 1930 Act. Below-cost sales may be disregarded if they are 
made "in substantial quantities," "within an extended period of 
time," and "at prices which do not provide for the recovery of all 
costs within a reasonable period of time."360 These criteria closely 
resemble the ambiguous language in prior law.s6I 
Consider the first condition. The Agreement establishes alterna-
tive tests for determining whether sales below cost of production 
are substantial and, therefore, whether they may be excluded from 
the law of criminal procedure relating to "reasonable suspicion" and holding that "absent a 
specific and objective basis for suspecting that a particular foreign firm is engaged in home 
market sales at prices below its cost of production, [the] threshold requirement of 'reason-
able grounds to believe or suspect' has not been satisfied"). 
356. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4881 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1994)). 
357. See supra note 152 and accompanying text; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 72; 
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 90, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3862. 
358. See Torrington Co. v. United States, 15 Ct. lnt'l Trade 456, 460 (1991); Al Tech 
Specialty Steel Corp., 6 Ct. lnt'l Trade at 250; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 833. 
359. See MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 833 (stating that " [ t] he changes ... are in tended to 
permit [the DOC] to initiate below-cost inquiries at the outset of a case"). 
360. Agreement, supra note 19, at 1-2; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4878-81 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. 1677b(b)(1) (1994)). 
361. See supra note 153 and accompanying text; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 72. 
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the calculation of NV.362 Such sales are substantial if they equai or 
exceed 20% of the exporter's total sales in its home market. Alter-
natively, such sales are substantial if the weighted-average unit 
price of the home-market sales is less than the weighted-average 
unit cost of production for such sales.363 The first test should 
reduce the likelihood of a final affirmative dumping determina-
tion. Under pre-Uruguay Round law the DOC used a 10% thresh-
old to determine whether to exclude below-cost sales. 364 By using 
the second test and raising the threshold to 20%, it is more likely 
that below-cost sales will be included in the computation of NV. 
The amount assigned to NV, therefore, is likely to be lower and it 
will be harder for the DOC to find a positive dumping margin. 
Nothing in the Agreement or the Act indicates whether or when 
the first or second test should be used. Clearly, a petitioner will 
argue for whichever test leads to the exclusion of below-cost sales. 
As two practitioners point out, 
[s]ome U.S. steel industry lobbyists claim that the 20 percent 
threshold will reduce the likelihood of a finding of dumping 
and permit exporters to engage in significant sales below the 
cost at home. This concern is misplaced, however, because the 
Antidumping Agreement expressly provides that, if the 
weighted-average sales price is below the weighted-average cost, 
the administering authorities may disregard the below cost sales 
even if they account for less than 20 percent of total home mar-
ket sales. 365 
In effect, the Agreement and the Act raise the threshold for exclu-
sion but then provide a petitioner with a means of circumventing 
the threshold. 
The second condition differs from prior law in two seemingly 
innocuous ways. Under prior law below-cost sales had to occur 
"over" an extended period of time. Below-cost sales must now 
occur "within" the period.366 As a result of the change, it is no 
longer necessary for the DOC to find that below-cost sales occur 
throughout some minimum number of months. The word "over" 
362. Agreement, supra note 19, at 2; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4882 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(2)(C) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 72. 
363. It is unclear whether the second test corresponds to the pre-Uruguay Round rule 
used by the DOC for highly perishable agricultural products. Compare MESSAGE, supra note 
69, at 832 (suggesting consistency) with PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.05 [6] (stating that the 
DOC "has established a higher threshold for below cost sales in cases involving perishable 
products"). 
364. See supra note 154 and accompanying text; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 72; 
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 89, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3861. 
365. Horlick & Shea, supra note 20, at 26 (emphasis added). 
366. See supra note 153 and accompanying text; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 72. 
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suggests that below-cost sales must occur for a sustained period, 
such as in each month for a six-month period. "Within," however, 
suggests that such sales occur at any point within the period, such 
as during the second month in a six-month period. Also, under 
prior law, the DOC interpreted "extended period of time" to mean 
six or possibly three months, and thereby confined its below-cost 
inquiry to a six-month period.367 The Agreement and the Act 
define "extended period of time" as one year but not less than six 
months.368 Consequently, the DOC can double the length of time 
it surveys for below-cost sales. Obviously, the longer the period of 
investigation, the greater the chance of finding below-cost sales to 
exclude from NV. 
With respect to the third condition-intended as a safe har-
bor-the Agreement and the Act provide a flawed mechanism for 
identifying prices that allow for cost recovery within a reasonable 
period of time. The definition dictates that if a price falls below 
per-unit cost at the time of sale but remains above weighted-aver-
age per-unit cost for the period of investigation, the price allows 
for cost recovery within a reasonable period of time.369 This test 
can be met only in rare circumstances, such as when costs fluctuate 
during the period of investigation and all subject merchandise is 
manufactured at a time of unusually high costs. The definition is 
further flawed because it fails to distinguish among variable, fixed, 
and total costs. These distinctions are important in understanding 
the economic rationale behind an exporter's pricing behavior.370 
Finally, the definition is somewhat circular; it essentially states that 
a price provides for cost recovery if it is above weighted-average 
costs. 
A petitioner can exploit these flaws to maximize NV and any 
dumping margin. A petitioner, for example, can urge a measure of 
cost recovery that is based on a speculative estimate of future pro-
duction costs. Further, a petitioner can take advantage of events 
that might complicate the weighted-average production cost calcu-
367. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 72; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 88, reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3860. 
368. Agreement, supra note 19, at 2; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4882 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(2)(B) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 72; HousE 
REPORT, supra note 18, at 88, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3860. 
369. Stated differently, a price below cost at the time of sale provides for recovery of 
costs within a reasonable period of time if it is above weighted-average cost of production 
at the time of sale. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 1-2; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. 
at 4882 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(2)(D) (1994) ); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 71-
72; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 88, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3860. 
370. See supra notes 342-350 and accompanying text. 
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lation. For instance, suppose there are temporary disruptions to 
production because of maintenance work at the foreign factory 
where the merchandise is made. As a direct result, production is 
temporarily suspended or reduced and unit costs are artificially 
inflated. Should these unit costs be excluded from the weighted-
average calculation? A petitioner seeking to exclude below-cost 
sales in order to obtain the highest weighted-average production 
cost possible will claim that the unit costs are not representative. 
The petitioner will claim that it is appropriate to allocate the effect 
of this work over time so that a proportional effect is realized.371 
However, a respondent, seeking the lowest possible weighted-aver-
age costs to satisfy the third condition for inclusion of below-cost 
sales, will claim that the maintenance work is periodic and 
foreseeable. 
In sum, the three-part criteria engenders protectionist abuse. It 
is wrong to exclude sales below the cost of production from the 
calculation of NV sales. Below-cost sales may be rational and eco-
nomically justified, yet their exclusion shows a blatant bias in favor 
of a petitioner. This problem is eliminated under the proposed 
traffic-light system, suggested in Part V, due to the elimination of 
the NV concept. 
4. Maximizing the Dumping Margin by Adjusting NV 
Article 2.4 of the Agreement, which is implemented in part by 
section 224 of the Act, establishes a general obligation that the 
comparison between EP and NV be "fair."372 The comparison 
would be more fair if LTFV sales were offset by non-L TFV sales. 
However, like prior law, the Agreement does not contemplate off-
sets.373 Failure to offset inevitably increases the probability of a 
final affirmative dumping determination, resulting in a clear and 
systematic bias in favor of petitioners. Offsets are a logical means of 
reducing the risk of protectionist abuse; thus, offsets are required 
in the traffic-light system proposed in Part V. 
More fundamentally, a key feature of Article 2.4 is its articulation 
of adjustments to NV designed to ensure a fair comparison 
between EP and NV. The Agreement mandates adjustments for dif-
371. The legislative history expresses a preference for the DOC to adopt the latter 
approach. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 89, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3861; 
MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 832. 
372. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4878 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (1994)). 
373. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. Of course, it could be argued that 
averaging is a type of offset system. 
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ferences between foreign and U.S. markets that affect the compara-
bility of the EP and NV. Such differences include trade levels, sales 
conditions, quantities, physical characteristics, and taxation.374 A 
benign assessment of Article 2.4's scheme for making adjustments 
is that its effect on a dumping margin determination is a priori 
inconclusive. Several adjustments are deductions that will decrease 
NV and, in turn, decrease the likelihood of a final affirmative 
dumping determination. For example, as under prior law, the cost 
of packing for shipment in the exporting country must be 
deducted from NV.375 Further, if the cost of transportation-
including warehousing expenses, incurred in bringing a foreign 
like product to the place of delivery in the exporting country and 
the amount of any rebated or uncollected indirect taxes imposed 
on a foreign like product-were included in the calculation of NV, 
they must be deducted.376 Petitioners fought hard to exclude 
deductions for freight and taxes from the Act. These deductions 
are important victories over the forces of protectionism and over-
turn two pre-Uruguay Round court cases, Federal-Mogul Corp. v. 
United States377 and Ad Hoc Committee v. United States. 378 The deduc-
tion from NV for transportation charges incurred in the exporting 
country mirrors the deduction from EP for movement charges and 
helps ensure that NV and EP are ex-factory prices.379 The deduc-
tion for indirect taxes alters prior law; such taxes were previously 
added to USP. The change is intended to ensure that dumping 
margins will be tax neutral.3SO 
At the same time, however, other adjustments may result in addi-
tions to NV that increase the probability of an affirmative dumping 
determination. For example, NV is increased by the cost of con-
tainers and coverings associated with packing and readying the sub-
ject merchandise for shipment to the United States.381 Because of 
374. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 StaL at 4878 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (1994)). 
375. See supra note 182 and accompanying text; 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (6) (B) (i) (1994). 
376. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 StaL at 4880 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (6)(B) (ii)-(iii) (1994) ); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 70; 
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 84, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3856. 
377. 17 Ct. lnt'l Trade 88, 92-100 (1993). 
378. 13 F.3d 398, 401-03 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
379. HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 84, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3856. 
380. !d.; see also Analysis and Summary, supra note 317, at 5 (explaining that the adjust-
ment for indirect taxes will guarantee a neutral effect on an antidumping margin 
calculation). 
381. Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4880 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(a) (6) (A) (1994) ). 
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this prov1Slon and the deduction of home-market packing costs, 
the Act ensures. that the exact same amount of packing costs are 
incorporated into NV and EP.382 However, it is unclear why all 
packing costs are not removed from both prices in the same man-
ner that freight and taxes are wholly excluded from NV and EP. As 
another example, differences in the physical characteristics, condi-
tions, and terms of sale between subject merchandise and a foreign 
like product may necessitate a "circumstances of sale adjustment to 
NV."383 On balance, it is impossible to predict whether additions to 
or deductions from NV will dominate the dumping margin 
calculation. 
A more critical assessment of adjustments to NV suggests that 
adjustments spawn opportunities for protectionist abuse. It 
remains true that" '[d]umping' often occurs as the result of Amer-
ican bureaucrats' manipulation of numbers, rather than actual for-
eign business practices."384 Specifically, a petitioner can continue 
to exploit the defects of the 1930 Act provisions on the COS and 
LOT adjustments to FMV and the ESP cap-offset scheme and thus 
maximize a dumping margin.385 With respect to the COS adjust-
ment, neither the Agreement nor the Act suggest a test for distin-
guishing "direct" from "indirect" sales expenses. Consequently, a 
petitioner remains free to urge the DOC to increase NV by arguing 
that an adjustment is inappropriate because it does not reflect a 
direct sales expense. What one observer wrote about prior law 
remains true: "[t]he question of whether a price is fair often 
depends on whether a low-level Commerce bureaucrat ordains that 
certain sales expenses are direct or indirect. "386 
Important precautions, which are lacking in the Agreement, are 
needed regarding a LOT adjustment.387 Ideally, this adjustment 
should be made only where a difference in the level of trade affects 
382. See supra note 375. 
383. Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4880 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(a)(6)(C)(ii) (1994)); HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 85, reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3857; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 828. 
384. BovARD, supra note 1, at 115. 
385. See supra notes 188-204 and accompanying text; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 
70-71; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 828. 
386. BovARD, supra note 1, at 123. While judicial review by the Court of International 
Trade and Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may force the "bureaucrat" to turn 
square corners when exercising discretion, these courts invariably accord tremendous def-
erence to agency determinations. Charlene Barshefsky & Michael J. Firth, International 
Trade Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During the Year 198 7, 3 7 
AM. U. L. REv. 1167, 1168 (1988). 
387. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text. 
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price comparability. There should be evidence of a pattern of price 
differences between sales at different levels of trade in an 
exporter's home-country market. If wholesale and retail prices in 
the exporter's home-country market are not substantially different 
over time, a LOT adjustment may be inappropriate. Mere refer-
ence to a company as a "wholesaler" should not automatically trig-
ger the adjustment. What should matter is whether that company 
actually performs the role of an intermediary between a producer 
and exporter. Similarly, a sales subsidiary that is created merely to 
perform the role of a de facto sales department should not trigger 
a LOT adjustment. The Act provides little guidance and merely 
states that an adjustment is necessary if differences in the level of 
trade involve the "performance of different selling activities" and 
affect price comparability "based on a pattern of consistent price 
differences" between sales in the exporter's home market and the 
United States.388 What selling activities are "different?" What price 
patterns are "consistent?" While neither the Agreement nor the Act 
guarantees that the DOC will make a LOT adjustment, a petitioner 
is free to attempt to exploit these ambiguities to maximize the 
dumping margin.3s9 
F;inally, controversy surrounding ESP caps and offsets-now 
called CEP caps and offsets-persists. Under prior law petitioners 
argued that the ESP offset should be eliminated because a respon-
dent can manipulate the amount of indirect sales expense it incurs 
in its home market to reduce FMV and thereby reduce any dump-
ing margin.390 Respondents countered that the ESP cap should be 
eliminated, stating that opportunities for manipulation are exag-
gerated and that total indirect sales expenses should be deducted 
from FMV. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in two 
cases, upheld the ESP cap-offset scheme.391 
388. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(7) (A) (1994); MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 829; SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 18, at 70-71; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87, reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.CAN. 3859. 
389. A respondent also could exploit the ambiguities by, for instance, attempting to 
fool the DOC with a fake chain of sales. 
390. Horlick, supra note 13, at 145. 
391. In Smith-Carona Group v. United States, the court stated that "[w]ere it not for the 
exporter's sales price offset, comparisons based on purchase price would be fair, yet com-
parisons based on exporter's sales price would be skewed in favor of a higher dumping 
margin." 713 F.2d 1568, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984). In SCM 
Corp. v. Silver Reed America, Inc., the court reversed a Court oflntemational Trade decision 
in which the ESP cap was held invalid and a deduction from FMV for all indirect expenses 
was allowed. 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The court explained that "[f]oreign produ-
cers had claimed indirect expense deductions under the rubric of 'differences in circum-
stances of sale' to the point where price disparity routinely disappeared" and that 
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Both the Agreement and the Act appear to favor petitioners by 
placing conditions on when a CEP offset to NV for indirect sales 
expenses may be made. First, the amount of this deduction is lim-
ited to the amount of the deduction from CEP for indirect sales 
expenses-the ESP cap is reincarnated as the CEP cap. 392 Second, 
the CEP offset may be made only if there is no home-market sale at 
the same level of trade as the sale in the United States and the 
DOC does not have adequate information to make a LOT adjust-
ment.393 The rationale for this limitation provided in the legislative 
history is opaque: 
Only where different functions at different levels of trade are 
established under section 773(a)(7) (A)(i), but the data avail-
able do not form an appropriate basis for determining a level of 
trade adjustment ... will [the DOC] make a constructed export 
price offset adjustment .... The adjustment will be "capped" by 
the amount of indirect expenses deducted from constructed 
export price .... In some circumstances, the data may not per-
mit [the DOC] to determine the amount of the level of trade 
adjustment. For example, there may be no, or very few sales of a 
sufficiently similar product by a seller to independent customers 
at different levels of trade. This could be the case where there is 
only one foreign respondent and all sales are to affiliated pur-
chasers. Also, there could be restrictive business practices which 
result in too few appropriate sales to determine a price effect. 
Similarly, the data could indicate a clearly contradictory result, 
for example contradictory patterns during different periods. In 
such situations, although an adjustment might have been war-
ranted, [the DOC] may be unable to determine whether there is 
an effect on price comparability. In such situations, although 
there is a difference in levels of trade, [the DOC] may be unable 
to quantify the adjustment. Where this occurs, [the DOC] will 
make a capped "constructed export price offset" adjustment ... 
in lieu of the level of trade adjustment that would be warranted . . . . 
The constructed export price offset adjustment will be made 
only where normal value is established at a level of trade more 
remote from the factory than the level of trade of the con-
structed export price; i.e., where the [level of trade] adjustment 
deducting all such expenses "could distort the computations in favor of foreign manufac-
turers." Id. at 1038-40. 
392. See Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4881 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b 
(a)(7)(B) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 71; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 
87, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3859. 
393. See Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat at 4881 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(a) (7)(B) (1994) ); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 71; HousE REPORT, supra note 
18, at 87, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3859; Analysis and Summary, supra note 317, at 5. 
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... , if it could have been quantified, would likely have resulted 
in a reduction of the normal value.!l94 
83 
The highlighted language suggests that a CEP offset is a proxy for 
the LOT adjustment, yet the two deductions serve entirely different 
purposes. 395 The former is aimed at equalizing differences in NV 
and CEP arising from indirect sales expenses, while the latter 
ensures that these prices are based on either wholesale or retail 
transactions. In other words, the highlighted language calls into 
question whether the CEP offset continues to operate or is effec-
tively replaced by LOT adjustments. The outcome depends on how 
the DOC applies the statutory provision on LOT adjustments.396 
The DOC could theorize that a LOT adjustment is predicated on 
an amalgamation of direct expenses, indirect expenses, and profit. 
Further, it could find that direct expenses can be equalized 
through a COS adjustment.39 7 Accordingly, the key practical differ-
ence between a LOT adjustment and CEP offset may be that only 
the former can equalize profit. Thus, the DOC might apply a CEP 
offset only if it cannot determine how to make a LOT adjustment. 
Undoubtedly, petitioners and respondents will argue about 
whether data are "appropriate" to make a LOT adjustment. 
An additional factor that makes it difficult to know how the DOC 
will treat LOT adjustments concerns the CEP concept, which is 
designed to be roughly equivalent to a stripped-down wholesale, 
retail, or other price. Theoretically, the DOC is supposed to find 
an actual sales price in the home market that is equivalent to the 
CEP. Yet, in practice, this undertaking seems virtually impossible. 
Overall, if the result of the conditions limiting the application of a 
CEP offset is that it is generally unavailable to respondents and any 
LOT adjustment is small, then dumping margins are certain to 
increase. Overall, the Agreement and the Act preserve and possibly 
extend opportunities for a protectionist abuser to manipulate the 
dumping margin calculation by adjusting NV. In contrast, the pro-
posed traffic-light system in Part V eliminates such opportunities by 
abolishing the concept of NV. 
394. HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87-88, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3859-60 
(emphasis added); MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 830-31. 
395. See supra notes 189-191, 199-201, 392-394 and accompanying text. 
396. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(7)(A) (1994). 
397. See MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 828. 
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5. Maximizing the Dumping Margin by Adjusting EP or CEP 
Article 2.4 of the Agreement also addresses adjustments to EP 
and CEP.398 Such adjustments, covered in section 223 of the Act, 
do little to minimize the risk that a protectionist abuser will maxi-
mize a dumping margin.399 Shortcomings include an absence of 
guidance on how to make allowances for costs and profits or how 
to designate comparable levels of trade. Also, the final balance 
between deductions and additions in calculation of EP or CEP is 
unclear. 
The basis for EP and CEP-the starting price-continues to be 
the first sale made to an independent buyer in the United States.400 
The Agreement, however, indicates that CEP must include adjust-
ments for costs-such as duties and taxes incurred between impor-
tation and resale, and for profits-and further specifies that the 
NV to which the EP or CEP is compared must reflect the same level 
of trade.401 Exactly how should allowances for costs and profits be 
made? \Vhat levels of trade are comparable? These questions are 
unanswered. Further, large deductions from EP or CEP, which 
increase the likelihood of a final affirmative dumping determina-
tion, are possible. The subtractions in prior law from PP and 
ESP,402 and the deductions specific to ESP,403 are retained under 
the new law with respect to EP or CEP404• 
A new deduction from CEP-an allowance "for profit allocable 
to selling, distribution, and further manufacturing in the United 
States"-is created.405 The DOC must determine the percentage of 
total profit allocable to U.S. sales on the basis of the ratio of U.S. 
manufacturing and selling expenses to total manufacturing and 
398. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3. 
399. See Act, supra note 23, § 223, 108 Stat at 4876 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a 
(1994) ). 
400. See supra notes 136-141 and accompanying text. 
40 I. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3. 
402. See supra notes 167-176 and accompanying text; 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c) (2) (1994); 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 63-64; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 79-80, reprinted in 
1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3851-52. 
403. See supra notes 177-180 and accompanying text; 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) (1994); SEN-
ATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 64-65; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 79-80, reprinted in 
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3851-52. 
404. Act, supra note 23, § 223, 108 Stat at 4876 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)-(d) 
(1994) ). 
405. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 824; Act, supra note 23, § 223, 108 Stat. at 4877 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(3) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 66; HousE 
REPORT, supra note 18, at 80, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3852. 
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selling expenses.406 Total profit accrued in the United States and 
home markets is multiplied by this ratio to yield profit allocable to 
the United States. The theory behind the new deduction is that it 
will ensure that CEP is "a price corresponding to an export price 
between nonaffiliated exporters and importers."407 The profit 
deduction, however, creates a perverse incentive for a respondent: 
A respondent is discouraged from engaging in direct investment in 
the United States because such investment may lead to greater U.S. 
profits and therefore higher dumping margins. Moreover, the 
profit deduction is operationally ambiguous. How should total 
profit be calculated? Some practitioners suggest that it should be 
calculated by subtracting manufacturing and selling expenses from 
total sales revenue.408 Section 223 of the Act is silent on this point. 
A petitioner may exploit this ambiguity in an effort· to maximize 
any dumping margin.409 Finally, there appears to be an inherent 
propetitioner bias resulting from the profit deduction from CEP. 
There is no compensating deduction from the NV. One practi-
tioner argues that a LOT adjustment should be made to the NV 
that is sufficient to compensate for the profit deduction from CEP: 
The DOC 
will be faced with the requirement to ensure that the level of 
trade adjustment to the normal value yields a fair comparison 
with the U.S. price after deductions of direct and indirect 
expenses and an allocated portion of profit. The automatic 
assumption that a comparison of sales at the same level of trade 
406. Act, supra note 23, § 223, 108 Stat. at 4877-78 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(f) 
( 1994)). Specifically, the numerator of the ratio consists of expenses incurred by the for-
eign exporter and affiliated U.S. seller with respect to the production and sale of subject 
merchandise sold in the United States. The denominator of this ratio is the sum of all 
expenses incurred by the foreign exporter and affiliated U.S. seller with respect to the 
production and sale of the subject merchandise sold in the United States and the foreign 
like product sold in the home market. /d.; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 66; HousE 
REPORT, supra note 18, at 80, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3852; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 
824-25. For a formulaic presentation of the ratio, see Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 494-
95. 
407. HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 80, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3852. 
408. See, e.g., Analysis and Summary, supra note 317, at 3-4 (concluding that total actual 
profit will be calculated as total sales revenue in the United States and home market minus 
total manufacturing and general expenses in the United States and home market). The 
legislative history of the Act indicates that losses (negative profits) will not be allocated. See 
MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 825. 
409. Suppose the exporter and importer are affiliates but the product is not resold to 
an independent buyer, or it is not resold in the same condition. What is the CEP in this 
situation? Article 2.3 of the Agreement states that a "reasonable" basis may be used to 
determine that price but provides no further guidance. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 3. 
Thus, substantial discretion is left to domestic authorities. The consequent uncertainty 
could benefit a petitioner. 
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requires no adjustment is based on the fiction that sales to two 
different parties at the same level of trade are identical in all 
respects. Unless the [DOC] can establish, based on positive evi-
dence, that the activities of the two parties at the same level of 
trade are, in fact, identical (which is often unlikely for commer-
cial entities in different countries), [the DOC] will not be able 
to assume that such sales are identical. 410 
Admittedly, the Agreement and the Act retain the pre-Uruguay 
Round additions for costs and profits to PP and ESP, which lead to 
a higher value for these prices, and, therefore, reduce the chance 
of a final affirmative dumping determination.411 At the same time, 
however, it is uncertain whether the effect of such additions on 
dumping margin calculations overwhelms or even balances the 
effect of deductions. What is clear is that complicated arguments, 
made under prior law, about adjusting PP and ESP will be raised 
again with respect to EP and CEP respectively, and renewed com-
plaints by practitioners of a bias against respondents are likely.412 
These arguments are not entirely resolved by the traffic-light sys-
tem proposed in Part V, because the proposed system relies on the 
concepts of EP and CEP in dumping margin determinations. 
6. Calculating CV 
Calculating CV is a complicated exercise rife with opportunities 
for protectionist abuse. Article 2.2 of the Agreement, implemented 
by section 224 of the Act, calls for the inclusion of the costs of 
manufacture, sales, general and administrative expenses, ( collec-
tively referred to as "SG&A expenses" or "general expenses") and 
profit in the CV calculation.413 As under prior law these items are 
added together to calculate CV.414 However, the new law works a 
dramatic change with regard to statutory minimum criteria. Profit 
and general expense figures must be based on actual data pertain-
410. Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 498 n.58. 
411. See Act, supra note 23, § 223, 108 Stat. at 4876 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c) 
(1994) ); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 63; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 79, reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3851. There is one small change in the 1930 Act regarding additions. 
Under pre-Uruguay Round law, an addition to the PP or ESP was made for taxes imposed 
in the country of exportation on the exported merchandise which were rebated. Section 
224 of the Act requires that such taxes be deducted from the NV. Act, supra note 23, § 224, 
108 Stat. at 4880 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(6)(B)(iii) (1994)). 
412. See, e.g., Horlick, supra note 13, at 146 (stating that while the DOC "shows no 
perceptible bias in favor of or against those claiming adjustments[,] ... [c]ertain standard 
[DOC] practices ... in effect 'tilt' against respondents"). 
413. See Agreement, supra note 19, art. 2.2, at 1; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 
4884-85 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1994)). 
414. See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text. 
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ing to the exporter's sales of the foreign like product in the ordi-
nary course of trade, i.e., its above-cost sales.415 Mandating the use 
of actual data precludes reliance on fixed minimum percentages, 
such as the 10% general expense and 8% profit amounts used by 
the DOC under prior law.416 This change is a welcome develop-
ment. During a recessionary period in an exporter's home country, 
adding a minimum 8% profit may inflate the "true" CV because 
the exporter's profit margin may be only 1 or 2%.417 CV, however, 
is a concept that requires DOC administrators to decide cost ques-
tions that have no answers. Hence, any law relying on the concept 
of CV is problematic. 
In the post-Uruguay Round regime, three significant difficulties 
are apparent. First, profits can be calculated on the basis of 
selected sales instead of generally accepted accounting princi-
ples.418 A dumping margin, therefore, may be enlarged by carefully 
selecting which sales to use and by excluding sales below the cost of 
production on the ground that they are, by definition, not in the 
ordinary course of trade.419 
Second, neither the Agreement nor the Act resolves the issue of 
what time period to use to compute the elements of CV.420 Should 
the DOC consider data on cost of manufacturing, general 
expenses, and profits for the week, month, quarter, year, or some 
other period prior to the respondent's alleged dumping in the 
United States? There is no doubt that a petitioner will argue in 
favor of whatever period maximizes CV and the dumping margin. 
Third, what if actual data concerning the sales of a foreign like 
product are unavailable? Under the Agreement three alternatives 
exist for calculating profit and general expense figures. Profit and 
general expenses can be calculated using: (1) actual profits real-
ized and general expenses incurred by the exporter in connection 
with sales of the same general category of merchandise in the 
exporter's home market; (2) weighted averages of actual profits 
realized and actual general expenses incurred by other exporters 
from home-market sales of the foreign like product in the ordinary 
415. Agreement, supra note 19, at 2; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 109 Stat. at 4884 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (2)(A) (1994) ); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 73. 
416. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33, 74. 
417. jACKSON, supra note 74, at 235. 
418. Horlick & Shea, supra note 20, at 26. 
419. See id. 
420. This issue has remained unresolved since the decision in F.W. Meyers & Co. v. 
United States, 12 Cust. Ct. 219, 239 (1974) (stating generally that a preexportation period 
of far less than one year would be appropriate). 
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course of business (profitable sales); or (3) any other reasonable 
method, as long. as the amount calculated for profit does not 
exceed the profit normally realized by other exporters or produ-
cers on home-market sales of the same general category of prod-
ucts.421 One weakness of the Agreement lies in its failure to 
prescribe a hierarchy among these alternatives.422 The DOC has 
discretion to select among the three alternatives on a case-by-case 
basis.423 Petitioners will urge the DOC to select the alternative that 
maximizes the dumping margin. Furthermore, these alternatives 
for calculating profit and general expense figures are inherently 
ambiguous. With respect to the first alternative, for example, what 
does the term "general category of merchandise" mean? Arguably, 
it encompasses more products than the term "foreign like product" 
used in the second alternative, but again, there is no a priori rule. 
With respect to the third alternative, when is it fair to say that prof-
its are "normally realized?"424 
Calculation of the CV is susceptible to protectionist abuse not 
only because of the problem of manipulation of the CV, but also 
because of difficulties relating to cost allocation. Cost of manufac-
turing must be allocated on the basis of records kept by the pro-
ducer, provided they are kept "in accordance with the generally 
accepted accounting principles ... and reasonably reflect the costs 
associated with the production and sale of the product" in ques-
tion.425 The DOC must consider all available evidence on the 
421. Agreement, supra note 19, at 2-3; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 73-74; HousE 
REPORT, supra note 18, at 94, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3866; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 
840. The third alternative is known as the "profit cap" method. HousE REPORT, supra note 
18, at 94, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3866; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 840. 
422. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 74; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 94, 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3866. 
423. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 74. 
424. Another example further illustrates the ambiguity that exists in this scheme. Con-
sider a U.S. producer in an industry plagued by endemic dumping. Its profits are likely to 
be low. On the one hand, the petitioner may argue that profits from the exporter's above-
cost sales should be included in the calculation of CV. If such sales do not exist, the peti-
tioner may argue for the use of profits from above-cost sales of different products exported 
by the same exporter (alternative (1) ), or for the use of profits from above-cost sales of the 
same product exported by a different exporter (alternative (2)). Ultimately, the petitioner 
will choose the alternative that yields the highest profit figure in CV to maximize the 
chance of a positive dumping margin. In contrast, the respondent will urge the use of the 
U.S. producer's artificially low profit figure (alternative (3)) in an attempt to establish a 
cap on what constitutes a reasonable profit. This use of alternative (3) will decrease CV, 
thereby reducing the likelihood that dumping will be found. See Stein, supra note 278, at 
883. 
425. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 2; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4885 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 74; 
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 91, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3863. 
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proper allocation of cost and adjust costs appropriately for non-
recurring items, such as research and development expenses that 
benefit current or future production, or for circumstances in 
which costs are affected by start-up operations. 
For example, suppose an exporter spends one million dollars on 
market testing and advertising over a five-year period before intro-
ducing a product into the U.S. market. The life cycle of this prod-
uct in the United States is not determinable. Should the DOC 
factor these costs into the cost of manufacturing when determining 
the CV? If so, how should it allocate these costs-over one year, 
five years, or ten years? Because the product's life cycle is uncer-
tain, any a priori allocation seems arbitrary. Suppose a foreign 
exporter uses the same factory or assembly line to make two prod-
ucts. The exporter can theoretically shift production costs from 
one product to another through its internal cost-allocating proce-
dures. While the exporter's allocation may be partly designed to 
minimize the cost of manufacturing the allegedly dumped prod-
uct, the allocation could also be grounded in economic reality and 
may not be inconsistent with true production costs. What criteria 
should the DOC use to determine whether the allocation is manip-
ulative? Should the DOC insist on an on-site inspection of the 
exporter's assembly line and examination of its books and records? 
Should the DOC attempt to reallocate costs when determining the 
cost of manufacturing? Without detailed information on the pro-
duction processes for both products, any reallocation can only be 
speculative. 
Finally, suppose the exporter incurs one-time start-up costs for 
research and development that lead to a new product based on the 
design of existing merchandise. Should the DOC characterize this 
as a start-up situation and therefore deduct start-up costs from the 
cost of manufacturing? The Agreement provides no guidance.426 
Section 224 of the Act defines start-up situations narrowly. In order 
for start-up costs to be deductible, the exporter must use a new 
production facility or produce a new product that requires substan-
tial additional investment and production levels must be limited by 
technical factors associated with the initial phase of commercial 
production.427 What is the distinction between improvements to 
existing merchandise or on-going improvements to present manu-
426. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 2. 
427. See Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4885-86 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(f) (1) (C) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 75; HousE REPORT, supra note 
18, at 91-92, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3863-64. 
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facturing facilities on the one hand, and new products and produc-
tion facilities on the other? Should the DOC include only part of 
the cost in the first instance to prevent a distortion in the cost of 
manufacturing and the CV?42S 
The legislative history of section 224 of the Act is sure to fuel 
arguments between petitioners and respondents. A new product "is 
one requiring substantial additional investment, including prod-
ucts which, though sold under an existing nameplate, involve the 
complete revamping or redesign" of an existing product.429 Thus, 
the complete redesign of a model would result in a new product, 
while a routine model-year change in merchandise would not. The 
example in the legislative history illustrates the difficulty in under-
standing this distinction. It states that a sixteen-megabyte computer 
chip is a new product if the previous version was a four-megabyte 
chip, but not if the previous version was merely a physically larger 
sixteen-megabyte chip.430 Yet, there should be no reason a sixteen-
megabyte chip should not be considered a new product, regardless 
of the previous chip's byte capacity, if it is smaller, faster, more 
accurate, or more durable than the previous version. 
Once a decision is reached on whether a start-up situation exists, 
the dispute shifts to the measurement of start-up costs. A key factor 
is the determination of the duration of the start-up period. Again, 
the Agreement provides no real guidance on this matter. Article 
2.2.1.1 note 6 is of little help: 
The issue addressed in article 2.2.1.1 n.6 of the Antidumping 
Agreement on what, if any, adjustment should be made for start-
up was a compromise between countries who wanted to have the 
ability to base decisions upon actual data within the context of 
ongoing investigations and those who wanted to have the oppor-
tunity to provide estimates of future or life-cycle costs. The com-
promise reached indicated that "the adjustment made for start-
428. Under prior Jaw the DOC examined factors such as the nature of the expense, the 
frequency of its occurrence, and its relationship to the product. See, e.g., Floral Trade 
Council v. United States, 16 Ct. lnt'l Trade 1014 (1992) (explaining that to be considered 
"extraordinary, the event must be unusual in nature and infrequent in occurance"); Cer-
tain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,154, 37,174 cmt. 42 
(1993) (final determination) (considering the relationship of the expense to the product); 
Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Belgium, 58 Fed. Reg. 37083, 37088 
cmt. 6 (1993) (final determination) (examining frequency of occurence and the nature of 
the expense); Steel Wire Rope from Korea, 58 Fed. Reg. 11,029, 11,035 cmt 12 (1993) 
(final determination) (rejecting expense as "extraordinary" because it was neither unusual 
in nature nor infrequent). However, there were no clear rules to resolve these issues. 
429. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 836. 
430. ld. The legislative history also indicates that a new production facility is one that 
involves substantially complete retooling, i.e., replacement of nearly all production of a 
facility or rebuilding of existing machinery. See id. 
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up operations shall reflect the costs at the end of the start-up 
period or if that period extends beyond the period of investiga-
tion, the most recent costs which can reasonably be taken into 
account by the authorities during the investigation.431 
91 
The Act seems to give the DOC discretion to resolve the issue on a 
case-by-case basis.432 Section 224 of the Act provides that the start-
up period ends at the time the level of commercial production 
characteristic of the merchandise, producer, or industry is 
achieved.433 Section 224 does not, however, state how the DOC 
should decide when this level is reached. The DOC will not give 
weight to the exporter's own projections of future volume or use 
the attainment of peak production levels as the standard because 
the start-up period may end well before an exporter achieves opti-
mum capacity utilization.434 Instead, the DOC will examine the 
actual production experience for the merchandise in question, his-
torical data regarding the exporter's experience with similar prod-
ucts, seasonal changes in demand, and business cycles. 435 However, 
if the product is new to the market, no such data will exist. In 
effect, the Act lacks a clear test, requiring the DOC to engage in a 
fact-intensive inquiry when some important facts are unavailable.436 
Obviously, a petitioner will urge the use of a short start-up period 
to minimize the amount of start-up costs deducted from the cost of 
manufacturing, thus maximizing the CV. 
Once this dispute is settled, a methodology for making a start-up 
adjustment must be selected. Precisely what costs should be 
deducted from the cost of manufacturing? The larger the number 
and size of items deemed indirectly related to the manufacture of a 
new product-and, consequently, not deducted from the cost of 
manufacturing-the larger the CV and, in turn, the larger the 
dumping margin.437 The Agreement is silent on this issue. The leg-
431. Holmer eta!., supra note 23, at 486 (footnotes omitted). 
432. See MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 836-37. 
433. See Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4885-86 (codified at 19 U .S.C. 
§ 1677b(f)(1)(C)(ii)-(iii) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 75; HousE REPORT, 
supra note 18, at 92-94, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3864-66. 
434. See MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 836-37. 
435. See Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4885 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(f)(1)(C)(ii) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 75-76; HousE REPORT, 
supra note 18, at 92-93, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3864-65; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 
836-37. 
436. See MEsSAGE, supra note 69, at 837. 
437. Conversely, one practitioner observes that 
[t]he Agreement does not provide a definition of what constitutes the end of a 
start-up process, how broadly or narrowly the concept of start-up should be 
viewed (for example, annual model changes vs. a new product) or what costs 
should be adjusted (variable or fixed or both) .... [A]n overly broad construction 
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islative history of the Act does state that "any adjustment for ... 
start-up costs must be carefully limited to ensure that such an 
adjustment is not transformed into a license to dump."438 Further, 
while Article 2.2.1.1 of the Agreement refers expressly to a deduc-
tion for start-up costs associated with "the production and sale of the 
product under consideration,"439 section 224 of the Act restricts 
the deduction to production costs.44° Finally, the Act does not 
restrict deductions to fixed costs; both fixed and variable start-up 
costs may be subtracted from the cost of manufacturing. 
The DOC will not deduct unit production costs incurred during 
the start-up period from the cost of manufacturing. Rather, the 
DOC deducts such costs at the end of the period.441 But inclusions 
in unit production costs are problematic. As defined by the DOC, 
such costs include wages, depreciation of plant and equipment, 
expenses for materials, overhead, insurance, rent, and leases. 442 
Suppose an exporter hires new workers, buys extra raw materials, 
and leases additional factory space to make a new product. Sup-
pose further that these inputs are also used simultaneously to man-
ufacture existing merchandise. When the start-up period ends, the 
workers are retained and the exporter continues to order materials 
and lease the space. Are all of the inputs directly related to the new 
product and thereby deductible from the cost of manufacturing, or 
should the DOC attempt to allocate only the relevant portion of 
the input costs to the new product?443 
of start-up situations will permit unsustainable pricing practices, that is, prices 
below cost over time, to be viewed as "fair pricing." 
Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 487. 
438. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 835. 
439. Agreement, supra note 19, at 2 (emphasis added). 
440. Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4885-86 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(f)(1)(C)(ii)-(iii) (1994)). 
441. Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4885 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(f)(1)(C)(iii) (1994)); MESSAGE, supranote 19, at837. 
442. MESSAGE, supra note 19, at 837. 
443. The effects of section 222(i) of the Act, which harmonizes the definitions of "affili-
ated persons," are unclear. See Act, supra note 23, § 222(i), 108 Stat. at 4875-76 (codified at 
19 U.S.C. § 1677(33) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 76. Suppose an exporter 
purchases inputs from a related company. The exporter owns, directly or indirectly, less 
than 50% of the supplier, or vice versa, and the inputs are sold by the affiliate to the 
exporter at below market value. Under prior law, for purposes of deciding whether the 
exporter sells merchandise in its home market at below the cost of production, the DOC 
determined the exporter's cost of production by using generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples and consolidating related companies. Consequently, the exporter and supplier were 
treated as unrelated parties and the below-market input price was not adjusted. Thomas H. 
Fine & Marie E. Parker, The Cost of Production and the Constructed Value-After GATT, in THE 
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 775, 780-81, 791 
(PU 1994). 
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Similarly, exclusions from unit production costs raise difficulties. 
The DOC plans to exclude sales and advertising expenses because 
these expenses are not directly linked to the manufacture of a new 
product.444 However, direct or otherwise, the link exists. When 
bringing a new product to market, expenditures for advertising 
and marketing are often as crucial as those for traditional factor 
inputs such as wages, materials, and land. Suppose the exporter in 
the above example hires Michael jordan to endorse the new prod-
uct through television and radio advertisements as well as an 
around-the-world marketing tour. The exporter incurred these 
expenses because forecasts indicated that without these efforts 
sales of the product would be negligible and the manufacturing 
operation would shut down. In this scenario it makes little sense to 
exclude sales and advertising expenses; without these expenses 
there would be no product. 
In sum, calculating a CV is a highly subjective exercise in which 
opportunities for protectionist abuse abound. The proposed traf-
fic-light system in Part V may help reduce such opportunities by 
clarifying the elements included in the cost of manufacturing. 
7. Changing the Presumption About Intermediate Country 
Sales 
The odds of obtaining a final affirmative dumping determina-
tion may increase if intermediate sales occur. The Agreement and 
the Act make it easier for a petitioner to persuade the DOC to use 
an intermediate-country sales price as the basis for the NV,445 
thereby increasing the dumping margin. They also spawn contro-
However, for purposes of determining the cost of manufacturing when calculating CV, 
the DOC relied on a different concept. It determined the cost of a major input sold to a 
related party at below cost on the basis of the best evidence available. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(e) (2)-(3) (1994). 
Section 222 (i) of the Act defines affiliated parties in the same way for purposes of both 
the cost of production and CV calculations. See Act, supra note 23, § 222(i), 108 Stat. at 
4875 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(33) (1994)). "Affiliated persons" include cases where 
one company owns the stock of another company, and where one company controls 
another company even in the absence of an equity relationship. ld. 
The ramification of this change on the outcome of the AD [antidumping] pro-
ceedings for each company will vary depending on their relationships with their 
suppliers and the percentage, as well as the value, of inputs purchased from 
related suppliers. The outcome for some industries and/or some countries could 
significantly change. 
Fine & Parker, supra, at 792. 
444. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 837. 
445. Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4879 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (3) 
(1994) ). 
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versy about a respondent's knowledge of the subsequent disposi-
tion of its merchandise. 
Suppose the Tata Steel Company of India (Tata) sells steel for 
Indian consumption at $1100 per ton and sells steel to the Madras 
Exporters Group (MEG), also an Indian company, for $1000 per 
ton. MEG exports the steel to the United States through Indonesia. 
It sells the steel to the Jakarta Trading Company GTC) for $1200 
per ton. JTC resells some of that steel for Indonesian consumption 
at $1300 per ton and exports the balance to Ford at $1100 per ton. 
Bethlehem Steel files a petition alleging that Tata, MEG, and JTC 
dump steel in the United States. Should the Indian domestic price 
of $ll00 per ton or the Indonesian domestic price of $1300 per 
ton be used as the basis for NV? 
Bethlehem Steel will argue for the intermediate-country sales 
price of $1300 per ton, and both the Agreement and the Act pro-
vide ample basis for Bethlehem Steel to do so.446 Essentially, the 
Agreement and the Act change the presumption in the 1930 Act 
regarding intermediate-country sales. The 1930 Act presumes that 
FMV is based on sales of such or similar merchandise in the coun-
try where the merchandise originated.447 Under prior law the DOC 
could base NV on sales in the intermediate country only if the pro-
ducer did not know that the seller intended to export the mer-
chandise and the merchandise was not substantially transformed in 
the intermediate country.44s The 1930 Act presumed that a foreign 
producer was aware of the proposed disposition of its merchandise 
after the first sale in the country of origin. 
Under the old law if Tata knew the steel it sold to MEG was 
intended for export to the United States, it would presumably dis-
count its usual domestic consumption price of $ll00 per ton for 
MEG to effect its dumping strategy of charging the highest feasible 
price in India and the lowest such price in the United States.449 
Accordingly, under prior law, the intermediate-country price was 
not used because it was considered tainted-it could have been a 
dumped price.450 Under prior law, therefore, the price in the 
country of origin ($1100 per ton) was selected as the basis for NV. 
Given a PP of$ll00 (the price Ford pays), to the chagrin of Bethle-
hem Steel, there is no dumping margin ($ll00- $1100). 
446. See id. 
447. See id. 
448. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 69. 
449. Id. 
450. Id. 
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In contrast, the Agreement and the Act reverse the presump-
tion-sales in the intermediate country are now the basis for 
NV.451 To the delight of Bethlehem Steel, a dumping margin of 
two hundred dollars ($1300 - $l100) exists. The new presumption 
assumes a producer is unaware of the planned subsequent disposi-
tion of its merchandise. If Tata does not know the steel it sells to 
MEG will be exported, it will not discount its usual domestic con-
sumption price of $l100 per ton in the sale to MEG to effect cross-
border price discrimination. In turn, the intermediate-country 
price is not tainted. In general, this new presumption benefits peti-
tioners because intermediate-country sales prices are usually 
higher than country-of-origin prices. An exporter in the country of 
origin will charge a mark-up to a trading company in the interme-
diate country, just as MEG charged JTC $1200 for the steel MEG 
obtained for $1000. 
The Agreement and the Act do specify four different scenarios 
in which NV must be derived from sales prices in the country of 
origin.452 However, these scenarios are consistent with prior law 
and appear unlikely to undermine the advantage petitioners will 
obtain from the new presumption.453 The first three scenarios are 
straightforward. NV is to be derived from sales price in the country 
of origin when: (1) the subject merchandise is merely transshipped 
through the intermediate country; (2) a foreign like product is not 
produced in the intermediate country; and (3) sales in the inter-
mediate country do not satisfy the 5% market viability test (sales in 
the intermediate country are less than 5% of sales to the United 
States), or when a particular market situation in the intermediate 
country does not permit a proper comparison.454 In these three 
scenarios Bethlehem Steel cannot claim that $1300 is the NV if 
TATA uses Indonesia as a conduit for its steel andJTC either, does 
not substantially transform the steel in Indonesia, or does not 
make a significant number of sales in Indonesia. The fourth scena-
rio provides that the NV is to be derived from the sales price in the 
country of origin if the producer knew, at the time of the sale, that 
the subject merchandise was destined for export because of the 
possibility that the intermediate-country price was a dumped 
451. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 4; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4878 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68-
69. 
452. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 4; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4879 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(3) (1994)). 
453. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68-69. 
454. ld. at 69. 
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price.455 Thus, if Tata knows its steel is destined for export, the 
India sales price of $1300 per ton is the basis for the NV. 
The central problem with both the old and new presumptions is 
their underlying assumptions about a producer's knowledge. Bas-
ing the source of NV on awareness, or lack thereof, of the subse-
quent disposition of merchandise creates ambiguity. The DOC is 
instructed to examine all relevant evidence,456 but in practice it 
may be difficult for the DOC to ascertain what a producer, espe-
cially a large foreign one, did or did not know. Must the producer 
have actual knowledge or is constructive knowledge sufficient? 
What if it did not know, but should have known that its product 
was destined for export? Suppose different officials have different 
information. Which officials' knowledge should matter, or should 
the knowledge of officials be aggregated? The petitioner has an 
incentive to engage in results-oriented behavior and exploit these 
ambiguities. The producer can check the prices in both the inter-
mediate country and the country of origin and then make an argu-
ment about the respondent's knowledge based on which of the two 
prices is highest. 
In conclusion, intermediate sales transactions provide yet 
another opportunity for a protectionist abuser to attempt to maxi-
mize a dumping margin. The extent to which this opportunity is 
exploited will depend upon the frequency of intermediate-country 
cases. These cases may arise largely with respect to China and 
Hong Kong. Intermediate-country sales and a producer's knowl-
edge about the subsequent disposition of its merchandise are irrel-
evant in the proposed traffic-light system in Part V because it 
eliminates the concept of NV. 
8. Spikes, Sustained Movements, and Currency Conversion 
To calculate NV, figures denominated in a foreign currency 
must be converted into U.S. dollars. The dumping margin calcula-
tion should not, however, be distorted by the conversion.457 Article 
2.4.1 of the Agreement indicates that the currency conversion 
should be made on the date of sale-the date when the material 
terms of the sale are established.458 If there is a sustained change in 
the exchange rate during the period of investigation, a respondent 
455. Id. 
456. Id. 
457. See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text. 
458. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3. 
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is expected to adjust its prices.459 Section 225(a) of the Act pur-
ports to implement Article 2.4.1 by requiring conversion of foreign 
currencies at the dollar exchange rate in effect on the date of 
sale.46° This requirement changes the DOC's existing practice of 
using a quarterly rate "unless the daily rate varies by more than five 
percent from the rate in effect on the first day of the quarter."4 6 1 
While in many cases application of the new rule will not generate 
controversy, two questions remain. First, how ·should intra-day 
"spikes" in exchange rates be treated? Reliance on an intra-day rate 
is dangerous because exchange rates may move dramatically within 
a single day. For example, suppose a Mexican exporter is accused 
of dumping. The NV is 100 pesos and the EP is $23 dollars. Sup-
pose further that the dollar-peso exchange rate is 3.65 pesos to the 
dollar at 9:00 a.m. on the date of the sale of the subject merchan-
dise, but at noon the Mexican finance minister announces an 
immediate 20% devaluation in the peso, which is followed by sell-
ing of pesos against dollars. By 4:00 p.m., $1 dollar is worth 5 pesos. 
If the 9:00 a.m. rate is used to convert the NV into dollars, the NV 
is $27.40. The petitioner will argue in favor of the morning rate 
because this rate results in a dumping margin of $4.40 ($27.40 -
$23.00). If the 4:00 p.m.· rate is used, the NV is $20 dollars. The 
respondent will argue that the afternoon rate should be used since 
it leads to a negative dumping margin of $3 dollars ($20.00 -
$23.00). 462 Absent a clear rule for spikes, a petitioner benefits if the 
foreign currency appreciates relative to the dollar after the mea-
surement time. If appreciation occurs, FMV denominated in dol-
lars increases and a dumping margin is created or increases. 
Conversely, a respondent benefits if the currency depreciates 
after the measurement time. If depreciation occurs, FMV denomi-
nated in dollars falls and a dumping margin is reduced or elimi-
nated. In cases where the period of investigation is short, whether a 
459. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 3; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 810. Suppose an 
exporter being paid in U.S. dollars for its merchandise sells the dollar forward against its 
home-country currency to hedge against the risk that the dollar might depreciate relative 
to its home currency before it is actually paid. The Agreement and Act, in this scenario, 
call for use of the forward rate as the rate at which to convert the exporter's prices and 
costs into dollars. For a discussion of foreign exchange hedging, see Bhala, supra note 165. 
460. Act, supra note 23, § 225(a), 108 Stat. at 4886 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b-l (a) 
(1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 76; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 96, reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3868. 
461. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 842; see supra notes 164-166 and accompanying text. 
462. To be sure, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York certifies the unoon buying rate" 
as "the" foreign exchange rate. 31 U.S.C. § 5151 (1988). But, this certification is made to 
the U.S. Customs Service for purposes of customs valuation. 
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dumping margin exists or the ma~itude of such a margin will 
depend substantially on the exchange rate selected. Neither the 
Agreement nor the Act sets forth the needed rule. Article 2.4.1 
states that "[f]luctuations in exchange rates shall be ignored."463 
This statement cannot be taken literally because every rate could 
be viewed as a flu'ctuation and thus ignored. 
Second, what accommodations should be made to allow an 
exporter to respond to a long-term trend in an exchange rate? The 
recent dramatic appreciation of the Japanese yen relative to the 
U.S. dollar serves as an illustration. Because of competition in the 
United States, many Japanese exporters cannot raise the price of 
the goods they export to the United States quickly enough to com-
pensate for this appreciation. However, U.S. antidumping law 
assumes that rapid price adjustments are possible, except in cases 
where a currency appreciation is an aberrational spike. By focusing 
on the difference between pricing in the United States and home 
markets, the law ignores the fact that a Japanese respondent may 
already be charging a price that is the same as or more than its U.S. 
competitors. 
Article 2.4.1 says that the authorities shall allow exporters a mini-
mum sixty-day "lag" time to adjust their export prices to compen-
sate for sustained movements in exchange rates during the period 
of investigation.464 But, the key phrase "sustained movement" is 
undefined. Is a sustained movement a change in one direction that 
occurs over a week, sixty days, or six months? Further, suppose the 
time period is one week. During that week the exporter's currency 
appreciates relative to the dollar on Monday, Tuesday, and Friday, 
but depreciates relative to the dollar on Wednesday and Thursday. 
The net result is an appreciation. Is this uneven movement "sus-
tained?" Because the lag rule is ambiguous, it is difficult for an 
exporter to judge when a "sustained movement" is taking place. 
Perhaps a consensus among Wall Street currency analysts about the 
strength or weakness of the dollar relative to a foreign currency 
may emerge after several months of study. Yet, by then it is too late 
for an exporter that has not adjusted its prices-the exporter will 
have run afoul of the lag rule. Of course, the exporter's customers 
may not agree. A cautious exporter must assume almost every 
change in an exchange rate will be sustained and consider chang-
ing its prices every day-and certainly within sixty days-to satisfy 
the lag rule. 
463. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3. 
464. /d. 
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The currency conversion provisions of the Agreement and the 
Act are also hypocritical. Foreign companies exporting to the 
United States must adjust their prices in response to exchange 
rates; however, U.S. companies exporting to foreign countries are 
encouraged to maintain their price levels when the dollar depreci-
ates relative to a foreign currency. 465 When depreciation occurs, 
for example, when the dollar fell from 150 yen per dollar in 1990 
to ninety yen per dollar in 1995,466 U.S. exports become cheaper 
for foreign buyers. Government officials and economists often urge 
U.S. exporters to maintain their price levels to increase their share 
in the foreign market instead of raising their prices to maximize 
profits. One rationale for this recommendation is the hope that 
maintenance of prices will help improve the U.S. bilateral mer-
chandise trade balance with the foreign country. In theory, foreign 
buyers will substitute cheaper U.S. products for more expensive 
domestic and third-country products. However, if the lag rule is 
enforced rigorously in the foreign country, U.S. exporters face the 
dilemma of trying to maximize foreign market share while mini-
mizing the risk of being accused of dumping in a foreign country. 
A petitioner can exploit the ambiguities surrounding spikes and 
sustained movements in a foreign currency by choosing an 
exchange rate that maximizes the dumping margin. The conver-
sion rules also lead to conflicting incentives for U.S. exporters. The 
traffic-light proposal in Part V partly resolves these problems by 
eliminating the concept of NV, although the same problems con-
tinue to plague the cost-of-production calculation. 
C. The Injury Determination 
1. Troublesome Material Injury Standards 
The standards for a material injury determination, set forth in 
the 1930 Act, remain unchanged by the Agreement. Article 3.1 of 
the Agreement identifies three variables to be considered in mak-
ing a material injury determination: ( 1) the volume of subject mer-
chandise in the importing country; (2) the effect of such 
merchandise on prices for a domestic like product; and (3) the 
consequent impact of such merchandise on domestic producers of 
the like product.467 The continuity of pre- and post-Uruguay 
Round material injury standards leaves three ambiguities 
465. See id. 
466. Bank Credit Analyst, supra note 166, at 57; Philip Gawith et al., Currency Tunnoil 
Boosts D-Mark, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at 1. 
467. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 4. 
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unresolved and the ITC's investigation susceptible to protectionist 
abuse.468 
First, the variables examined in connection with a material injury 
determination do not expressly include the cost structure of either 
the petitioner or the respondent. 469 Microeconomic theory indi-
cates that differential cost structures are a principal source of com-
parative advantage.470 These structures should be the primary 
variable in the ITC's investigation. Next, the three injury variables 
articulated in Article 3.1 of the Agreement are extraordinarily 
broad. Consider the second variable: Article 3.2 of the Agreement 
explains that the effect of such merchandise on prices for a domes-
tic like product is measured through an assessment of whether 
there has been significant price undercutting by the allegedly 
dumped imports.471 This is accomplished by comparing the price 
of the allegedly dumped import with the price of the like product 
in the importing country to determine whether the imports have 
the effect of depressing prices significantly, or whether the imports 
prevent price increases which otherwise would have occurred. 472 
Any competition, whether from imported or domestic products, 
will cause undercutting or price decreases or will inhibit price 
increases.473 The benefits return to consumers and outweigh losses 
to producers; hence, such results should be encouraged. Finally, 
consider the third variable: Article 3.4 of the Agreement provides a 
nonexhaustive list of items used to gauge the impact of dumped 
imports on the domestic industry. Factors to be considered 
include: (1) all relevant economic factors that bear on the state of 
the domestic industry, such as any actual or potential decline in 
sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on invest-
468. The ITC bases its material injury determination on data provided by foreign 
exporters and U.S. producers in response to questionnaires issued by the ITC. As under 
prior law, if an exponer or producer does not respond to a questionnaire or impedes an 
investigation, the ITC can issue a subpoena for the information or make a determination 
based on "information available." See Agreement, supra note 19, at 11, 25-26; Act, supra 
note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4849 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 16736(a) (1) (1994)). While issu-
ing a subpoena to a U.S. imponer is straightforward and, indeed, under prior law was 
common, issuing one to a foreign producer could raise issues of jurisdiction and foreign 
state compulsion. 
469. Arguably, costs may be considered in the second stage of the ITC's analysis; 
namely, causation. Yet, the lax causation standard set forth in Article 3.5 of the Agreement, 
discussed below, is itself a problem. 
470. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
471. Agreement, supra note 19, at 4. 
472. See id. 
473. See jACKSON, supra note 74, at 239. See generally SAMUELSON, supra note 53, at 457-88 
(discussing perfect competition). 
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ments, or utilization; (2) all factors affecting domestic prices; (3) 
the magnitude of the dumping margin; and ( 4) the actual and 
potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, 
wages, growth, and ability to raise capital or make investments.474 
Again, it seems certain that competition, whatever its source, will 
have an impact on some, if not all, of these items and that a final 
affirmative injury determination is virtually inevitable. Moreover, 
no single variable is dispositive of an injury; therefore, the lTC is 
invited to look at several factors to find injury.47s 
It should be recognized, however, that the Agreement broadens 
the ITC's discretion in one manner that could reduce the risk of 
protectionist abuse. Under pre-Uruguay Round law the magnitude 
of the dumping margin was not an explicitly listed factor, resulting 
in confusion as to whether it should be considered. 476 Article 3.4 of 
the Agreement, implemented by section 222(b) (1) (B) of the Act, 
states that the magnitude of the dumping margin is a factor that 
the lTC may consider in making its i~ury determination.477 Thus, 
the lTC can exercise its discretion to render negative injury deter-
minations in cases where the dumping margin is small. 
Finally, protectionist abuse may occur because of a failure to dis-
tinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence of injury. A 
decline in profits, wages, or the ability to raise capital is direct evi-
dence.478 A large dumping margin or a decline in output, produc-
tivity, or capacity utilization is, at best, an indicator of injury or 
causation.479 The lTC is statutorily required to rely on both the 
direct and the circumstantial evidence equally when rendering an 
injury determination.480 This requirement "can lead to a paradoxi-
cal situation in which the U.S. government determines that the 
industry has been injured when the marketplace, in the form of 
share prices, has judged its prospects to be improving by investing 
more money in the industry and raising its stock prices."481 
The traffic-light system proposed in Part V attempts to resolve 
these ambiguities in the material injury determination. The traffic-
474. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 5. 
475. See id. at 4. 
476. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
477. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 5; Act, supra note 23, § 222(b) (1) (B), 108 Stat. at 
4870 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (C) (iii)(V) (1994) ); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 
54, 80; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 66-67, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3838-39. 
478. Horlick, supra note 13, at 159. 
479. !d. 
480. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(c)(iii)(l994). 
481. Horlick, supra note 13, at 159 (foomote omitted). 
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light system emphasizes cost differentials, eliminates the magni-
tude of a dumping margin as a basis for a final affirmative determi-
nation, and requires direct evidence of material injury.4s2 
2. A Lax Causation Standard 
Article 3.5 of the Agreement retains, in substantial part, the lax 
causation standard set out in the 1930 Act.483 Interestingly, the 
Federal Trade Commission reported in 1994 that "the vast mcyority 
of domestic industries competing with dumped and subsidized 
imports are not severely injured by unfair imports."484 In light of 
this finding, the fact that the causation standard in the Agreement 
remains lax is a great boon to petitioners. 485 The causation stan-
dard, set forth in Article 3.5 of the Agreement, states that 
demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped 
imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based 
on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authori-
ties. The authorities shall also examine any known factors other 
than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring 
the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other 
factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. Factors 
which"may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the vol-
ume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, contrac-
tion in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, 
trade restrictive practices of and competition between the for-
eign and domestic producers, developments in technology and 
the export performance and productivity of the domestic 
industry. 486 
While this list is not exhaustive, the failure to mention costs is 
remarkable. A theoretically sensible list would focus attention on 
differential cost structures.487 
The lack of a precise definition for the term "causal relation-
ship" leaves open the question of whether the United States is pre-
cluded from imposing antidumping duties when the imports are a 
remote or partial cause of an industry's woes. Arguably, a negative 
482. See supra notes 245-258 and accompanying text; Agreement, supra note 19, at 5; 
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 67, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3839. 
483. Agreement, supra note 19, at 5. 
484. Morris E. Morkre & Kenneth H. Kelly, FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION, EFFEcrs OF 
UNFAIR IMPORTS ON DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES: U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY 
CAsES, 1980 TO 1988, at 69 (1994) (emphasis added). 
485. See generaUy Angelos Pangratis & Edwin Vermulst, Injury in Anti-Dumping Proceed-
ings, 28]. WoRLD TRADE 61, 73-83 (1994) (proposing an analytical framework for resolving 
causation issues, including strengthening the standard to eliminate de minimis injuries 
from the dumping analysis). 
486. Agreement, supra note 19, at 5. 
487. See supra notes 469-470 and accompanying text. 
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answer may be inferred from the fact that the lTC remains barred 
from weighing causes.48S This prohibition makes it easier for a pro-
tectionist abuser to obtain protection. It is necessary to require a 
direct and substantial causal relationship to minimize abuse. The 
traffic-light system proposed in Part V utilizes the "substantial" cau-
sation standard applied in escape clause actions under section 201 
of the Trade Act of 1974.489 
A problem related to the lax causation standard is the ITC's con-
tinued ability to cumulate imports. Article 3.3 of the Agreement 
expressly condones the practice of cumulatively assessing the 
impact on a domestic industry of imports that are the subject of 
different antidumping petitions "if imports are simultaneously sub-
ject to investigation, the margins of dumping ... are greater than 
de minimis, and a determination is made that cumulative assessment 
is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between 
the imported products and between the imported products and 
the domestic like product."490 Generally, this provision is consistent 
with the 1930 Act;491 thus, the ITC's cumulation practice has 
become the international standard. Cumulation increases the 
probability of a final affirmative injury determination because it 
488. See supra notes 249-250 and accompanying text. 
489. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201(b)(4), 88 Stat. 1978,2012 (repealed 
1988). 
490. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 58; Agreement, supra note 19, at 4-5. 
491. See supra notes 252-256 and accompanying text; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 
33, 40-41, 58. Under prior law cumulation was permitted for all imports that were simulta-
neously subject to investigation. Section 222(e) of the Act allows for cumulation of imports 
that result from petitions filed on the same day. See Act, supra note 23, § 222(e) (G) (i) (I), 
108 Stat. at 4873 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (G)(i)(I) (1994) ); HousE REPORT, supra 
note 18, at 73, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3845. This welcome change should limit the 
range of imports cumulated. 
Minor necessary changes to the 1930 Act were implemented by § 222 (e) of the Act. Act, 
supra note 23, § 222(e), 108 Stat. at 4873 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G)(i)(l) 
( 1994)). Article 3.3 of the Agreement, for example, establishes three prerequisites for the 
use of cumulation. To implement the third prerequisite concerning competitive condi-
tions, section 222(e) of the Act explains that the ITC may not cumulate imports for which 
the DOC has made a preliminary negative dumping determination, unless the DOC subse-
quently reaches a final affirmative determination before the lTC renders its final determi-
nation. ld. § 222(e)(2)(G) (ii) (1), 108 Stat. at 4873 (codified at 19 U.S.C 
§ 1677(7) (G) (ii) (I)); see MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 847-50. Section 222(e) of the Act also 
preserves two important exceptions to the use of cumulation. Exports from beneficiary 
countries under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act may be cumulated only with 
exports from other beneficiary countries. Act, supra note 23, § 222(e) (2) (G) (i) (III), 108 
Stat. at 4873 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (G) (i)(III) (1994)). Second, exports from 
Israel may not be cumulated unless the ITC finds that Israeli exports cause or threaten to 
cause material injury to a U.S. industry. Id. § 222(e)(2) (G) (ii)(IV) (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677(7)(G)(ii)(IV) (1994)); see SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 59; HousE REPORT, 
supra note 18, at 75, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3847; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 850. 
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makes dumping a strict liability offense. The absence of an agree-
ment or intent among exporters to drive U.S. rivals into bank-
ruptcy is irrelevant. If a U.S. competitor is injured, the exporters 
are presumed responsible. Moreover, cumulation penalizes a small 
exporter by grouping it with large exporters.492 Consequently, the 
small exporter is subject to final affirmative dumping and i~ury 
determinations based essentially on the practices of the large 
exporters.493 The result is particularly unfortunate in the case of 
developing countries whose nascent industries are important to 
their economic growth. They rely on a comparative advantage, vis-
a-vis developed country producers, that is based on low costs. The 
antidumping duty wipes out the advantage. Accordingly, cumula-
tion is prohibited in the traffic-light system proposed in Part V. 
3. Troublesome Threat Standards 
A petitioner unable to obtain a final affirmative material i~ury 
determination is likely to argue that a threat of material injury 
exists. Article 3. 7 of the Agreement sets forth standards, imple-
mented by section 222(c) of the Act, concerning threat determina-
tions.494 A change in circumstances that would create a situation in 
which dumping would cause injury must be "clearly foreseen and 
imminent."495 The Agreement and the Act give the lTC a nonex-
clusive list of variables to consider, such as: (1) whether there is a 
significant rate of increase in subject merchandise in the United 
States, indicating that substantially increased importations are 
likely; (2) whether the exporter has sufficient freely disposable 
capacity, or whether it will imminently and substantially increase its 
capacity, suggesting that a substantial increase in imports of subject 
merchandise is likely; (3) whether the subject merchandise enters 
the United States at prices that will have a significant depressing 
effect on U.S. prices, which would likely increase demand for fur-
492. See jACKSON, supra note 74, at 240. 
493. Id. For example, suppose the DOC finds that steel producers in japan, Korea, and 
Britain dump steel in the United States. Suppose it also finds that steel exports from India 
and Turkey, which are not negligible but amount to a far smaller volume than those from 
the other three countries, are dumped. Because Indian and Turkish steel is imported in 
small quantities, it could not possibly damage the U.S. steel industry. Nevertheless, the lTC 
cumulates the steel exports from the five countries and renders a final affirmative determi-
nation of injury. Undoubtedly, the cause of injury to the U.S. steel industry is the dumping 
of japanese, Korean, and British steel, yet an antidumping duty is imposed on Indian and 
Turkish steel as well. 
494. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 5-6; Act, supra note 23, § 222(c), 108 Stat. at 
4870-71 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i) (1994)). 
495. Agreement, supra note 19, at 5. 
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ther imports; and ( 4) whether large inventories of subject mer-
chandise exist. No single variable is dispositive. The totality of the 
circumstances must be considered before determining that further 
dumped imports are imminent and, absent protection, that these 
imports will lead to material injury.496 With the exception of the 
last variable discussed below, Article 3.7 is generally consistent with 
prior law.497 
As with the standards for a material injury determination, ambi-
guities surround the standards for a threat determination and 
opportunities for protectionist abuse abound. Like the concept of 
CV, the concept of threat may be intrinsically susceptible to abuse. 
Still, the Agreement raises four serious concerns. First, the relative 
cost structures of the petitioner and the respondent are not 
express factors. Microeconomic logic suggests that whether a U.S. 
industry is likely to be injured will depend upon the industry's abil-
ity to cut costs and thereby maintain or regain a comparative 
advantage. 
Second, under prior law, the lTC could consider only substantial 
increases in inventories of the subject merchandise in the United 
States.498 Now, the lTC must consider inventories of subject mer-
chandise wherever the inventory is located. Yet, it is a mistake to 
infer an intent to dump in the United States from offshore inven-
tory accumulation. Such increases may result from recessionary 
conditions in offshore markets, seasonal changes in consumption 
or production patterns, or consolidation of inventory facilities. The 
critical issue, which may be difficult to resolve, is whether the 
respondent intends to -dump its increased inventories in the 
United States. 
Third, the United States appears to have taken advantage of the 
fact that the list of articulated variables in Article 3. 7 is not exhaus-
tive. Section 222(c) of the Act indicates that the United States shall 
retain its more extensive pre-Uruguay Round list of factors. 499 
Items on that list include export subsidies; production shifting in 
496. Id. at 5-6; Act, supra note 23, § 222(c), 108 Stat. at 4870-71 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677(7) (F) ( 1994) ); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 56; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, 
at 70, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3842. 
497. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 56; HousE REPoRT, supra note 18, at 70, 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3842. 
498. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 56; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 854. 
499. Compare Agreement, supra note 19, at 5-6 (listing four factors the authorities 
should consider in determining the threat of material injury) with Act, supra note 23, 
§ 222(c) (i), 108 Stat. 4870-71 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (F) (i)(I)-(IX) (1994)) 
(explaining nine factors that the commission is to consider "among other relevant eco-
nomic factors" when determining the existence of the threat of material injury). 
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the foreign country; raw and processed agricultural products; 
actual and potential negative effects on existing development and 
production efforts; and any other demonstrable adverse trends.500 
By offering a more extensive list of variables than those set forth in 
Article 3.7, the Act enhances a petitioner's ability to make a suc-
cessful threat of an i~ury claim. 
Finally, perhaps the greatest uncertainty surrounding threat 
determinations is their predictive and speculative nature. Admit-
tedly, Article 3.8 reminds VVTO members to take "special care" 
when making threat determinations501 and the legislative history of 
Section 222(c) implements this reminder, cautioning that "the 
ITC's threat determinations must not be made on the basis of mere 
conjecture or supposition."502 Nonetheless, any threat determina-
tion requires the lTC to engage in prognostication. The lTC must 
ask whether continued imports of subject merchandise will cause 
i~ury, and if the lTC answers in the affirmative, whether such an 
i~ury would occur in spite of the elimination of such imports. The 
possibility that an antidumping duty may be imposed on the basis 
of these inherently uncertain determinations invites protectionist 
abuse. Thus, in the traffic-light system proposed in Part V, threat of 
injury is not a basis for an injury determination. 
4. Dealing with Captive Production 
Ambiguities surrounding the new rules on captive production 
create opportunities for petitioners who have lost their compara-
tive advantage to an exporter to argue that they are being injured 
by imports. The rules, set forth in section 222(b) (2) of the Act, go 
beyond the provisions in the Agreement.503 Captive production 
"refers to production of the domestic like product that is not sold 
in the merchant market and that is processed into a higher-valued 
downstream article by the same producer."504 A sale in the 
"merchant market" is a sale made to an unrelated customer, and a 
"downstream article" is an article that is distinct from a domestic 
500. Act, supra note 23, § 222(c)(i), 108 Stat. 4870-71 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677(7)(F)(i)(I)-(IX) (1994)) 
501. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 6. 
502. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 56; see also HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 70, 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3842. 
503. Act, supra note 23, § 222(b)(2), 108 Stat. at 4870 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677(7) (C) (iv) (1994)). 
504. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68, reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3840. 
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like product but is produced from that product.505 Captive produc-
tion typically occurs when a company is vertically integrated and 
internally transfers a significant portion of its production volume 
for further internal processing into a distinct downstream article 
(captive production),506 while at the same time selling some of its 
domestic production to unrelated U.S. customers (the merchant 
market).507 The problem the lTC encounters is whether it should 
focus exclusively on the merchant market, or whether it should 
also consider captive production when making an injury 
determination. 
Whether the lTC renders a final affirmative injury determination 
may depend on the resolution of this issue. First, the ITC's focus 
will affect its determination of the market share of imports in the 
domestic industry. A petitioner generally seeks to define the rele-
vant market narrowly to exacerbate purported injury to its industry 
by showing a higher import-penetration ratio.508 Accordingly, the 
petitioner will then urge the lTC to consider only merchant-mar-
ket sales. Second, the manner in which the lTC resolves the issue 
also influences its evaluation of the financial performance of U.S. 
producers. Here again, the narrower the definition of the affected 
market, the easier it is for a petitioner to claim it has been injured 
by the subject merchandise. Adverse financial performance in one 
market niche is not offset by positive financial performance in a 
different niche because the latter is excluded from consideration. 
The ITC's pre-Uruguay Round practice was to ignore this distinc-
tion and examine domestic production regardless of the destina-
tion of the merchandise.509 The Agreement is silent on captive 
production. Through section 222(b)(2) of the Act, the United 
States unilaterally amended the 1930 Act to deal with the prob-
lem.510 As one practitioner points out, this amendment raises an 
immediate concern: 
There is no basis in the Antidumping Agreement for singling 
out captive production for special treatment for purposes of 
material injury analysis. The Agreement requires that the effects 
505. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55. 
506. ld. at 54; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3840. 
507. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 54; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68, reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3840; see also MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 852; Analysis and Summary, 
supra note 317, at 9 (defining captive production as production of a product that is primar-
ily consumed internally in the manufacture of a finished article). 
508. See PoWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 4-5. 
509. See Analysis and Summary, supra note 317, at 9-10. 
510. Act, supra note 23, § 222(b)(2), 108 Stat. at 4870 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677(7)(c)(iv) (1994)). 
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of the dumped imports be assessed in relation to the domestic 
production of the like product. In addition, with two limited -
exceptions, neither of which relates to captive production, the 
Agreement defines the domestic industry to be the domestic 
producers "as a whole" of the like product. Thus, injury analysis 
that is premised upon the exclusion of captive production is likely to be 
challenged as inconsistent with the Agreement. 
Still writhing from defeat in the 1993 hot-rolled steel cases, 
the U.S. integrated steel mills actively lobbied for the inclusion 
of the captive production provision in the implementing legisla-
tion .... The [Clinton] administration eventually caved to polit-
ical pressure ... and the captive production provision made its 
way into the implementing legislation.sii 
In other words, as a threshold matter, any distinction made by the 
ITC between the merchant market and captive production, pursu-
ant to section 222(b) (2) of the Act, may be invalid under the 
Agreement and subject to challenge in the WTO. 
Section 222(b) (2) of the Act authorizes the ITC to decide on a 
case-by-case basis whether to consider only merchant-market sales 
when examining market share and financial performance.512 The 
rationale for distinguishing between the merchant and the captive 
market is clear. In a captive production situation, imports compete 
primarily with sales of a domestic like product in the merchant 
market, not with inventory internally transferred for processing 
into separate downstream articles.513 Hence, the ITC should 
include imports that are captively consumed for processing into 
downstream articles in its analysis only if the imports compete with 
merchant-market sales of the domestic like product.514 
511. Holmer et aL, supra note 23, at 490-91 (emphasis added) (foomotes omitted). 
512. Act, supra note 23, § 222(b)(2), 108 Stat. at 4870 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677(7)(C)(iv) (1994)); MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 852. 
513. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68, reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.CA.N. 3840; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 852. 
514. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 853. The legislative history states: 
Imports which are sold in the merchant market shall be included in the import 
penetration ratio for the merchant market. Imports which are captively con-
sumed by the related-party importer for processing into a downstream article 
should be included in the import penetration ratio for the merchant market only 
if the imports compete with sales of the domestic like product. If such imports do 
not compete with sales of the domestic upstream like product in the merchant 
market, the ITC shall include such imports in the total import share of the indus-
try's total production, but not in the import penetration ratio for the merchant 
market or in any other calculation in which captive domestic production is 
excluded. 
Id.; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55-56; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 69, 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CA.N. 3041. Note that the ITC can calculate the market share of 
imports in the merchant market and include allegedly dumped products in the 
calculation. 
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The challenge is to develop a practical, bright-line test to deter-
mine whether an analysis of market share and financial perform-
ance focused on the merchant market is needed. Section 
222(b) (2) utterly fails in this regard. Section 222(b) (2) directs the 
lTC to pursue four inquiries: (1) whether the volume of merchant 
sales and internal captive production transfers is "significant"; (2) 
whether the production of the domestic like product that is trans-
ferred internally for further processing into a separate downstream 
article enters the merchant market for the upstream like product; 
(3) whether the domestic like product is the "predominant" mate-
rial input used in the production of the separate downstream arti-
cle; and ( 4) whether the domestic like product sold in the 
merchant market is "generally used" in the production of the 
downstream article.515 The lack of clear definitions renders these 
inquiries inherently ambiguous and enables a petitioner to argue 
for exclusion of captive production by simply demonstrating 
greater import penetration in the allegedly injured domestic 
industry. 
Consider the first inquiry. There is no standard for determining 
what volume of production is "significant." The legislative history 
provides little guidance; it merely states that " [ c] aptive production 
and merchant sales are significant if they are of such magnitude 
that a more focused analysis of market share and financial per-
formance is needed for the lTC to obtain a complete picture of the 
competitive impact of imports on the domestic industry."516 
With respect to the third inquiry, there is no definition of "pre-
dominance." Again, the legislative history is little help; it indicates 
that the domestic like product is considered "predominant" only if 
it is the "primary" material used in the production of the down-
stream article.517 Is this a 50% test, where the domestic like prod-
uct is the "predominant" or "primary" input if it exceeds 50% of 
the total value of the product, or is a super-majority threshold 
amount required? 
Finally, with respect to the fourth inquiry, the petitioner and 
respondent are certain to disagree over whether a domestic like 
product is "generally used" in the production of the downstream 
515. Act, supra note 23, § 222(b)(2), 108 Stat. at 4870 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677(7)(C) (iv) (1994) ); HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68-69, reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.CAN. 3840-41. 
516. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68, reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3840 (explaining significant captive production). 
517. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68, reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3841; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 853. 
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article. Yet again, the legislative history does not help; it defines 
"general use" in terms of significance. If a "significant" portion of 
the production of the domestic like product that enters the 
merchant market is actually processed into the same downstream 
article as that produced from the internally transferred captive pro-
duction, the domestic like product is "generally used" in down-
stream production.518 Worse yet, the legislative history increases 
the opportunity for protectionist abuse by stating that whether a 
domestic like product sold in the merchant market is physically 
capable of being processed into a downstream article is irrele-
vant.519 The legislative history states that the only question for con-
sideration is whether the domestic like product is actually used in 
downstream production.52° Conceivably, a petitioner could deliber-
ately abstain from using a domestic like product to create the 
impression that the merchant and captive production markets 
should be distinguished. 
It is unclear how these four inquiries relate to one another and 
how they should be applied to particular situations. Several ques-
tions and examples will help to illustrate this point. First, what pri-
ority should be given to the inquiries? Suppose the volumes of 
merchant and captive production sales are significant (the first 
inquiry), and the domestic like product is not used in the down-
stream article (the third inquiry). These two factors, considered in 
isolation, suggest that the merchant and captive production mar-
kets should be treated separately. But, suppose also that the second 
and fourth inquiries yield an affirmative answer, suggesting that 
the markets are not distinct; what should the lTC do? Second, 
which producers are relevant to the fourth inquiry? Suppose one 
auto producer files an antidumping petition against exporters of 
certain japanese auto parts. Two other auto producers, but not the 
first, use a domestic like product from the merchant market in 
their downstream production of cars. Should the lTC only 
examine data from the first producer? Finally, does the second 
inquiry create a per se rule? Does any sale of the domestic like 
product in the merchant market constitute "entry" into that mar-
ket? Suppose a domestic producer sells its "over-run" production in 
518. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 69, reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3841; MESSAGE, sufrra note 69, at 853. 
519. SENATE REPORT, sufrra note 18, at 55; HousE REPORT, sufrra note 18, at 69, reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3841. 
520. SENATE REPORT, sufrra note 18, at 55; HousE REPORT, sufrra note 18, at 69, reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3841. 
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the merchant market to unrelated businesses. Has the steel 
entered the merchant market? 
In sum, a petitioner can exploit the ambiguous terms and nature 
of the four inquiries to encourage the lTC to artificially narrow its 
investigation. If the petitioner is successful in this endeavor, the 
result is an exaggeration of the market share of imports and injury 
to the financial condition of the affected domestic industry. The 
traffic-light system proposed in Part V returns to the rule of the 
earlier law, under which the lTC ignored the distinction between 
the merchant and captive markets. 
D. Anticircumvention and the Expansion of Protection 
Ambiguous post-Uruguay Round anticircumvention rules allow 
for the scope of an antidumping order to be expanded to include 
imported parts. As a result, a U.S. parts manufacturer can obtain 
undeserved protection from imported parts. In tum, by raising the 
cost of these parts by the amount of the antidumping duty, such 
protection unjustly harms U.S. companies that rely on such parts. 
Suppose RCA produces portable pagers in the U.S. from compo-
nents imported from Malaysia.521 Suppose also that RCA files an 
antidumping petition against Sony, who produces pagers in Japan 
and exports them to the United States. Suppose finally that the 
DOC issues an antidumping order against Sony covering the 
pagers. Consider two possible scenarios that could arise after the 
order: (1) Sony exports pager components to its U.S. subsidiary, 
Sony-U.S.A., which makes pagers from the components; or (2) 
Sony exports pager components to a related company in Seoul, 
Sony-Korea. Sony-U.S.A. then imports pager components from 
Sony-Korea, as well as from Sony, for use in the production of 
pagers. 
A threshold question in both cases is whether RCA should be 
entitled to petition the DOC to expand the scope of the original 
order to cover components even though RCA is not a domestic 
producer of the components. Both pre- and post-Uruguay Round 
law both provide an affirmative answer to this question.522 A party 
521. This hypothetical is adapted from an antidumping investigation and determina-
tion of sales at LTFV. Certain Radio Paging and Alerting Receiving Devices from Japan, 48 
Fed. Reg. 36,349 (Dep't Comm. 1983); High-Capacity Pagers from Japan, 48 Fed. Reg. 
28,682 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination); High-Capacity Pagers from Japan, 47 
Fed. Reg. 40,679 (Dep't Comm. 1982) (initiation). 
522. With respect to pre-Uruguay Round law, see Horlick, supra note 13, at 156. The 
Act did not change the prior law on this matter. 
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with standing to file a petition regarding a finished product but 
not components, can seek to extend the order to components. To 
reduce protectionist abuse, the law should be revised to deny 
standing to RCA and bar it from seeking this result. 
The substantive questions raised in both cases further highlight 
the risk of protectionist abuse. In the first case is Sony circum-
venting the order by exporting components to the United States 
for assembly into finished merchandise? In the second case is Sony 
circumventing the order by causing its U.S. subsidiary to use parts 
from a third country? The DOC cannot answer either question 
unless it identifies a minor assembly operation in the United States 
that permits an exporter to continue dumping finished merchan-
dise by substituting exports of finished merchandise, which are 
subject to an antidumping order with exports of parts, which are 
not covered by the order. Put differently, the DOC must distin-
guish between a minor assembly operation and an instance of a 
bona fide direct foreign investment made by an exporter in a U.S.-
based manufacturing operation that contributes substantial added 
value to imported parts resulting in finished merchandise. 
Prior law was helpful in resolving only the first case. As discussed 
above, to expand an antidumping order prior law required that a 
"small" difference exist between the value of parts imported into 
the United States from a country subject to an antidumping order 
and the finished product made from those parts.523 Thus, with 
respect to the first scenario, the key inquiry would be whether a 
"small" difference in value exists between the pager components 
exported by Sony to Sony-U.S.A. and the pagers produced by Sony-
U.S.A. Prior law, however, failed to prevent the sort of circumven-
tion suggested in the second case, i.e., the "third-country parts" 
problem that is encountered when an exporter circumvents an 
antidumping order by establishing a "screwdriver," or minor assem-
bly operation in the United States that purchases as many parts as 
possible from a third country.524 In determining whether the dif-
ference in value between parts imported from the country subject 
to the order and the finished product was "small," the DOC could 
not consider these third-country parts.525 
523. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
524. HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 102, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3874; 
MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 893. 
525. Smith-Corona Corp. v. United States, 17 Ct. lnt'l Trade 47, 49-51 (1993) (holding 
that an antidumping order applicable to Japanese portable electronic typewriters (PETs) 
dumped in the U.S. was not circumvented and that the DOC acted correctly in excluding 
from its investigation third-country components of the PETs). 
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Section 230 of the Act now provides help in the second scena-
rio.526 Section 230 addresses the third-country parts problem by 
requiring the DOC to focus its anticircumvention investigation on 
two "mandatory factors."527 First, the DOC must determine 
whether a "minor or insignificant" assembly is occurring in the 
United States or a third country.528 Second, the DOC must deter-
mine the value of parts imported from the country, subject to the 
order into the United States, or whether a third country is a "signif-
icant" portion of the total value of the finished product.529 In brief, 
section 230 "shift[s] the focus of the anticircumvention inquiry 
away from a test of the difference in value between the subject mer-
chandise and the imported parts or components, towards nature of 
the process performed in the United States or a third country."530 
Despite this improvement in the prior law, there are two difficul-
ties with this section. First, section 230 is inconsistent with the 
Agreement. The Agreement is silent on anticircumvention.53I As 
two practitioners point out, "there is no provision permitting anti-
circumvention measures or the imposition of antidumping duties 
on products which have not been fully investigated and found to 
be dumped and causing injury."532 Indeed, Article 18.1 of the 
Agreement forbids a WTO member from taking action against 
526. Act, supra note 23, § 230, 108 Stat. at 4891 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677j(b)(l)(C)-(D) (1994)). 
527. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 893. 
528. /d. 
529. /d. Section 230 of the Act retains the requirement that before expanding the 
scope of an antidumping order to include imponed parts, the DOC must consider 
whether: (1) there are changes in the pattern of trade regarding the sourcing of parts to 
produce the finished product; (2) the producer of the finished product subject to the 
order is related to the U.S. or third-country assembler; and (3) imports of parts from the 
country subject to the order into the United States or a third country have increased after 
the investigation that led to the original order. See id. at 894; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, 
at 82; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 101, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CA.N. 3873. 
530. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 81-82. 
531. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 80. The Uruguay Round Ministerial Decision 
(Decision) recognizes the "problem" of circumvention and the desirability of having uni-
form rules on anticircumvention as soon as possible. See MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 819. This 
decision does not provide a foundation for section 230. The Decision is reprinted in 
MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 1694. The December 20, 1991, Dunkel Draft of the Agreement 
contained provisions that the United States regarded as weak. The United States success-
fully persuaded other contracting parties to delete these provisions from the final Agree-
ment. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 819. For a critique of the Dunkel Draft, see Gary N. 
Horlick, How the GATT Became Protectionist, 27 J. WoRLD TRADE 5 (1993). 
532. Horlick & Shea, supra note 20, at 28; see also Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 499-
500 (noting the inconsistency of the U.S. government's interpretation of the Decision and 
its obligations under Article VI of the 1947 GATT and the Agreement). 
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dumping except in accordance with the Agreement.533 Further-
more, Article VI of the 1947 GATT provides that antidumping 
duties cannot be imposed without a finding of dumping and injury 
with respect to a like product from the country subject to investiga-
tion.534 Thus, section 230 is a unilateral modification, without 
foundation in the Agreement, of U.S. anticircumvention rules. 
Second, the statutory language utilizes but does not define criti-
cal terms. What assembly operation is "minor or insignificant?" 
What value of imported parts is "significant?" For example, with 
respect to the first mandatory factor, section 230 lists a number of 
variables the DOC may consider in deciding whether an assembly 
operation is "minor or insignificant. "535 These variables include the 
levels of investment, research, and development; the nature of the 
production process; the extent of production facilities; and 
whether the value of the processing performed in the United 
States is a "small" proportion of the value of finished merchandise 
sold in the United States.536 No hierarchy among or weighing sys-
tem for these variables is suggested; the DOC must proceed on a 
case-by-case basis. 
As another example, with respect to the second mandatory fac-
tor, the legislative history of section 230 indicates Congress did not 
"intend to replace one problematic test-the "small' value test-
with another."537 Ironically, this result is not avoided because it is 
no easier to define "significant" than "small." No quantitative test is 
established to determine when the value of import parts is a "signif-
icant" portion of the total value of finished merchandise. While a 
bright-line test was rejected in order to preserve the DOC's flexibil-
ity, the result is that it is now necessary for an uncertain case-by-
case adjudication.538 What is clear, however, is the legislature's goal 
of enhancing the ability of a petitioner to expand an antidumping 
order. The legislative history indicates that Congress "expects and 
intends that the new standard will be less difficult to meet, thereby 
improving our ability to prevent circumvention."539 
533. Agreement, supra note 19, at 22. 
534. GATT, supra note 2, art. VI, 61 Stat. at A3, A23, 55 U.N.T.S. at 188, 212. 
535. Act, supra note 23, § 230, 108 Stat. at 4891 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677j (1994)). 
536. Id. § 230, 108 Stat. at 4892; .see also MESSAGE, .supra note 69, at 893; SENATE REPORT, 
.supra note 18, at 82; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 101, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 
3873. 
537. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 82. 
538. Id.; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 101, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3873. 
539. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 82. 
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In sum, the Act may have gone beyond the bounds of the Agree-
ment. In any event, the Act's mandatory factors do not qualify as 
rigorous tests for deciding when to expand the scope of an 
antidumping order or protection to cover imported parts or mer-
chandise. One solution would be to use quantitative tests for defin-
ing "minor or insignificant" assembly operations and "significant" 
added value to provide greater discipline. An alternative solution, 
suggested in the proposed traffic-light system, is to treat the sugges-
tion of expanding any extant order as a new case and require new 
dumping margin and injury determinations. 
E. Reviewing an Order 
1. The Irony of Sunset Reviews 
Traditionally, the United States has revoked only a small number 
of outstanding antidumping orders and has done so only after they 
have been in effect for a long period of time.540 As two practition-
ers point out, 
[b]etweenjanuary 1, 1980 [sic] and july 31, 1994, a total of 533 
antidumping and countervailing duty orders had been, at some 
time, placed into effect. During this same period of time, 162 
orders (30.39%) were revoked. The average period of time a 
revoked duty order remained in effect was 8.28 years.541 
Another observer's results were even more startling: "Over ninety 
percent of all companies convicted of dumping since 1980 are still 
restricted by dumping orders."542 Reviewing and revoking an order 
raises two competing concerns: 
On the one hand, the purpose of an antidumping order is to 
provide relief from imported goods that are unfairly competing 
in one's domestic market. Once domestic industry has proven 
its case-that the goods are being dumped and the dumping 
injures or threatens injury to a U.S. industry-the order and 
resulting duty should remain in effect during the existence of 
that conduct. It is an expensive and time-consuming exercise to 
go from allegation to order, both for the parties and for the 
administrative agencies charged with determining whether the 
allegations are true. This first view reflects the concern that 
once the domestic industry has proven that it is, in fact, injured 
by dumping or subsidies, it should not be asked to reprove its 
case. 
540. See Barbara R. Stafford & Linda S. Chang, The Sunset Pr(J!Jisions, Mortality and the 
Uruguary Round, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT 1994, 721, 727 n.12 (PU 1994). 
541. Id. (emphasis added). 
542. BovARD, supra note l, at 140. 
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On the other hand, an order and the ensuing duty should not 
remain in place for any longer than necessary. It is blatantly 
unfair to keep an order in effect, whether by design or inertia, 
when it is no longer needed. As with many of he issues 
addressed in the Uruguay Round, the approach to the sunset 
issue preferred by individual GATT member states was based on 
whether their principal concerns were anxiety over placing an 
undue burden on injured domestic parties, or vexation with an 
unnecessary and, therefore, unfair encumbrance on 
exporters. 543 
Article 11.3 of the Agreement purports to balance these competing 
concerns by mandating, pursuant to a provision known as the "sun-
set" rule,544 the termination of an order no later than five years 
from the date of its imposition.545 The sole exception to the sunset 
543. Stafford & Chang, supra note 540, at 729-30. 
544. Act, supra note 23, § 220(a), 108 Stat. at 4859 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1675(a)-(3)(A) (1994)). 
545. The sunset review, as well as the "new shipper" review discussed in the next sec-
tion, should not be confused with a "normal" administrative review or a "changed circum-
stances" review. 
Under pre-Uruguay Round law almost all antidumping orders were subject to a normal 
administrative review within one year from the date they were issued. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) 
(1988). Upon request of an interested party, the DOC calculated final liability for an 
antidumping duty on an entry of merchandise subject to an order. SENATE REPORT, supra 
note 18, at 43. The amount calculated during the investigation phase was thereby regarded 
as an estimate. The DOC revoked the order if it concluded that: ( 1) one or more produ-
cers subject to the order had not sold merchandise at LTFV for three consecutive years; (2) 
it is unlikely that they will sell their merchandise at LTFV in the future; and (3) they agree 
to reinstatement of the order should they resume LFIV sales. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (1988); 
19 C.F.R. § 353.25(a) (1995). See, e.g., Antifriction Bearings (other than Tapered Roller 
Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France, 60 Fed. Reg. 10,900 (1995) (notice of final 
administrative review). 
Article 9.3.1 of the Agreement establishes deadlines for an administrative review; nor-
mally 12 months and in no case more than 18 months. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 1466. 
Section 220(a) of the Act implements these deadlines. Act, supra, note 23, § 220(a), 108 
Stat. at 4859 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(3)(A) (1994)). 
With respect to a "changed circumstances" review, under pre-Uruguay Round law, an 
interested party not only had to request the review but also show there were "changed 
circumstances sufficient to warrant a review." 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(1) (1988). A decision by 
the DOC as to whether this standard is met was not subject to judicial review. AOC Int'l 
Proton Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, No. 93-06-00341, 1993 Ct. Inti. Trade LEXIS 238, 
at *9-12 (Ct. Int'l Trade Dec. 22, 1993). If an interested party made the requisite showing, 
the DOC recalculated FMV, USP, and the dumping margin. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b) (2) 
(1988). A changed circumstances review of a final determination by the DOC and ITC 
could not be made within two years of the date of the determination. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1675(b)(4) (1988); see also OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 70 (stating that no review may 
occur within 24 months of notice of final determination without good cause). 
In connection with a changed circumstances review, Article 11.2 of the Agreement 
requires the appropriate authority to determine whether dumping and injury would be 
likely to continue or recur if the antidumping order were revoked. Agreement, supra note 
19, at 17. Section 220(a) implements this requirement. Agreement, supra note 19, at 17; 
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rule occurs when the appropriate authority-the DOC-as a result 
of a review it initiates or a review initiated by an interested party, 
concludes that termination "would be likely" to lead to a continua-
tion or recurrence of dumping and injury. This ambiguous excep-
tion brings to the fore the failure of Article 11.3 to successfully 
balance the competing concerns raised in the above-quoted pas-
sage. Ironically, a sunset review is unlikely to lead to revocation. 
The irony of the ineffectiveness of Article 11.3 is suggested by 
two subtleties in sections 220(a) and 221 (a) of the Act, which 
implement Article 11.3.546 First, an antidumping duty may remain 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 44-45; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55-56, reprinted in 
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3827-28; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 878. 
Under pre- and post-Uruguay Round law, revocation of an antidumping order may also 
result from a review initiated by the DOC without the request of any party. If the DOC 
determines that an order is no longer of interest to any party or that other changed cir-
cumstances warrant revocation, it will initiate a review. 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(d) (1995). Lack 
of interest is demonstrated by an affirmative statement of a petitioner or the absence of a 
request for a review for four years (which, in essence, means that five annual review peri-
ods have transpired). In practice, any unsupported statement of interest would prevent 
revocation. 
Neither the Agreement nor the Act correct three key problems with administrative and 
changed circumstances reviews-their cost, scope, and attendant burdens of proof. These 
problems are inherent biases against commencing a review and lifting an order. First, 
because these reviews are triggered only upon request of an interested party, the mecha-
nism "uses the transaction cost of participation in a proceeding as the criterion for decid-
ing whether a review will be conducted." Horlick, supra note 13, at 128. Theoretically, the 
DOC could initiate an administrative review, but it rarely does so. !d. at 129. The price tag 
for revocation can exceed $100,000. !d. 
Second, "[i]n practice a respondent can only request review of the order to the extent it 
itself is covered," whereas "[a] domestic petitioner can request a review of all companies 
specifically named in the order, as well as any new entrants or other companies specifically 
named." !d. at 128-29. A petitioner could cause an antidumping duty on several companies 
to be raised, whereas a respondent could cause only the duty it owes to decrease. Arguably, 
a respondent should be able to trigger a review of all respondents-even though some may 
be its competitors-that are covered by an order. 
Third, the burden of persuasion rests on the party seeking revocation of an order. For 
example, a petitioner need not show that dumping and injury persist; rather, a respondent 
must prove that there are changed circumstances sufficient to warrant a review. This bur-
den reflects a "guilty until proven innocent" approach. 
546. Act, supra note 23, §§ 220(a), 221 (a), 108 Stat. at 4857, 4865 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 1675(a), 1675a (1994)). In one sense, the sunset rule is consistent with prior law. Under 
pre-Uruguay Round DOC regulations, the DOC could revoke an order if there had been 
no request for review of that order for four years. 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(d) (4) (1995); see supra 
note 544. However, in two respects, the sunset rule is inconsistent with prior law. 
First, there was no such rule in the 1930 Act. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33; HousE 
REPORT, supra note 18, at 56, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3828; see also Horlick, supra 
note 13, at 129 (explaining that the United States previously did not have a sunset rule for 
dumping). Under prior law antidumping duties were imposed as long as dumping or 
injury continued. Indeed, the failure of the United States to review antidumping orders 
was a source of concern throughout the GATT negotiations. See 2 THE GATT URUGUAY 
RouND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992), at 1424-25 (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1993). 
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in force pending the outcome of a sunset review, which may take 
one year.547 Interestingly, under pre-Uruguay Round law, time lim-
Under an Executive Order issued pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, authority 
for calculating dumping margins and issuing orders was transferred in 1980 from the 
Department of the Treasury to the DOC. See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, §§ 2(a), 
5(a) (1) (C), 3 C.F.R. §§ 513-515 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1590 (1994); Exec. 
Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. 131, 135 (1980). The Treasury regulations called for modifica-
tion or revocation of an order, either upon request of a party or on the initiative of the 
secretary of the Treasury, if there was a change in circumstances. See 19 C.F.R. § 153.41 (a)-
(b) ( 1975). Section 751 (a) of the 1979 Act called for the DOC to undertake annual reviews 
of all antidumping orders. This requirement imposed an unnecessarily heavy burden on 
the DOC that was alleviated by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. As a result of the 1984 
Act, reviews were conditioned upon request: See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (1984); see also 
HousE SuscoMM. oN TRADE, HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs, 98TH CoNG., 2o SESS., 
REPORT ON H.R. 4784 TRADE REMEDIES REFoRM Acr OF 1984 16 (Comm. Print 1984) (stat-
ing purpose of conditional reviews). 
Second, under prior law the ITC could notify the DOC of its determination that circum-
stances in the affected market or industry had changed so significantly that injury was 
unlikely to recur if an order were revoked. 19 C.F.R. §§ 207.45(a), (c) (1995). In tum, the 
DOC could revoke the order. The burden of proof rested on an exponer engaged in 
dumping to show that injury would not recur and, therefore, revocation was justified. The 
Agreement shifts that burden from the respondent to the DOC. This shift has caused one 
practitioner to suggest that the sunset rule weakens U.S. antidumping law because it is 
easier than under prior law for the respondent to obtain revocation. See Stein, supra note 
278, at 890-91. This suggestion is disputed above. 
547. Ankle 11.4 specifies that a sunset review normally should be completed within 
one year of its commencement. Agreement, supra note 19, at 17. Normally, the DOC will 
complete its review within 240 days and the lTC will complete its review within 360 days. 19 
U.S.C. § 1675(c)(5) (1994); SENATE REPoRT, supra note 18, at 46; HousE REPORT, supra 
note 18, at 57, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3829; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 881. Depend-
ing on the amount of interest in a sunset review, measured by submissions from companies 
in the relevant domestic industry, exponers, and the exponers' government, the DOC and 
the lTC may decide not to conduct a full-fledged sunset review. Indeed, if there is no 
interest, no review is conducted and the order is revoked automatically. See MESSAGE, supra 
note 69, at 879-81. In addition, if an antidumping order was not revoked after a previous 
sunset or changed circumstances review, a sunset review must be conducted within five 
years of that prior order. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 58, reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.CAN. 3830. 
When the Act took effect on january 1, 1995, there were approximately 400 orders eligi-
ble for review on the ground that they had been in effect for at least five years. See id. The 
Agreement contains a "procrastination" provision to deal with these transition cases. Arti-
cle 18.3.2 allows WTO Members to treat all orders in effect on the date the Agreement 
enters into force as if they had been issued on the date of entry into force. Agreement, 
supra note 19, at 22. Thus, there will be no sunset review revocation for five years from the 
date of enactment. To ensure timely completion of reviews of a backlog of over 400 transi-
tion cases, the DOC and the ITC will stan the reviews 18 months before this date and 
complete them within 18 months after this date. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 47; 
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 58, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3830; MESSAGE, supra 
note 69, at 882; Stafford & Chang, supra note 540, at 742. In addition, section 220(a) of the 
Act indicates that sunset reviews may take up to 18 months. Act, supra note 23, § 220(a), 
108 Stat. at 4863 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(6) (1994)). In summary, with respect to 
transition cases, the United States took advantage of the flexible language in Ankle 11.4, 
which provides that a sunset review "normally" should be completed within 12 months of 
1995] Rethinking Antidumping Law 119 
its for annual reviews were hortatory, not mandatory.548 Some 
"annual" reviews have dragged on for ten years, in part because of 
the backlog of reviews that the DOC inherited from the Depart-
ment of the Treasury.549 Courts have adopted this approach to sun-
set reviews, thereby stretching out the review process. Second, 
section 220(a) and its legislative history state that the DOC and the 
lTC must conduct a sunset review "after" five years from the impo-
sition of an order.550 Article 11.3, however, uses the phrase "not 
later than five years from" the imposition of an order. While post-
Uruguay Round U.S. law is not inconsistent with Article 11.3, it 
does take advantage of the outermost permissible limit.551 
The substantive standard for sunset reviews allows the DOC and 
the lTC to render likelihood determinations that are susceptible to 
protectionist abuse. The DOC must determine whether the revoca-
tion of an outstanding antidumping order "would be likely" to lead 
to a continuation or recurrence of dumping within a reasonably 
foreseeable time.552 Similarly, the lTC must decide whether revoca-
tion of the order "would be likely" to result in continued or recur-
ring material injury within a reasonably foreseeable time.553 It is 
impossible to determine with precision what will happen if an 
order is revoked. Applying the "likelihood" standard entails mak-
ing a predictive determination which is speculative and plagued 
with ambiguity.554 
the date of its initiation. The United States viewed its situation as abnormal because of the 
large volume of transition cases. For non transition cases, sunset reviews will begin 30 days 
before the expiration of the five-year period and will be completed within one year. Staf-
ford & Chang, supra note 540, at 745. 
548. See supra note 547. 
549. For example, in one case concerning import entries of tapered roller bearings 
from japan during 1974-1979, the DOC did not issue the final results of its annual review 
until June 1990. Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1160, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
550. Act, supra note 23, § 220(a), 108 Stat. at 4861 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (1) 
(1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 45. 
551. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 56, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3828. There 
may be a third subtlety to sections 220(a) and 221 (a) of the Act. Because it may be simple 
and inexpensive to request a sunset review, a petitioner is likely to do so. 
552. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 883, 889-91. 
553. /d. at 883; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 48; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 
59-60, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3831-32. This standard must be distinguished from 
that applied by the lTC in material injury and threat determinations. In the former situa-
tion the lTC looks for current material injury by reason of dumped imports. In the latter 
situation the lTC looks for imminent material injury. !d. at 60. 
554. See MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 883; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 59, reprinted in 
1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3831; see also, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 
933 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that a likelihood determination in a changed circumstances 
review is "inherently predictive"). 
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Consider the DOC's "likelihood" determination. The Agreement 
offers no guidance on calculating the likelihood of future dump-
ing; thus, the matter is left to each WTO member. One solution 
might be to calculate a future margin based on estimated future 
prices in the exporting and importing countries' markets. The 
DOC rejected this formula and decided to rely on its original 
dumping calculation, "as that would be indicative· of respondents' 
behavior without the discipline of an order."555 But this decision 
presumes past actions are a reliable indicator of future behavior 
and ignores the possibility that supervening events may cause an 
exporter to dramatically alter its behavior. 
For instance, the factors the DOC examines in making its likeli-
hood determination under section 221 (a) of the Act are 
the relationship between dumping margins, or the absence of 
margins, and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise, 
comparing the periods before and after the issuance of an order 
.... For example, declining import volumes accompanied by the con-
tinued existence of dumping margins after the issuance of an order may 
provide a strong indication that, absent an order, dumping would be 
likely to continue, because the evidence would indicate that the 
exporter needs to dump to sell at pre-order volumes. In con-
trast, declining (or no) dumping margins accompanied by 
steady or increasing imports may indicate that foreign compa-
nies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the 
United States and that dumping is less likely to continue or 
recur if the order were revoked. 556 
Declining import volumes or the existence of dumping margins 
after an order may not be probative of the likelihood of continued 
or recurred dumping. Declines could result from cyclical economic 
factors in the United States, such as a recession; from changes par-
ticular to the exporter, such as a shift in export strategy (a decision 
to export a lower volume of goods to the United States and a 
higher volume of goods to another importing country); or from a 
change in costs, such as an increase in wages, leading to lay-offs 
A related avenue for protectionist abuse may exist when the DOC deems a response to 
its notice of initiation of a sunset review "inadequate." Act, supra note 23, § 220(a), 108 
Stat. at 4862 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(3)(B) (1994)). In such a case the DOC may 
make a determination on the basis of facts available. This determination is subject only to a 
relaxed standard of review by the Court of International Trade. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1516a(b) (1)(B)(ii) (1994). 
555. Stafford & Chang, supra note 540, at 747; see also MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 890 
(stating that a company that dumps despite an order would likely continue to dump if the 
order were removed). 
556. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 889-90 (emphasis added); 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(c) (1994); 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 52; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 63, reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.CAN. 3835. 
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and the closure of a production facility. Similarly, the persistence 
of a dumping margin after an order has been issued could result 
from changes in conditions in the exporter's home market, such as 
an increase in prices caused by inflation which would result in an 
increase in NV; a change in exchange rates, such as an apprecia-
tion of the exporter's home currency relative to the U.S. dollar 
which would result in an increase in NV; or a change in the U.S. 
market, such as increased market competition resulting in a lower 
export price.557 Nevertheless, there is a built-in bias against an 
exporter based on its preorder behavior.558 The onus is put 
squarely on the exporter to prove that declining import volumes 
and dumping margins are not indicative of the likelihood of a con-
tinuation or recurrence of dumping. The exporter remains guilty 
until it proves its innocence.559 Not surprisingly, some practitioners 
"expect that in practice the [DOC] will be very likely to find that 
dumping is likely to continue or recur in almost every sunset 
review."560 
Furthermore, the ITC's likelihood analysis makes a change in 
the status quo unlikely. While section 221 (a) of the Act articulates 
specific factors that the lTC must consider,561 the ITC's likelihood 
determination remains "inherently speculative" and calls for "pre-
dictive inquiries [which] may suggest a number of possible out-
comes."562 Like the DOC, the lTC assumes the role of a soothsayer 
557. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 890. 
558. See id. at 889-90. 
559. Still another example of this conclusion is a provision in section 221 (a) on the 
magnitude of the dumping margin. The size of the dumping margin calculated by the 
DOC in the original investigation may be used by the lTC to decide whether there is a 
likelihood of material i11iury. See Act, supra note 23, § 221 (a), 108 Stat. at 4868 (codified at 
19 U.S.C. § 1675a(c)(3) (1994)). Hence, the exporter is encumbered by its past behavior 
with respect to both the DOC and lTC likelihood determinations. To be sure, section 
221 (a) allows the DOC to consider other information like price, cost, market, or economic 
factors that the DOC deems relevant. However, it will do so only" [i]f good cause is shown." 
/d. 
560. POWELL, GOLDSTEIN, FRAZER & MURPHY, UPDATE OF ANALYSIS OF HOUSE WAYS AND 
MEANs CoMMITTEE REPORT 1 (Oct. 1994) (on file with The George Washington journal of Inter-
national Law and Economics). 
561. Act, supra note 23, § 221 (a), 108 Stat. at 4865-67 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a) 
(1994)). 
562. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 47-48. The likelihood of material injury standard 
is applicable and the same factors are considered, regardless of whether the ITC's initial 
affirmative determination concerned material injury, threat of material injury, or material 
retardation of an industry. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 883; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 
48. In addition to the factors discussed below, section 221 (a) calls for the lTC to consider 
duty absorption (i.e., whether an importer affiliated with an exporter of dumped merchan-
dise pays the antidumping duty after imposition of an order, rather than eliminating the 
dumping in order to insulate the first unrelated buyer in the United States from the effects 
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when it considers the question of how an exporter might respond 
if the order to which it has been subject is lifted. Specifically, the 
lTC evaluates whether removal of an order would be likely to result 
in a significant increase of the following: (1) in the volume of 
imports; (2) in price underselling and consequent price suppres-
sion or depression with respect to a domestic like product; and (3) 
in impact on the domestic industry.563 Some of the evaluative fac-
tors, which are set forth in section 221 (a) of the Act, plainly dis-
courage the lTC from revoking an order.564 
For example, the lTC considers whether the state of the relevant 
domestic industry has improved during the pendency of the 
order.565 This factor should cause the lTC to determine whether 
the industry has taken measures, such as reducing costs and invest-
ing in new technology, to meet foreign competition. Instead, the 
legislative history urges the lTC to maintain an order to protect a 
U.S. industry. 
[T] he lTC [is required] to consider whether any improvement 
in the state of the industry is related to the existence of the 
order .... The Committee believes that this is an important 
inquiry. An antidumping ... order ... is expected to have a 
beneficial effect on the domestic industry. The Committee does 
not, therefore, believe that the lTC should find that there is no 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence of material injury sim-
ply because the industry has improved after an order was 
imposed .... Moreover, an improvement in the condition of the 
industry after an order is imposed . . . may indicate that the industry is 
likely to deteriorate if the order is revoked . . . . 566 
The legislative history also suggests that the lTC may make an 
affirmative likelihood determination without data showing that the 
current state of the relevant domestic industry is likely to deterio-
rate if the order is lifted.567 This factor invites the lTC to confuse 
correlation and causation. The lTC may conclude that if the 
domestic industry improves during the order period, then "termi-
of the order) and the magnitude of the dumping margin. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 
49, 51. 
563. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 50-51; see also HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 
60, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3842 (comparing the continuing material injury standard 
and current material injury standard). 
564. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 50. 
565. See id. at 48. 
566. Id. at 49 (emphasis added). 
567. The legislative history states that the lTC may make an affirmative likelihood 
determination "notwithstanding the lack of any likely further deterioration of the current 
condition of the domestic industry if revocation of the order ... would be likely to lead to 
the continuation or recurrence of material injury." See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 60, 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3832 (emphasis added); MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 884. 
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nation of the order would result in continuing or recurring 
injury."568 Such a conclusion may be erroneous because the 
improvement may be attributable to factors other than the order, 
such as a change in market conditions during the order period. 
Vulnerability of the U.S. industry is another factor that discour-
ages revocation. The indicia of "vulnerability" are not set forth in 
the Act, but generally the term connotes susceptibility to material 
injury.569 It does not matter if the industry is vulnerable because of 
past dumping or poor management, mere vulnerability is suffi-
cient.570 Thus, the ITC can renew an order where the cause of the 
weakening of a domestic industry is not principally attributable to 
imports.571 Equally irrelevant is the. fact that causes other than 
future imports may contribute to future injury.572 Consequently, 
the ITC may renew an order if the likely causes of future injury to a 
vulnerable industry are economic recession and technological 
change. 
Finally, the DOC and the IT9 likelihood determinations share 
common ambiguities. For instance, how far into the future should 
568. Stafford & Chang, suf!ra note 540, at 749. The legislative history states that 
[t]he ITC's prior injury determination] is an important consideration since this is 
the most recent period in which imports of the merchandise under review com-
peted in the U.S. market free of the discipline of an order ... [and that] if the 
ITC finds that the conditions that led to the initial finding of material injury, 
threat, or material retardation are likely to recur, it would be reasonable for the 
ITC to conclude ... that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of 
material injury. 
SENATE REPORT, suf!ra note 18, at 48. 
569. SENATE REPORT, suf!ra note 18, at 49; MESSAGE, suf!ra note 69, at 885. 
570. The legislative history states that 
the concept of "vulnerability" is derived from existing standards for material 
injury and threat of material injury. In material injury determinations, the ITC 
considers other factors .... These other factors may account for the injury, but 
they may also demonstrate that an industry is facing difficulties from a number of 
sources and is vulnerable to dumped ... imports. 
SENATE REPORT, suf!ra note 18, at 49. 
571. Stafford & Chang, suf!ra note 540, at 750. 
572. MESSAGE, suf!ra note 69, at 885. Another factor arises in a sunset review of a case 
involving an order affecting a regional U.S. industry. Section 221 (a) gives the ITC discre-
tion to base its sunset review on its original injury determination for a particular regional 
industry. If the original determination is no longer valid, the lTC may redefine the region 
or examine the United States as a whole. Act, suf!ra note 23, § 221 (a), 108 Stat. at 4865 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(8) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, suf!ra note 18, at 51. This 
flexibility allows the ITC to account for the potential effects on marketing and distribution 
of a dumped good after imposition of an order. SENATE REPORT, suf!ra note 18, at 51. This 
discretion, however, allows the ITC to switch petitioners and thereby reincarnate an obso-
lete order. This discretion is potentially incongruous with the fundamental purpose of 
sunset reviews. For instance, if an original determination applicable to producers in Vir-
ginia becomes obsolete, the lTC should not be able to reincarnate the order by consider-
ing Alabama producers. 
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the DOC and the lTC look in an attempt to assess the likelihood of 
a continuation or recurrence of dumping? The unsatisfactory 
answer found in the legislative history to section 221 (a) is for "the 
reasonably foreseeable future."573 What if there are several "likely" 
outcomes upon revocation? The legislative history of section 
221 (a) of the Act lacks a relative weighing system for different out-
comes. Section 221 (a) merely indicates that a decision to retain an 
order is not erroneous where there are several "likely" outcomes, as 
long as the likelihood determination is "reasonable in light of the 
facts of the case."s74 
In conclusion, the sunset review process resembles the midnight 
sun. The DOC and the lTC likelihood determinations associated 
with the sunset review process are, ironically, unlikely to lead to an 
improvement in the United States's record of revoking orders, 
since more orders may be renewed than revoked on their fifth 
anniversary. To prevent the entrenchment of orders, the proposed 
traffic-light system in Part V requires automatic termination of an 
order after one year. 
2. The Presumption of New Shipper Guilt 
Unfortunately, during the Uruguay Round negotiations the 
United States rejected as unreasonable a proposal that exempted 
new shippers.575 The proposal required a new investigation before 
imposing an antidumping duty on a new shipper.576 The United 
States, however, agreed to a proposal, embodied in Article 9.5 of 
the Agreement577 and implemented by section 220(a) of the Act, 
that provides a new shipper with an expedited review to establish 
an individual dumping margin on the basis of that shipper's own 
sales.578 
573. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 883. With respect to the ITC's likelihood determina-
tion, this period normally exceeds an "imminent" time frame which it uses in its initial 
threat of material injury analysis. Id. at 887. 
574. !d. at 883. 
575. Section 220(a) of the Act defines a "new shipper" as an exporter who did not 
export the merchandise in question to the United States during the original period of the 
antidumping investigation and is not affiliated with any exporter who did export the mer-
chandise to the United States during that period. Act, supra note 23, § 220(a), 108 Stat. at 
4866 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994)). 
576. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 875. 
577. Agreement, supra note 19, at 15. 
578. Act, supra note 23, § 220(a), 108 Stat. at 4858-59 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1675(a)(2)(B) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 43-44; HousE REPORT, supra 
note 18, at 55, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3827. 
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The new shipper review rule suffers from a conceptual weakness. 
Automatically covering a new shipper in an antidumping order 
results in an order which is overly broad in scope; a new shipper is 
initially presumed guilty of dumping and a petitioner is initially 
presumed worthy of protection from that new shipper. The rule 
also suffers from practical defects. A new shipper review may 
impose significant monetary and time costs on a new shipper. Arti-
cle 9.5 states that antidumping duties cannot be imposed on a new 
shipper's products during the period of review.579 Under the 1930 
Act a new shipper paid estimated antidumping duty deposits.580 
The legislative history of the current Act indicates that cash depos-
its, bonds, or other security can be posted, at the importer's 
option, until the review is completed.581 Undoubtedly, posting a 
bond is less costly than depositing cash; however, a new shipper 
still incurs the cost of a lost opportunity when required to purchase 
a bond. Further, it is unclear how long an "accelerated" review will 
take. A reasonable estimate, based on the DOC's past performance 
and the fact that there is no mandatory date for completion, is at 
least one year. The effect of the rule may be to discourage new 
shippers facing an antidumping duty from exporting to the United 
States, thereby making the industry less competitive and making 
consumers worse off. To avoid these defects, the traffic-light system 
proposed in Part V eliminates the automatic extension of an order 
to a new shipper and requires a new investigation before an order 
can be imposed on that shipper. 
V. TowARD A TRAFFIC-LIGHT SYSTEM 
Both in the United States and elsewhere, antidumping laws go 
beyond preventing anti-competitive practices-which should be 
their rationale-and often have the effect of protecting domes-
tic industries from foreign competition.582 
A. System Overview 
Part IV argued that ambiguities in the Agreement and the Act, 
coupled with a neglect of fundamental microeconomic principles, 
facilitate protectionist abuse. What should the Uruguay Round 
negotiators have done? First, the negotiators should have placed 
579. Agreement, supra note 19, at 15. 
580. 19 C.F.R §§ 353.14, 353.15 (1995). The deposit amounts are based on "all others" 
rates. 
581. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 44. 
582. EcONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 239 (Feb. 1994). 
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greater emphasis on certainty and predictability; they should have 
made greater use of bright-line rules and clearly defined terms and 
phrases to curtail opportunities for protectionist abuse. Second, 
the negotiators should have paid more attention to the underlying 
microeconomic rationales for cross-border price discrimination, 
rather than focusing on the mere act of such discrimination. The 
negotiators should have attempted to classify the behavior of an 
exporter according to its cost structure and based on this classifica-
tion, they should have narrowed the range of actionable dumping 
situations. 
These prescriptions suggest parameters for a new antidumping 
scheme that would be less susceptible to protectionist abuse. A pro-
posal for such a scheme-the "traffic-light" system-is offered 
below. The system is akin to .that established for countervailing 
duty law in the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.583 It outlaws only predatory dumping 
that is a substantial cause of material injury; it limits the duration of 
an antidumping order; and it eliminates anticircumvention rules. 
The system, therefore, is simpler and less susceptible to abuse than 
the system set out under the Agreement and the Act. 
B. System Theory 
The microeconomic theory underlying the traffic-light system is 
the cost structure of a firm. The theory is graphically represented 
at Appendix B.5s4 The total cost ofproduction a firm incurs rises as 
the quantity of output produced by that firm increases.585 Total 
cost is defined as the sum of fixed and variable costs.586 Fixed costs 
arise from short-run contractual commitments, such as wages and 
salaries, rental and lease payments, interest on outstanding debt, 
583. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Dec. 15, 1993, Hein's 
No. KAV 3778; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 1533. The traffic-light proposal might also result 
in a closer alignment between antidumping law and antitrust law on predatory pricing. 
Interestingly, in 1923, Viner proposed a tripartite system. He distinguished among three 
different kinds of dumping: sporadic, short-run, and long-run dumping. Viner argued that 
firms can adapt to sporadic dumping and long-run dumping leads to gains for consumers 
that outweigh losses to producers in the importing country. However, short-run dumping 
was predatory-the exporter might intentionally undercut producers of the like product 
in the importing country to drive them out of business, establish a monopoly, recoup its 
losses from dumping, and earn monopoly rents. Thus, short-run dumping should be 
actionable in order to protect consumers in the importing country. See Hoekman & Leidy, 
supra note 28, at 160 n.13 and accompanying text. 
584. The discussion below is drawn in part from SAMUELSON, supra note 53, at 427-32, 
439-46. 
585. Id. at 439-40. 
586. Id. at 440-42. 
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and depreciation.587 Even if a firm halts production, it must con-
tinue to meet these obligations. Fixed costs, therefore, are 
expenses incurred even with zero output.58B As output rises, aver-
age fixed costs fall.589 Variable costs consist of that portion of total 
costs other than fixed costs. Variable costs equal zero when no out-
put is produced and increase as the level of output increases. Aver-
age variable costs decrease as output increases because of 
economies of scale in production and the pattern of marginal 
costs. Later, when these economies of scale are exhausted, average 
variable costs will rise as output increases.590 Average total costs 
consist of the sum of averaged fixed and average variable costs. 
Average total costs initially fall but later rise as output increases 
because of the pattern of average variable costs.5 9 1 
Finally, the marginal cost of the firm's output is the increment of 
total cost that results from producing one additional unit of out-
put. As the firm begins to produce, its marginal costs decline to a 
minimum positive number because of increasing economies of 
scale that result from using some or all factors of production. Each 
additional unit of a variable factor of production yields more than 
one additional unit of output.592 When marginal costs fall, each 
incremental unit of output pulls down average variable and aver-
age total costs. Eventually, however, marginal costs will begin to 
rise. This increase, known as the law of diminishing returns, oper-
ates to reduce the extra output that results from an incremental 
variable factor. 593 In turn, average variable and average total costs 
begin to rise with incremental units of output. Accordingly, the 
marginal cost curve, depicted in the graph, must intersect the mini-
mum points of the average cost and average variable cost curves. 
When marginal costs fall, average total and average variable costs 
are, by definition, falling. Conversely, when marginal costs rise, 
587. /d. at 440-41. 
588. /d. 
589. Average fixed cost (AFC) at a given quantity of output (Q) is calculated by divid-
ing fixed costs (FC) at that quantity by that quantity, i.e., AFC = FC/Q. The numerator is 
constant at all levels of output. Hence, average fixed cost falls as the denominator rises. /d. 
at 441, Fig. 24-1. 
590. The average variable cost (AVC) at a given quantity of output (Q) is calculated by 
dividing the variable cost (VC) for that quantity of output by that level, i.e., AVC = VC/Q. 
591. Average total cost (ATC) is calculated by summing AFC and AVC and dividing the 
result by Q. As Q increases, ATC is "pulled up" by AVC. 
592. Variable factors of production are those factors that can be altered in the shan 
run, such as labor. In contrast, in the shan run, a firm cannot alter the amount of a fixed 
factor, such as land used in the production process. 
593. SAMUELSON, supra note 53, at 428. 
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average total and average variable costs also must rise; any average 
curve is pulled down when marginal costs are falling and pushed 
up when they are rising.s94 
This cost structure reveals a firm's break-even and shut-down 
points. The break-even point is the point where the price for the 
firm's output equals its minimum average total cost, which, by defi-
nition, is where the marginal and average total cost curves 
intersect: 
Price= Marginal Cost= Minimum Average Cost. 
At the break-even point, the firm earns no excess profits in the 
long run. Yet, it is economically rational for the firm to continue 
producing because it covers both its fixed and variable costs. Below 
this point, the firm cannot cover its total costs-it covers its fixed 
costs, but not all of its variable costs. Nevertheless, it still may be 
rational for the firm to continue to produce and sell merchandise 
at a price below the break-even point, as long as the price remains 
above the shut-down point. 
The shut-down point is the point where the price for the firm's 
output is at or below its minimum average variable cost. By defini-
tion, the shut-down point occurs where the marginal and average 
variable costs curves intersect: 
Price= Marginal Cost= Minimum Average Variable Cost. 
At or below the shut-down point, the firm cannot cover any of its 
variable costs. When the price for its output is so low that it receives 
less revenue than the variable cost incurred from producing the 
output, it is economically rational for the firm to cease production. 
C. System operation 
1. Red-light Dumping 
The traffic-light system eliminates the comparison between 
prices in the home and importing countries. As one observer 
noted, granting protection on the basis of price in a foreign market 
is "irrational."595 There is no need to calculate NV; the concept is 
abolished. Thus, opportunities for protectionist manipulation asso-
ciated with adjustments-the 5% home-market viability test, third-
country sales, below-cost sales, intermediate country sales, and cur-
rency conversion-are eliminated. Instead, dumping is defined in 
terms of the cost structure of the respondent. The DOC compares 
594. !d. at 441, 443, fig. 24-1 (b). 
595. PHIUP SLAYTON, THE ANTI-DUMPING TRIBUNAL 65 (1979). 
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the respondent's cost of production, focusing on its break-even 
and shut--down points for the subject merchandise, and the EP or 
CEP of the subject merchandise.596 The dumping margin formula 
is: 
Dumping Margin = Cost of Production - EP (or CEP). 
Cost of production consists of the sum of the cost of factor inputs; 
principally, labor, land and physical capital, and general expenses, 
with no allowance for profits.597 Cost of production should include 
the cost of transporting the subject merchandise to and selling it in 
the United States. The issue should be whether it is rational to sell 
the merchandise in the United States, not whether it is rational to 
sell in general. Additionally, if cost of production incorporates all 
items that are also included in the EP or CEP, then the need to 
make adjustments and the risk of manipulation is reduced. 
This cost of production calculation is not unwieldy for three rea-
sons. First, it is similar in manner to the way in which the DOC 
calculates NV for nonmarket economies, except that the DOC 
"borrows" the cost factors from comparable market economies. 
Hence, the DOC already has experience in using this methodol-
ogy. Second, the DOC examines the actual data from the respon-
dent's audited financial information that most closely corresponds 
to the period in which red-light dumping is alleged.598 This exami-
nation is based on information provided by the exporter in 
response to the DOC's antidumping questionnaire. The DOC may 
request verification of this information from the exporter if the 
DOC believes such verification is necessary. Third, the DOC's ques-
tionnaire, which is currently being revised, is extensive.599 Because 
section D of the draft revised questionnaire concerns cost of pro-
596. Readers familiar with antitrust Jaw will recognize an analogy between this proposal 
and the Areeda-Tumer test for predatory pricing. Under that test a price lower than rea-
sonably anticipated short-run marginal cost is predatory because a profit-maximizing pro-
ducer in a competitive market should supply a quantity of output at which price equals 
marginal cost. However, because of practical difficulties in measuring marginal cost, aver-
age variable cost is used as a proxy for marginal cost. Thus, the test states that a price lower 
than average variable cost-which is referred to here as the shut-down point-is illegal. See 
HoVENKAMP, supra note 61, at 300. The Areeda-Tumer test has been widely debated in the 
antitrust literature. See supra note 61. 
597. More specifically, cost of production is calculated in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles (GMP). See PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.05[6]. 
598. In the absence of actual data, threshold amounts could be ascribed for the cost of 
factor inputs and general expenses. 
599. See Notice, Request for Public CommentS on Revised Antidumping Questionnaire, 
60 Fed. Reg. 26,026 (1995); U.S. Dep't of Comm. Import Admin. Office of Antidumping 
Investigations, Request for Information (May 10, 1995) (on file with The George Washington 
Journal of International Law and Economics). 
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duction, there should be little difficulty in obtaining information 
relevant to the cost of production calculation. In effect, the burden 
is on respondents to maintain and provide this information. 
The DOC's goal, when comparing items one and two above, is to 
identify the respondent's break-even and shut-down points. Based 
on its identification of break-even and shut-down points, the DOC 
categorizes the respondent's activity as red-light, yellow-light, or 
green-light dumping. A bright-line legal presumption is associated 
with each category which, in turn, allows the DOC to filter out 
those petitions that simply seek protection from a respondent that 
is more efficient. · 
Admittedly, values assigned to the break-even and shut-down 
points are likely to vary with the measurement period. A measure-
ment period that is too short must be avoided because in the short 
run virtually all costs are fixed. Conversely, it is necessary to avoid 
using a measurement period that is too long because in the long 
run a respondent can vary all of its inputs in the production pro-
cess and adjust all of its contractual commitments. A measurement 
period that is too long, therefore, provides a respondent with an 
opportunity to react to market trends, such as changes in tastes and 
technological developments. Over time, an exporter can substitute 
fixed for variable costs, and thereby manipulate its shut-down 
point.600 By deliberately increasing fixed costs in relation to varia-
ble costs to lower the shut-down point, the respondent reduces the 
likelihood of a red-light dumping determination. There are two 
advantages to linking the measurement period to the period of 
alleged red-light dumping. First, linking the measurement period 
to the alleged dumping period creates an unambiguous standard 
and, therefore, forecloses arguments that the period is too short or 
too long. Second, it is fair. 
With respect to red-light dumping, the threshold question is 
whether an exporter is engaged in predatory dumping if it sells its 
product in the importing country below its shut-down point-at a 
price below its minimum average variable cost. Under these cir-
cumstances it is reasonable to conclude that predatory dumping is 
occurring. The exporter is behaving aggressively, perhaps ruth-
lessly; it is sustaining losses which, if it were a profit-maximizing 
enterprise, would cause it to shut down. At this point, it is fair to 
infer that the exporter seeks to drive its competitors in the import-
ing country out of business, establish a monopoly position, and 
600. PosNER, supra note 56, at 308-09. 
1995] Rethinking Antidumping Law 131 
reap monopoly rents. Although it can still be argued that the 
exporter is behaving in an economically rational manner, the 
exporter is sacrificing short-run for long-run profits in favor of 
market share,601 and the net welfare effect of such behavior on the 
importing country will surely be negative because competition will 
be lessened. Red-light dumping, therefore, creates an irrebuttable 
presumption against the respondent that it is engaging in preda-
tory pricing and a rebuttable presumption that such pricing has 
injurious effects. 
These presumptions shift the battleground to the lTC. No final 
antidumping duty is imposed and no estimated deposit is required 
until the lTC renders a final affirmative determination that the 
red-light dumping is the substantial cause of material injury. Its 
method of injury determination has, consequentially, been 
reformed in four ways. First, the lTC must focus on cost differen-
tials. The lTC cannot use the magnitude of a dumping margin as a 
basis for a final affirmative determination; it must obtain direct evi-
dence of material injury. An interesting case arises when a peti-
tioner has shown that a respondent's EP is below the respondent's 
shut-down point and also proves that either this EP is below the 
petitioner's shut-down point, or that this EP is below the average 
shut-down point for the relevant U.S. industry. Arguably, it may be 
inferred that the petitioner is of "typical" efficiency; at least as effi-
cient as the respondent but cannot compete with the EP. Alterna-
tively, it may be justified to infer that red-light dumping, not the 
petitioner's inefficiency, is the substantial cause of material injury. 
Second, the dumping of the subject merchandise must be the 
"substantial" cause of injury. "Substantial" causation is defined in 
the same way as it is for escape clause actions under section 201 of 
the Trade Act of 1974: Substantial causation is "important and not 
less than any other cause. "602 Dumping must be isolated as a causal 
factor and other possibilities must be excluded. The respondent 
can rebut the presumption of injurious effects by introducing evi-
dence of additional or more substantial causes of iftiury, most nota-
bly that the petitioner's cost structure indicates it is an inefficient 
producer. 
Third, the inherently speculative bases for an iftiury determina-
tion of threat and material retardation are eliminated. Only actual 
material iftiury suffices. Although eliminating these bases means 
the lTC cannot take preventive action against dumped merchan-
601. See Deardorff, supra note 29, at 151-54. 
602. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)(B) (1994). 
132 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. [Vol. 29 
dise, waiting until actual injury occurs not only lessens the chance 
of an inefficient petitioner obtaining undeserved protection,· but 
also compels the inefficient petitioner to adjust and respond to for-
eign competitive pressures. This represents a legal policy choice 
that only actual, not prospective, harm should be redressed. 
Finally, the lTC must ignore any distinction between merchant and 
captive markets. Accordingly, a petitioner is unable to artificially 
narrow the defined market under investigation. 
The ITC's determination could also be reformed to include an 
examination of the extent to which injury occurs to competition in 
the relevant industry and to consumer interests. First, the lTC 
could question whether there are barriers to entry in the relevant 
U.S. industry. For example, consider a hypothetical case where a 
respondent engaged in red-light dumping forces a U.S. company, 
Firm A, out of business. If there are significant barriers, no U.S. or 
foreign company can challenge the respondent in the industry. 
Not only is Firm A injured, but industry competition and consumer 
interests are also injured. Alternatively, if there are no barriers to 
entry into the industry, another U.S. company, Firm B, can com-
mence operations and compete with the respondent. The respon-
dent may then again engage in red-light dumping and force Firm B 
into insolvency. Yet again, another domestic rival, Firm C, may rise 
to take the place of Firm Band compete with the respondent. This 
process causes a hemorrhage of the respondent's profits because it 
has to continue to lower its price to eliminate the challenge of each 
new domestic competitor. Thus, as one antitrust scholar explains, 
[t]he rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses 
today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the future. The 
monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if new 
entrants appear soon after the successful predator attempts to 
raise its price. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market 
contains significant barriers to new entry. The relevant barriers are 
Bainian, not Stiglerian: that is, one must ask whether post-preda-
tion monopoly profits will be disciplined by new entry.603 
Accordingly, in the above example, because of low barriers to 
entry, the respondent cannot reap the benefits of predation by 
charging monopoly prices after a competitor has been dispatched. 
Second, the lTC should consider the respondent's share of the 
market for the subject merchandise. Again, consider the example 
of the respondent engaged in red-light dumping that drives Firm A 
out of business. Suppose the respondent has 5% of the aggregate 
603. HOVENKAMP, supra note 61, at 310 (emphasis added). 
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market share for the subject merchandise. Surely this case should 
be treated differently from one in which the respondent's market 
share is 90%. As one antitrust scholar puts it: "A market with two 
competitors, one of which is very large, is far more conducive to 
predatory pricing than a market with several relatively small com-
petitors. Predatory pricing is simply implausible in competitive 
markets. "604 
In sum, to determine whether the respondent has rebutted the 
presumption that pricing associated with red-light dumping has 
injurious effects, the lTC should undertake two further examina-
tions. First, the lTC should attempt to determine whether there are 
significant barriers to entry in the relevant industry. Next, the lTC 
should determine whether the respondent has a significant share 
of the market for the subject merchandise. As intimated above, 
these inquiries overlap with antitrust analysis. More research may 
be needed to determine whether these inquiries are appropriate in 
the antidumping context and whether other factors, such as the 
existence of excess capacity in the respondent's firm or the disposi-
tion of productive assets of a petitioner that has gone bankrupt,605 
are relevant. However, one advantage to the application of anti-
trust analysis is readily apparent; if the absence of barriers to entry 
and a large market share rebut the presumption that red-light 
dumping is injurious, a petitioner's likelihood of success is 
reduced. In tum, the risk of protectionist abuse may be lessened. 
Under the red-light dumping scheme outlined above, if the lTC 
finds injury, the DOC issues an antidumping order. The duty 
equals the difference between the EP or CEP and the respondent's 
shut-down point. The order terminates automatically in two years 
from the date of issuance, during which time the petitioner is 
expected to implement changes to respond to foreign competi-
tion.606 Under the red-light dumping scheme, therefore, sunset 
reviews are unnecessary because the order cannot be extended607 
and the petitioner cannot petition for a new order within two years 
of the date of expiration of the initial order. At any point during 
the duration of an order, the respondent may request an adminis-
trative review for the purpose of proving that it no longer engages 
604. /d. at 309. 
605. See id. at 311-13. 
606. In contrast, under the escape clause-section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, as 
amended-the period of relief, including any provisional relief, is four years. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2253(e) (1) (A) (1994). 
607. In contrast, under the escape clause, extensions are permissible but the aggregate 
period of relief cannot exceed eight years. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(e) (1)(B) (ii) (1994). 
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in red-light dumping or to adjust the margin of dumping and 
amount of duty imposed. Upon such proof, the DOC would be 
required to lift or amend the order. 
To further avoid protectionist abuse, the presumption regarding 
new shippers is reversed. A new shipper is automatically exempt 
from an antidumping order. Only a new petition filed against a 
new shipper could lead to an order against it. Likewise, allegations 
of circumvention are treated not by expanding an existing order, 
but rather by initiating a new case. Admittedly, it may be necessary 
to allow for an exception to the automatic exemption for new ship-
pers. In an industry in which production facilities are easily mobile, 
a dumper could move to a new country and establish itself as a new ' 
shipper. Arguably, this dumper is not a bona fide new shipper and 
should not receive the automatic exemption. 
What if some, but not all, of the exporter's sales in the importing 
country occur at or below its shut-down point? The issue is whether 
the exporter's yellow-light and green-light sales608 should offset its 
red-light sales. Under the traffic-light system, the propetitioner bias 
in favor of finding large dumping margins by barring offsets is 
eliminated; offsets are permitted. 
Economists may object to making red-light dumping actionable 
because, as an empirical matter, predatory pricing does not occur 
very often.609 For example, "[r]ather than being predatory in moti-
vation, the low price in the importing country may be merely an 
attempt to meet the competition of local firms in the importing 
country ... [or] competition in the local market of some third-
country exporter."610 This objection misunderstands the proposed 
traffic-light system: The whole point of the system is to narrow the 
scope of antidumping law. In practice, foreign companies are often 
accused of predatory pricing. Typically, a foreign company is puz-
608. See discussion infra pan V.2-.3. 
609. See, e.g., DAM, supra note 29, at 169 (stating that "[a] review of cases in which 
dumping duties have been imposed will uncover few cases in which domestic firms have in 
fact been driven out of business" (foomote omitted)); Deardorff, supra note 29, at 35-36 
(noting that "economists have routinely dismissed predatory dumping as so unlikely that it 
should not be used to justify anti-dumping duties"); Hockman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 
161 (finding that "in practice cases of successful predatory dumping remain undocu-
mented" (foomote omitted)); PosNER, supra note 56, at 305 (noting that in the antitrust 
context "[c]onfirmed instances of predatory price discrimination were rare even before 
the practice was illegal"); see also Brenda S. Levine, Predatory Pricing Conspiracies After Matsu-
shita Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.: Can an Antitrust Plaintiff Survive the Supreme 
Court's Skepticism?, 22 INT'L LAw. 529, 537 (1988) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court, 
throughout its discussion of Matsushita, "expressed skepticism that a predatory pricing con-
spiracy could ever arise" (foomote omitted)). 
610. DAM, supra note 29, at 168. 
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zled by such an accusation, asking how it can be accused of dump-
ing when its U.S. prices are the same as or higher than the prices of 
its U.S. competitors. Interestingly, one economist explains that 
"[t]he truth of the matter is that predatory dumping by foreigners 
in the U.S. market is much less of a problem than predatory pro-
tectionists who use alleged dumping by foreigners as an excuse to 
obtain protection in the domestic market."611 
In addition, the phenomenon of multiple-benefit predation is 
sometimes observed in the antitrust context. Multiple-benefit pre-
dation "occurs when the predator predates in one situation, but 
stands to benefit in several."612 This phenomenon could occur in 
the antidumping context. For example, a foreign company might 
predatorially dump a product in only one market in which it com-
petes. In the other markets, the foreign company intends to intimi-
date rivals into maintaining, not cutting, their prices. Thus, 
multiple-benefit pricing is a signal emanating from the one market 
in which dumping occurs but is directed at competitors in other 
markets. The signal is designed to impose price discipline in those 
other markets. Finally, and more generally, even if undesirable 
behavior rarely occurs or leads to adverse results, it does not follow 
that a law against that behavior is unjustified. Infrequent violations 
may be a testament to the success of the law in deterring the 
behavior. 
A second objection that can be raised against making red-light 
dumping actionable is that even when predatory dumping does 
occur, the exporter may have to keep its price fairly low to discour-
age potential competitors from reentering the market.613 The 
exporter, in this scenario, would not necessarily reap monopoly 
rents; therefore, imposing an antidumping duty on it may not be 
justified. The defect in this objection is that it emphasizes price as a 
barrier to entry, where in fact many nonprice factors are potential 
barriers to entry. It is difficult to forecast the criteria by which 
potential competitors will make entry decisions. 
611. KRAuss, supra note 29, at 70-71. 
612. HoVENKAMP, supra note 61, at 306. 
613. See Deardorff, supra note 29, at 36 (noting that in order for predatory pricing to 
be successful, the predator must prevent reentry and that this is most easily done "by keep-
ing price fairly low"); Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 161 (noting that "even if all 
competitors worldwide were driven from the market, to be able successfully to exploit mar-
ket power over time, barriers to entry in the postpredatory phase must be present" (foot-
note omitted)); PoSNER, supra note 56, at 305 (discussing the costs of predation to the 
predator in the antitrust context). 
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A third objection posits that even if predatory dumping drives 
competitors out of the importing country, it may not eliminate 
other exporters from the market. 614 An exporter engaged in preda-
tory dumping will not necessarily become a monopolist; rather, it 
may face fierce competition from other exporters (assuming all 
exporters do not collude). Again, however, this approach lacks pre-
dictive power. Whether other exporters will remain standing after a 
sustained onslaught of dumping by one exporter cannot be known 
until after the battle. Moreover, this objection implicitly, and rea-
sonably, assumes that what should matter is competition, not the 
national identities of the competitors. But no country likes to see a 
domestic industry wiped out and supplanted by foreigner 
companies. 
Fourth, and finally, proving predation is difficult, particularly if 
the law demands evidence of intent. 
[G] iven that the principal theoretical rationale for [antidump-
ing] is the predation argument, one could argue that use of 
[antidumping] should be limited to such cases. Of course, it will 
be quite difficult to establish the .intent of the dumping firm. However, 
one could require that certain necessary conditions be met that 
are expected to be positively correlated with the possibility of 
predation. Market share and concentration ratios are obvious 
possibilities in this connection. For example, it could be 
required that firms that are dumping have x% of the global mar-
ket, and that there exist [sic] at least a concentration ratio for 
the global industry of y% .... [I]n practice market shares of 
countries facing [antidumping] investigations are often 
negligible.615 
To be sure, requiring direct evidence of intent is likely to be too 
difficult a standard for petitioners to meet. Indeed, there has been 
no prosecution under the Antidumping Act of 1916, which con-
tains an intent test. 616 One possible solution would be to admit cir-
cumstantial evidence of the exporter's motivation. Such evidence 
could pertain to objectively quantifiable factors, such as those sug-
gested in the above-quoted passage. The traffic-light system, how-
ever, dispenses with the problem of intent by making red-light 
614. See Deardorff, supra note 29, at 150. 
615. Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 177-78 (emphasis added) (foomote omitted). 
616. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1994); see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. 
Supp. 1190, 1243 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (stating that "despite its venerable age (64 years), [the 
1916 Act] is virtually a statute of first impression"); Kermit W. Almstedt, International Price 
Discriminatian and the 1916 Antidumping Act-Are Amendments in Order?, 13 LAw & POL'Y 
INT'L Bus. 747, 756-57 (1981); Roy L. Prosterman, Witholding of Appraisement Under the 
United States Anti-Dumping Act: Protectionism Or Unfair Competition Law?, 41 WASH. L. REv. 
315, 316 n.4 (1966). 
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dumping a strict liability offense. This resolution helps minimize 
uncertainty and narrows the scope of disagreement between a peti-
tioner and respondent. 
2. Yellow-light Dumping 
Is an exporter dumping if it sells its product in the importing 
country at a price somewhere in between its break-even and shut-
down points-at a price below its minimum average total cost but 
above its average variable cost? The answer is not clear. As dis-
cussed above, there are strong justifications for believing that, at 
least in the short-run, such yellow-light pricing is rational, not pred-
atory, and has no net adverse welfare effect.617 However, a counter-
argument can be made that if the exporter continues to price its 
product between the two critical points over a long period, it may 
be engaging in predation. If competitors are eliminated and the 
market becomes oligopolistic or monopolistic, the net welfare 
effect of yellow-light pricing would be negative. 
Because there are plausible competing explanations, a presump-
tion of predatory intent against the respondent is unjustified. 
Thus, in the event of yellow-light dumping, the DOC should issue a 
cautionary statement to the respondent, informing it that its pric-
ing strategy for the subject merchandise is nearing the point of red-
light dumping which, in turn, will trigger certain presumptions 
against the respondent. However, no lTC injury determination is 
made, no antidumping duties are imposed, and no deposits 
required. The investigation is terminated and the caution has no 
precedential value in a subsequent action. 
Suppose a respondent receives more than one caution within a 
short period of time; for example, within three years. In this case 
tougher action against the respondent is merited. One option is to 
require the respondent to submit cost and price information to the 
DOC so that it can closely monitor the respondent's pricing behav-
ior. A second option is to presume that the respondent is engaged 
in red-light dumping. 
It may be argued that this proposal will encourage petitioners to 
file yellow-light dumping cases in order to inject price uncertainty 
into the respondent's calculus. If the proposed yellow-light scheme 
does lead to bad-faith yellow-light petitions, the system could be 
tightened, perhaps by presuming that the first microeconomic 
617. See supra notes 342-350 and accompanying text. 
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explanation discussed above is correct-that there is no predation. 
In turn, only red-light petitions would be accepted. " 
3. Green-light Dumping 
Finally, is an exporter dumping when it sells in the importing 
country at or above its break-even point-at a price equal to or 
above its minimum average total cost? Clearly, the answer to this 
question must be negative; hence, this case is one of green-light 
dumping. Regardless of the relationship between the price of the 
subject merchandise and the price of the foreign like product, the 
respondent is acting in an economically rational manner. The 
respondent not only covers its ·total costs, but may also earn a 
profit. The only recourse for a producer in the importing country 
claiming harm from green-light dumping is to reduce its own cost 
structure to match that of the respondent.618 If the DOC renders a 
green-light dumping determination, the entire investigation is 
automatically terminated without an lTC injury determination. 
Thus, as in yellow-light dumping, a green-light dumping case is a 
one-step matter. As with the yellow-light case, no antidumping 
duties are imposed and no deposits are required. 
D. System Appraisal 
The central purpose of the traffic-light system is to limit the risk 
of protectionist abuse. By restricting the scope of actionable dump-
ing behavior, the traffic-light system makes antidumping law a less 
attractive, more difficult remedy to obtain. By classifying dumping 
behavior and attaching definite legal consequences to each cate-
gory, the law is simpler and less ambiguous than under the Agree-
ment or the Act. 
Of course, the traffic-light system does not solve every problem 
identified in Part IV. Important issues about the dumping margin 
calculation must be considered. For example, problems of cost 
allocation and start-up operations need to be resolved. Likewise, 
the adjustment and currency conversion, problems discussed in 
Part IV.B.8. supra, need to be addressed. Nor does the traffic-light 
system suggest possible improvements to procedural aspects of pre-
liminary and final determinations. Accordingly, the system is only a 
618. See PosNER, supra note 56, at 309-10 ("It can be argued that if U.S. industry is hurt 
when the Japanese firm is selling at a price equal to its marginal cost, it is a self-inflicted 
hurt, a hurt due to the failure of the U.S. firms either to minimize their costs or to com-
pete." (footnote omitted)). 
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partially complete first draft that attempts to distinguish the protec-
tionist abuser from the meritorious petitioner. 
Three issues are of particular significance.619 First, if red-light 
dumping is found, should there be an exception to the imposition 
of an antidumping duty if the dumped product is not made or is in 
short supply in the United States? A "no or short supply" exception 
would consider the interests of consumers in the dumped prod-
ucts. If the dumped product does not exist in the United States, or 
is in insufficiently short supply to meet domestic consumption 
needs, then 
the application of dumping duties to imports of that product 
only serves to punish U.S. industrial users, without providing any 
counterbalancing benefit to domestic producers. In this situa-
tion, there are only two true beneficiaries of the dumping 
duties: foreign suppliers, who can raise their prices in the U.S. 
market and earn windfall profits at the expense of U.S. indus-
trial users; and the downstream foreign competitors of the U.S. 
industrial users, who gladly find their American counterparts 
hamstrung by higher costs. The higher costs from antidumping 
duties have a serious adverse impact on the ability of U.S. indus-
trial users to compete in world markets and may ultimately 
translate into a loss of U.S. jobs.62° 
It is noteworthy that Canada and the European Union have a "no 
or short supply" exception in their antidumping laws. Their excep-
tions take the form of either a public interest test, whereby 
antidumping duties are not imposed if such imposition would be 
against the public interest, or a lesser duty rule, whereby the 
amount of the duty imposed is less than the dumping margin.621 
Alternatively, there may be a valid economic reason for not insti-
tuting a "no or short supply" exception. The point of imposing a 
duty is to level the competitive playing field and give the petitioner 
"breathing room" to reinvigorate its operations. 
[C]laims that the injured domestic industry should not be con-
cerned when it is unable to supply all or any of a particular item 
ignore the commercial reality of why companies stop producing 
or never start producing a particular item-expected inade-
quate return on investment. Without the correction of the price 
discrimination, domestic producers will not be able to make 
market-driven decisions about expanding production, reenter-
ing products where prior dumped pricing signals dictated mar-
ket exit. There is no realistic way to provide the market signals 
619. For a discussion of these issues in the context of post-Uruguay Round antidump-
ing law, see Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 503-11. 
620. Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 503. 
621. Id. 
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where products are exempted from payment of duty. Such a sys-
tem also would have the perverse effect of rewarding the most 
successful dumpers-those that have eliminated all domestic 
production of an item or prevented U.S. companies from ever 
commencing production.622 
Put simply, an antidumping duty does not eliminate supply from 
the U.S. market, but rather confers upon U.S. companies the 
opportunity to compete with fairly priced imports. A "no or short 
supply" exception would eliminate this opportunity. 
Second, if red-light antidumping duties are imposed on a 
respondent, should such duties be treated as a cost of doing busi-
ness in the United States and deducted from the EP when calculat-
ing the dumping margin? Consider a case where a U.S. importer of 
a dumped product is unrelated to the foreign producer or 
exporter of that product. If an antidumping duty is imposed on the 
unrelated importer, the importer has two choices. First, it may 
attempt to pass on all or a portion of the duty to its U.S. customer. 
Second, it may absorb all or a portion of the duty, essentially treat-
ing the duty as a cost of doing business. 
If the importer selects the first option, it loses some of its com-
petitive advantage over U.S. producers of the like product because 
the price of its product rises by the amount of the duty not 
absorbed. If the importer selects the second option, again, it loses 
some of its competitive advantage over U.S. competitors because its 
costs rise by the amount of the duty absorbed. This situation is to 
be contrasted with one in which the U.S. importer and its foreign 
supplier are related. If the importer chooses to absorb all or some 
of the antidumping duty, then relief for the U.S. producers of the 
like product is "artificially curtailed."623 "This result is due to the 
twin facts that the prices to the importer's customers have not been 
raised, or not raised sufficiently, and the importer is not a potential 
customer for the domestic producers. "624 In effect, the cost of the 
duty is allocated among two related companies on a nonarms-
length basis, and the price of the dumped product charged to U.S. 
customers does not rise to reflect payment of the duty. 
Interestingly, since 1986 the European Union has treated 
antidumping duties as a cost and deducted them from the EP.625 
The result is, of course, a larger dumping margin. The United 
622. !d. at 505. 
623. Id. at 506. 
624. Id. at 506-07. 
625. Id. at 508. 
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States has consistently rejected this approach.626 Instead, under the 
Act, during the second and fourth administrative reviews, the DOC 
will, upon request, consider whether a foreign producer or 
exporter sells a product through an affiliated importer in the 
United States that absorbs antidumping duties instead of eliminat-
ing the dumping.627 If the DOC makes an affirmative finding of 
duty absorption, it must inform the ITC, which may consider the 
finding in its sunset review to determine whether injury is likely to 
continue or recur.628 The dumping margin, however, is not 
affected by an affirmative finding.629 
Third, when red-light antidumping duties are collected, should 
the proceeds be given to the petitioner to enable it to invest in 
production improvements and worker training so that it can 
become more competitive? The emotional appeal of distributing 
the proceeds to those injured by dumping is powerful. Moreover, 
the economic reasons may be compelling. First, those injured by 
dumping are in the best position to utilize the proceeds for invest-
ment in physical capital, human capital, and other productive 
inputs. Second, potential respondents may feel additional pressure 
not to dump when they realize that duties imposed on them are 
transferred directly to their competitors. 
However, one problem with a scheme to channel the proceeds 
from antidumping duties to petitioners is that it may violate Article 
18.1 of the Agreement.630 That article states that antidumping 
duties are to be the exclusive remedy for dumping.631 Would the 
transfer of proceeds amount to a different remedy or merely a 
derivative of the imposition of duties? A second concern, and possi-
bly a more serious problem, is that the scheme may give rise to a 
countervailing domestic subsidy under Article VI of GATT 194 7 
and the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures.632 
626. See, e.g., MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 885 (stating that the Act is not to be inter-
preted to treat antidumping duties as a cost). 
627. See Act, supra note 23, § 221, 108 Stat. at 4865 (codfied at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) ( 4) 
(1994)}; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 885. 
628. See Act, supra note 23, § 221, 108 Stat. at 4865-66 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 1675(a)(4), 1675a(a}(1)(D) (1994)}; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 886. 
629. See MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 885. 
630. Holmer et a!., supra note 23, at 511. 
631. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 22. 
632. Holmer et a!., supra note 23, at 511. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Rethinking antidumping law was a responsibility of the Uruguay 
Round negotiators. They failed. They perpetuated a law filled with 
ambiguities surrounding the filing of dumping petitions, dumping 
margin calculations, injury determinations, anticircumvention, and 
reviews. They perpetuated a law incongruous with fundamental 
microeconomic precepts. The post-Uruguay Round regime, there-
fore, is at least as susceptible to protectionist abuse as its predeces-
sor. Sadly, antidumping law remains a major potential nontariff 
barrier to trade. The proposed traffic-light system is an effort at 
pragmatic reform. Its aim is to reduce ambiguity in the law, and 
infuse it with microeconomic logic. 
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APPENDIX A. PRE- AND PosT-URUGUAY RouND TERMINOLOGY 
AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Pre-Uruguay Round Term and 
Abbreviation 
Class or kind of merchandise 
subject to investigation 
Constructed Value (CV) 
Exporter's Sales Price (ESP) 
Department of Commerce (DOC) 
Foreign Market Value (FMV) 
International Trade Commission 
(lTC) 
Less Than Fair Value (LTFV) 
Like product 
Purchaser's Price (PP) 
Such or similar merchandise 
United States Price (USP) 
United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) 
Post-Uruguay Round Term and 
Abbreviation 
Subject merchandise 
Constructed Value (CV) 
Constructed Export Price ( CEP) 
Department of Commerce (DOC) 
Normal Value (NV) 
International Trade Commission 
(lTC) 
Less Than Fair Value (LTFV) 
Domestic like product 
Export Price (EP) 
Foreign like product 
No comparable term 
United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) 
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APPENDIX B. GRAPHS 
GRAPH A. 
AVERAGE CosTs; BREAK-EVEN & SHuT-DOWN PoiNTS 
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Quantity of Merchandise Sold 
GRAPH B. 
ToTAL, FIXED, & VARIABLE CosTs 
Quantity 
Variable 
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